
IMPERIAL AND POST-COLONIAL IDENTITIES: ZIMBABWEAN COMMUNITIES IN BRITAIN

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Abstract

This comparative study of Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain illustrates why they should not be viewed as reified communities with fixed essence, but as a product of ethno-racial identities and prejudices developed and nurtured during the phases of Zimbabwe's history. Through an analysis of personal interviews, participant observation, and secondary and primary sources, the thesis identifies and engages historical experiences which had been instrumental in not only constructing relations between Zimbabwean immigrant communities, but also their economic and social integration processes. The quest to recognise historic legacies on Zimbabwean immigrants' interactions and integration processes necessitated the first thematic chapter to engage the construction of ethno-racial identities in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial phases of Zimbabwe's history.

With contemporary literature on the Zimbabwean communities in Britain tending to create perceptions that Zimbabwean immigrants are a monolithic community of Blacks, the thesis' examination of inter-community relations between Blacks, Whites, Coloureds and Asians unveils Zimbabwean immigrants fragmented by historic racial and ethnic allegiances and prejudices. Examining education and employment as economic integration indicators has also facilitated the identification of historical experiences that have been influential in determining economic integration patterns of each Zimbabwean community. Intermarriage, language, religion and relations with the indigenous population were critically engaged to gauge the influence of historical socialisation on Zimbabwean communities' interaction with Britain's social structures.

While it is undeniable that colonial Zimbabwe was beset with a series of political and economic policies which set in motion salient racist discourses that inevitably facilitated the construction of racially divided diaspora communities, the thesis also unveils a Black diaspora community imbued with historic communal tensions and prejudices. By focusing on Black Zimbabwean immigrants, the thesis will not only be acknowledging an increase of Sub-Saharan Africans in Britain, but also offers an alternative perspective on Black British History by moving away from the traditional areas of study such as eighteenth century slavery and post-1945 African-Caribbean migration.

Exploring the dynamics of diaspora relations of the Shona and the Ndebele will expose how both the Nationalist Movement and the post-colonial government failed to implement nation building initiatives needed to unite Africans that had been polarised along ethnic lines. Black Zimbabweans therefore migrated as products of unresolved ethnic conflicts that had been developed and nurtured throughout the phases of Zimbabwe's history. In the absence of shared historic socio-economic or cultural commonalities within the Black community and between the Zimbabwean diaspora communities demarcated by race, the thesis will be tackling the key question: are Zimbabweans in Britain an imagined community?

Map of Post-colonial Zimbabwe



Source <http://www.mapsofworld.com/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-political-map.html#>

Acronyms

BSAC	British South Africa Company
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NDP	National Democratic Party
NUSZ	National Union of Zimbabwean Students'
ONS	Office of National Statistics
PF ZAPU	Patriotic Front Zimbabwean African People's Union
RPC	Rhodesians Pioneer Club
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADF	South African Defence Force
SDA	Seventh Day Adventist
SRANC	Southern Rhodesia African National Congress
UANC	United African National Council
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

Acronyms

ZANLA	Zimbabwean National Liberation Army
ZAPU	Zimbabwean African People's Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwean Peoples' Revolutionary Army
ZIMFEST	Zimbabwe Music Festival
ZPSF	Zimbabwe Pensioners Support Fund

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Words used interchangeably

Zimbabwe.....Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia

Zambia.....Northern Rhodesia

Nyasaland.....Malawi

Gukurahundi.....Matabeleland Civil conflict, Matabeleland Insurgency

Chronology of Zimbabwe's Key Historical Events

- 1838** Ndebele Kingdom in the west of what was to become Zimbabwe.
- 1857** Most major Shona chieftaincies subjects of the Ndebele.
- 1888** Ndebele king Lobengula signed the Rudd Concession.
- 1889 (October)** The Cecil John Rhodes' British South Africa Company granted the Royal Charter to annex and administer the territory of what was to become known as Zimbabwe.
- 1890 (September)** Pioneer column arrived in Salisbury Harare and raised the Union signalling the occupation of Mashonaland.
- 1893** Anglo-Ndebele war resulting in the occupation of Matabeleland.
- 1895 (May)** Name Sothern Rhodesia officially adopted by British South Africa Company.
- 1896 (March)** Ndebele uprising in Matabeleland.
- 1896 (June)** Shona uprising (First Chimurenga).
- 1923** Responsible Government succeeds the British South Africa Company.
- 1932** Land Apportionment Act came into effect.
- 1945** Post-war Influx of White settlers.
- 1953** Creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

- 1957** Formation of the first nationalist party, Southern Rhodesia African National Congress.
- 1958** Southern Rhodesia African National Congress banned.
- 1960** Formation of the National Democratic Party.
- 1961** National Democratic Party banned to be replaced by Zimbabwean African People's Union.
- 1962** Rhodesian Front wins election in Southern Rhodesia led by Winston Field.

ZAPU banned in September.
- 1963** Dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Zimbabwe African National Union formed on 8 August.

Both ZANU and ZAPU started sending recruits for military training in socialist countries.
- 1964** Ian Smith becomes Rhodesia's Prime Minister.
- 1965** Unilateral Declaration of Independence declared by Ian Smith on 11 November.

Sanctions imposed by Britain on selected Rhodesian products.
- 1966** Full embargo on Rhodesian trade imposed by British Government.

United Nations imposes oil embargo.

1968 United Nations imposes mandatory Sanctions.

1973 Zambia shuts its border with Rhodesia.

1975 Mozambique becomes independent and becomes base of ZANU. Liberation struggle Intensifies.

1979 Abel Muzorewa wins elections. The country is renamed Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The Nationalist movement did not recognise his win. The war intensifies.

1979 Lancaster House Agreement paving the way for democratic elections.

1980 Robert Mugabe' ZANU PF won election. Mugabe became the Prime Minister of a coalition government.

1982 Coalition collapsed. PF ZAPU leadership thrown out of government and others detained.

1982 Start of Gukurahundi (Civil conflict).

1983 Fifth brigade sent to Matabeleland to crush the insurgency.

1989 Unity Agreement between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU to form a new ZANU PF party with Mugabe as the leader and Joshua Nkomo his deputy.

1999 Formation of the Movement for Democratic Change political party marking

the first credible challenge to Mugabe's rule.

- | | |
|------------------|--|
| 2000 | Government defeated on draft constitution referendum. |
| 2000 | Invasions of White farms Zimbabwe. Exodus of White farmers. |
| 2000 | MDC gains nearly 50% of parliamentary seats in violence ridden elections. |
| 2002 | Mugabe wins presidential elections amidst violence |
| 2002-2008 | Targeted sanctions by the West on Mugabe's government and ruling party officials. |
| | Increased political violence on political opposition. |
| | Mass emigration intensifies. |
| 2008 | Inflation over 250 million per-cent. |
| 2008 | MDC wins parliamentary elections and Morgan Tsvangirayi wins first round of presidential elections. Mugabe wins the second round after political violence. |
| 2009 | Government of National Unity formed with Mugabe as president and Tsvangirayi Prime Minister. |

2013

Term of Government of National Unity ended.

Zimbabwe approves a new constitution.

Mugabe and his ZANU PF party win controversial presidential and
parliamentary elections.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

This study of Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain is set within the historiographical paradigms which do not only trace the history of immigration in Britain, but also the experiences of immigrants as they transform British society. Discourses on the transformation of Britain's demography from the nineteenth and twentieth century clearly illustrate how migrants from within Europe have been instrumental in Britain's social and economic evolution.¹

Migration historians identify the European migration trends between 1800 and 1945 to have been dominated by communities such as the Irish, Jewish, Italian, French and German. This historical focus on European immigrants' transformation of British society has not been restricted to the pre-World War Two era. Kathy Burrell's examination of migration and post-migration experiences of Greek-Cypriots, Polish and Italians in Leicester is part of migration historiography which also reveals how the contemporary diversity of the British population has been a product of post-war European migration.²

However, with fourteen per-cent being recorded as non-White in the 2011 UK census,³ the explanation of the ethnic composition of British society also lies in the transformative impact of the arrival of non-European communities throughout Britain's migration history. It is the immigration of people from beyond Europe's borders that paved the way for Africans to contribute to the transformation of Britain's demography. This thesis' examination of

¹ See, for example: Azadeh Medaglia *Patriarchal structures and ethnicity in the Italian community in Britain* (Aldershot: Ashgate. 2001), pp-73-79; David Cesarani (Ed) *The Making of modern Anglo-Jewry* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1990); Roger Swift and Sheridan Gilley (Eds) *The Irish in Britain, 1815-1939* (London: Pinter. 1989) Panikos Panayi *German immigrants in Britain during the nineteenth century, 1815-1914* (Oxford : Berg 1995); Kathy Burrell and Panikos Panayi (Eds) *History and Memories: Migrants and their History in Britain* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006).

² Kathy Burrell *Moving lives: Narratives of nation and migration among Europeans in post-war Britain* (Aldershot: Ashgate 2006).

³ Office of National Statistics, 'Ethnicity and National Identity in England and Wales 2011' available at <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-england-and-wales/rpt-ethnicity.html#tab-Ethnicity-in-England-and-Wales> (Accessed on 25th August 2015).

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Zimbabwean communities in Britain will therefore be complementing the emerging historiography of the Afro-British that has been exploring the experiences of African immigrants within British social and economic structures.

African migration to Britain should not be understood as a post-war phenomenon. There is archaeological and literary evidence that traces the longevity of Africans resident in Britain to the 'Romano-British period.'⁴ David Killingray affirms the early presence of Africans in the British Isles by identifying 'trading, raiding and slaving sea routes' as being responsible for bringing Africans especially from North Africa to Britain in the Middle Ages.⁵ Africans would arrive in a variety of roles mainly as seaman, slaves or manual labourers.⁶ The expanding maritime and slave trade allowed the trend to continue until the early nineteenth century when slavery was made illegal. The growth of the African immigrant population in Britain continued into the first half of twentieth century as illustrated by Table One below:

Table 1: Growth of African Population

Year	Estimated Population
1911	4 540
1921	4 940
1931	5 202
1951	11 000

Source: Killingray, 'Africans in the United Kingdom an Introduction' p.2

⁴ See for example: Paul Edward, 'The Early African Presence in the British Isles' in Jagdish Gundara and Ian Duffield (eds) *Essays on the History of Blacks in Britain* (Aldershot: Avebury 1992) p.9; Peter Fryer *Staying Power: the History of Black People in Britain* (London: Pluto. 1984) pp.1-32.

⁵ David Killingray (ed), 'Africans in the United Kingdom an Introduction' in David Killingray *Africans in Britain* (Ilford: Frank Cass.1994) p.3.

⁶ Ibid.

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Despite this early recognition of African diaspora history in Britain, Hakim Adi notes how current documentary evidence suggests that the early presence of Africans either as visitors or permanent residents can only be traced back from the sixteenth century.⁷ Killingray's assertion that the vast majority of Africans to arrive in Britain 'over the last 400 years were either non-literate or left no personal written record'⁸ can therefore not be ignored when exploring why African history in Britain is mainly restricted to the post-sixteenth century period. Without written sources it was inevitable for migration historians to face challenges in accessing African immigrants' personal or individual 'biographies, networks or communities' since their personal history would have been lost.⁹ It is only in recent decades that migration historians as alluded by Killingray have started to catapult personal or community experiences of early Africans from obscurity by using fragmented records of parish registers, newspapers or criminal records as sources.¹⁰

However, placing Africans in Britain's migration research as illustrated by a collection of essays in Killingray's volume *Africans in Britain*, by notable scholars on Afro-British history unravels a West African bias or those connected with slave or mercantile trade links. It was the Scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century, (in which the British were leading participants), that started the process of new forms of socialisation between the colonisers and the colonised indigenous communities which would influence future migration patterns of Africans who were not directly linked with slave mercantile trading. These were individuals from the elite community of students or businessmen who had the linguistic and literacy competency to interact with British socio-economic structures.

⁷ Hakim Adi, 'West Africans in the 20th Century' in Mark Christian (Ed) *Black identity in the 20th century: Expressions of the US and UK African diaspora* (London: Hansib. 2002) p.34.

⁸ Killingray, 'Africans in the United Kingdom' p. 5.

⁹ Ibid p.3.

¹⁰ Ibid p.5.

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With pre-emigration exposure to westernisation, it is therefore not surprising that publications by leading academics on Afro-British history, notably Anthony Kirk-Greene, Hakim Adi, John Hargreaves and Marika Sherwood unveil a confident and educated African community from the late nineteenth century by examining issues related to: African student communities or individuals, pan-Africanism, diaspora political activism and political refugees.¹¹ For example, Adi in his essay, 'West African Students in Britain, 1900-60: The Politics of Exile' chronicles pan-Africanist political activism of West African students in Britain. Maintaining the theme of Pan-Africanism, Adi further explores how refugee or asylum seeker migration statuses encouraged the development of Pan-Africanism within the exiles from the later decades of the nineteenth century into the twentieth century.¹²

However, despite the historiographical recognition of the presence of Africans in Britain since the Middle Ages, Panayi pointed out how they 'only counted a few thousand' in 1945.¹³ It was only after the end of World War Two when a new trend in Britain's immigration started to emerge with the arrival and permanent settlement of a significant number of non-European immigrants of which Africans were part. The majority of the non-European post-war arrivals as noted by Leo Lucassen were from Britain's colonies and former colonies in the West Indies, South Asia and Africa.¹⁴ The new post-war migration trends of non-Europeans had not only coincided with the collapse of the British Empire, but

¹¹ Collection of essays in Killingray's *Africans in Britain* by: Anthony Kirk-Greene, 'Doubly Elite: African Rhodes Scholars, 1960-90 pp.220-234; Hakim Adi 'West African Students in Britain 1900-60: The politics of Exile' pp.107-128; John Hargreaves, 'African Students in Britain: The Case of Aberdeen University' pp.129-144; Marika Sherwood, 'Kwame Nkrumah: The London Years' pp.164-194.

¹² Hakim Adi, 'African Political Thinkers, Pan-Africanism and the Politics of Exile, c1850-1970' in Stefan Manz and Panikos Panayi (Ed) *Refugees and cultural transfer to Britain* (Abingdon: Routledge. 2013) pp.143-171

¹³ Panayi, *An Immigration History of Britain*, p.23.

¹⁴ Leo Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850* (Illinois: University of Illinois Press 2005), p.23.

also Britain's demand for unskilled and unskilled labourers following its economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s.¹⁵

Migration scholars Joanna Herbert and Ceri Peach point out how the increase in Britain's non-European immigrant population in response to the economic boom was helped by pull factors linked to the Nationality Act of 1948.¹⁶ To ensure a guaranteed supply of mainly unskilled or semi-skilled manpower, the Act encouraged citizens from the New Commonwealth to settle and work in Britain, since the British government conferred citizenship on them.¹⁷ The new post-war phase in British migration had therefore provided the opportunity for Blacks to become more visible in the British population.

The impact of the arrival and permanent settlement of non-European immigrants with different social, cultural and physical characteristics to what the British had been accustomed to was recognised by migration scholars such as Avtar Brah, Zig Layton-Henry and Peter Fryer. Brah states how the post-war presence of Blacks and Asians added a new dimension in the dynamics of societal interactions by elevating 'culture, political and identity' differences.¹⁸ With culture and identity beginning to be significant influences in the construction of relations in a British society that was increasingly becoming racially diverse, stereotypes and prejudices naturally led to the development of doubts over whether the new non-European migrants would successfully fit into Britain's society. This was because the new arrivals as argued by Layton-Henry were perceived by the British as being inferior

¹⁵ Ibid., p.130.

¹⁶ See for example: Joanna Herbert, *Negotiating Boundaries in the City: Migration, Ethnicity and Gender in Britain* (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008) p.16; Ceri Peach, 'South Asian Migration and Settlement in Great Britain, 1951-2001', *Contemporary South Asia*, Vol. 15, (2006), pp.133-146.

¹⁷ Peach, 'South Asian Migration'.

¹⁸ Avtar Brah, 'The Asian in Britain', in N Ali, V.S Kalra and S Sayyid, (Eds), *A Post-Colonial People: South Asians in Britain* (London: C Hurst and Company, 2006), p.6.

to European immigrant communities which had dominated Britain's immigration landscape in the nineteenth and in the first half of the twentieth century.¹⁹

With reference to West Indians Fryer explains how two-thirds of Britain's White population had 'a low opinion of Black people or disapproved of them.'²⁰ They were seen as 'uncivilised, backward people inherently inferior to Europeans.'²¹ It was therefore an expected outcome that John Solomos' analysis of post-war legislation and public policies in his volume *Race and Racism in Britain* demonstrates how the new settlers found themselves experiencing racial exclusion in their attempts to establish their communities whilst interacting with Britain's economic and social structures.²²

It was this development of prejudices and stereotypical views of the non-European post-war immigrants that attracted academic interest exploring themes identified by Burrell as 'social integration and assimilation, race and racism, segregation and inequality, moving more recently into debates on multiculturalism and post-colonialism'.²³ These themes demonstrate how Britain's attitude to non-European immigrants had facilitated post-war migration research to be dominated by discourses exploring interactions between immigrant communities and their host society's socio-economic and political structures.

Migration scholars Tariq Modood, Joanna Herbert, Sarah Hackett and Lorna Chessum have developed arguments exploring the evolutionary nature of social and economic integration of the post-war non-European immigrants in the British society. They used integration indicators like employment, education or housing to determine Britain's receptiveness to

¹⁹ Zig Layton-Henry *The politics of immigration: Immigration, 'race' and 'race' relations in post-war Britain* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1992) p.28.

²⁰ Peter Fryer *Staying Power: the History of Black People in Britain* (London: Pluto. 1984) p.374.

²¹ Ibid.

²² John Solomos *Race and Racism in Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2003).

²³ Burrell, *Moving Lives*, p.1.

immigrants. Tariq Modood mainly refers to South Asians and West Indians, with limited reference to West Africans when exploring prejudices experienced by ethnic minorities as they attempted to settle.²⁴ Using Leicester as a case study, Joanna Herbert provides an insight on race relations mainly between South Asians and the indigenous white population²⁵ whilst Lorna Chessum complements research on South Asians in the city by examining how migration and settlement of the African Caribbeans from the late 1940s further transformed the city's racial demographics.²⁶

Sarah Hackett recognises the significance of cultural identities of immigrants in their integration processes by examining Muslim immigrant communities in Britain and Germany from the post-1945 era into the last decade of the twentieth century.²⁷ Hackett's comparative analysis of Muslims in two European countries demonstrates the evolving complexity in the experiences of non-European immigrants arriving with distinct cultural differences to most Europeans. Arriving with a way of life alien to most of Europeans made it an inevitable response as alluded to by Lucassen that religion gradually emerged as a significant component in determining their receptiveness to foreigners.²⁸

However, the majority of this academic attention on the post-war experiences of non-European immigrants in Britain tends to skirt discourses on the socio-economic integration of Africans, especially those from Southern Africa. This is despite a steady post-war increase of African immigrants in Britain. There was an inextricable link between decolonisation and

²⁴ Tariq Modood, *Ethnic Minorities in Britain diversity and disadvantage* (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1997).

²⁵ Herbert, *Negotiating Boundaries*.

²⁶ Lorna Chessum, *From immigrants to Ethnic Minority: Making Black Community in Britain* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).

²⁷ Sarah Hackett, *Foreigners, Minorities and Integration: the Muslim Immigrant Experience in Britain and Germany* (Manchester: Manchester University Press. 2013).

²⁸ Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat*, p.129.

an increase of Africans in Britain after World War Two. As the British Empire in Africa collapsed, Africans, as pointed out by Robert Dawson, joined other Commonwealth Immigrants from the West Indies and South Asia migrating to Britain.²⁹ The inevitable consequence was that the African population in Britain continued to grow throughout the 1970s and the later decades of the twentieth century with the arrival mainly of students and political refugees from both English and non-English speaking states.³⁰

Killingray illustrates how Africans by the end of the twentieth century had established themselves as a noticeable community of non-European migrants when he points that the 1991 census recorded over 207 000 residing in Britain.³¹ This was the census in which for the first time individuals were invited to record their ethnic origin. This trend of African migration into Britain continued into the twenty-first century as part of what Burrell describes as 'an increasingly globalised world.'³² The 2011 census affirmed the extent to which Africans have become a significant immigrant community within Britain's twenty-first century demography by recording 989 000, that is, 1.7% of the population in England and Wales as Africans.³³

By focusing on Zimbabweans in Britain as a case study, the thesis will not only be offering an alternative perspective on Black British migration history by moving away from the traditional areas of Black immigration study such as eighteenth century slavery and post-1945 African-Caribbean migration, but will also be acknowledging an increase of

²⁹ Robert Davison, *Black British: Immigrants to England* (London: Oxford University Press. 1966), p. 2

³⁰ Killingray, 'Africans in the United Kingdom', pp. 19-20.

³¹ Ibid. p.2.

³² Burrell, *Moving Lives*, p. 2.

³³ The Office of National Statistics, *2011 Census Analysis: Ethnicity and Religion of the Non-UK Born Population in England and Wales*: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census-analysis/ethnicity-and-religion-of-non-uk-born-population-in-england-and-wales--2011-census/rpt.html#tab-Ethnicity-of-the-non-UK-born-population-> (First Visited 20 October 2015).

contemporary Sub-Saharan Africans in Britain; especially those from its former colonies in Southern Africa. Examination of Zimbabweans as an African community in Britain is therefore a worthy study since it demonstrates that Africans are an immigrant community distinctive from West Indians.

Analysis on the diaspora Zimbabwean community also contributes to what can be perceived as a historiographical gap which tends to shy away from the interrelated impact of colonialism, nationalist movements and post-colonial governance on Africans in the diaspora. Erik Bleich is one of the few scholars to have explored the impact of colonial exposure to immigrants. His comparative analysis on how France's indirect rule policy on its colonies (that has been highly assimilationist) and Britain's indirect rule is an example of academic interest that presents arguments showing an inextricable link between colonisation and migrants socio-economic integration in their receiving society.³⁴

Choosing Zimbabweans in contrast to other African immigrants provides what Lucassen describes as 'some scope for the historical analysis of the course of the integration process.'³⁵ The thesis will demonstrate how the colonial era's socialisation by the British created the foundation for construction of identities and prejudices that mirrored that of the British. The diasporic Zimbabwean community would therefore not escape migrating with inherited social, economic and cultural backgrounds (biased toward the British way of life) that would be essential in mapping their integration processes as they settled in Britain.

Zimbabweans in Britain

³⁴ Erik Bleich, 'The Legacies of History? Colonisation and Immigrants Integration in Britain and France', *Theory and Society*, vol.34 (2005), pp. 171-195.

³⁵ Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat*, pp.115.


The Office of National Statistics (ONS) identified Zimbabweans as one of the African communities from African Commonwealth countries that have been adopting Britain as their first choice migration destination; a trend that continued into the new millennium.³⁶

The rapid rise of the Zimbabwean population in Britain illustrated by Figure One below demonstrates how Zimbabweans had always embraced Britain as a migration destination in both the colonial and post-colonial era. Zimbabwe's special relationship with its colonial master had always been cemented by what Robin Cohen identifies as ties of kinship, economic interdependence, preferential trade arrangements, sport, tourism, education and academic certification.³⁷

Figure One

³⁶The Office of National Statistics, *Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011*: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_346219.pdf (First visited 29 April 2015)

³⁷ Robin Cohen, *Frontiers of Identity 1994: The British and the others* (London: Longman, 1994), p .17



Sources: Office of National Statistics, 2011³⁸; and International Organisation of Migration, 2006³⁹

Even at independence in 1980, Cohen states how White Zimbabweans of British descent continued to cling to their passports as a means of affirming their British identity and hedging their political bets if they would be forced to migrate in the future.⁴⁰ For a majority of Blacks with no ancestral links with Britain, the distance between the two countries could not deter them from migrating. As a former colonial master that had economically benefitted from Zimbabwe's resources, there were perceptions within Blacks that Britain 'owed' them.⁴¹ Zimbabweans' migration to Britain in both the colonial and post-colonial era

³⁸ Office of National Statistics, *Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011* <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census-analysis/immigration-patterns-and-characteristics-of-non-uk-born-population-groups-in-england-and-wales/story-on-immigration-patterns-of-non-uk-born-populations-in-england-and-wales-in-2011.html?format=print> (First Visited 29 April 2015).

³⁹ International Organisation of Migration, *Zimbabwean Mapping Exercise, December 2006*, Available at http://unitedkingdom.iom.int/sites/default/files/doc/mapping/IOM_ZIMBABWE_MR.pdf (First Visited 29 April 2015).

⁴⁰ Cohen, *Frontiers of Identity*, p. 17.

⁴¹ Dominic Pasura, *African Transnational Diasporas: Fractured Communities and Plural Identities of Zimbabweans in Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp.43.

could therefore be classified into the following five categories: visitors, students, those with dual nationality or ancestral heritage, political asylum seekers and those on work-permits.⁴²

Social scientists and not migration historians have been the quickest in recognising the growth of the Zimbabwean community in Britain. Leading social scientists on Zimbabwean immigrants namely Alice Bloch, JoAnn McGregor, Dominic Pasura and Beacon Mbiba have been exploring inter-related themes which include: reasons for migration; socio-economic integration; diaspora activism of home politics; and transnationalism. Alice Bloch's paper 'Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives' provides a comparative analysis of Zimbabweans in Britain with those in South Africa by examining how the Zimbabwean community she describes as possessing a 'higher average level of qualifications' than other immigrants in their countries of settlement faced deskilling as they struggled to find employment suitable to their qualifications.⁴³

JoAnn McGregor also gives an insight into the economic integration of the Zimbabwean diaspora community in Britain by unveiling how the care sector had been the largest recruiter of contemporary first generation Zimbabweans determined to find employment so as to circumvent the trappings of immigrant poverty and meet their transnational obligations.⁴⁴ Beacon Mbiba reinforces the economic integration of Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain by identifying how blocked mobility in Britain's labour market persuaded some within the community to be entrepreneurial by opening businesses.⁴⁵

Dominic Pasura covers social aspects of the diaspora Zimbabwean community by exploring

⁴² Ibid pp.43-47.

⁴³ Alice Bloch, 'Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives', *Social Policy and Administration*, Vol. 40 (2006), pp. 67-87.

⁴⁴ JoAnn McGregor, 'Joining the BBC (British Bottom Cleaners): Zimbabwean Migrants and the UK care Industry' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 33 (2007), pp.801-824.

⁴⁵ Beacon Mbiba, 'Beyond Abject Spaces: Enterprising Zimbabwean Diaspora in Britain', *African Diaspora*, Vol. 4 (2011), pp. 50-75.

issues related to religious identities, changes in domestic gender roles, transnational engagements such as political activism in home politics and sending of remittances back home.⁴⁶

This academic research into Britain's Zimbabwean population has been significant, though not exhaustive. This is because: the emerging academic discussions tend to focus on Black Zimbabwean immigrants with very little, if any, acknowledgment of Whites, Coloureds (Mixed Race) and Asians. This limited academic attention on Zimbabwean minority communities in Britain by social scientists also mirrors the neglect of the historiography on colonial Zimbabwe. Whilst there has been detailed historiographical focus on construction of the White community in the colonial era, Coloureds and Asians failed to attract the attention of historians. This is despite Floyd Dotson and Lillian Dotson's volume 'The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi' recognising the emergence of the Asian community at the turn of the 20th century.⁴⁷

As for Coloureds, their early presence in Colonial Zimbabwe had been recognised by John Pape who pointed out that by 1930 1,138 Coloured children from White fathers had been enumerated by the colonial government.⁴⁸ James Muzondidya's 'Walking a Tightrope: Towards a Social History of the Coloured People of Zimbabwe' has also been an invaluable source in providing an insight into how this growing Coloured community constructed its identity amidst marginalisation in both colonial and then in post-colonial Zimbabwe.⁴⁹ Julie Seirlis' essay 'Undoing the United Front? Coloured Soldiers in Rhodesia 1939–1980' further

⁴⁶ Pasura, *African Transnational Diasporas*.

⁴⁷ Floyd Dotson and Lillian Dotson, *The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi* (London: Yale University Press. 1968).

⁴⁸ John Pape, 'Black and white: The "perils of sex" in colonial Zimbabwe', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 15 (1990), pp. 699-720.

⁴⁹ James Muzondidya, *Walking a Tightrope: Towards a Social History of the Coloured People of Zimbabwe* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005).

explores the extent to which Coloureds' participation in Rhodesia's military operations against the nationalist led liberation struggle was not only fully appreciated by the Rhodesian government, but it also carried the potential of undermining Coloureds' claim to citizenship in post-colonial Zimbabwe.⁵⁰ With each racial community migrating with a background of different historic experiences, the imported identities and prejudices of Zimbabwe's minority communities should therefore not be trivialised when seeking to understand the construction of relations and their integration processes.

Despite Shari Eppel's affirmation that contemporary Zimbabweans are still a product of prejudices, identities and unresolved conflicts of race and ethnicity rooted in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial events,⁵¹ much of the literature has also downplayed the presence of Zimbabwe's past when explaining ethnic or race relations between the Zimbabwean diaspora communities. Ethno-racial prejudices and traumas developed and nurtured during the phases of Zimbabwe's history facilitated the construction of memories and experiences that have been instrumental in defining how the diaspora communities of Zimbabweans interact with each other and with Britain's social and economic structures. By examining the ethno-racial relations and integration processes of Zimbabweans living in Britain the thesis will therefore be presenting an argument showing why diaspora communities from former colonial states should not be understood as a product of fixed

⁵⁰ Julie Kate Seirlis, 'Undoing the United Front? Coloured Soldiers in Rhodesia 1939–1980', *African Studies*, vol. 63 (2004), pp. 73-93.

⁵¹ Shari Eppel, 'Gukurahundi: The need for Truth and Reconciliation', in Brian Raftopoulos and Tyron Savage, (eds), *Zimbabwe Injustice and Political Reconciliation* (Cape Town: Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, 2004), p. 43.

essence but as the 'outcome of historical political and cultural processes through which the ideas of belonging come to be defined'.⁵²

The colonisation of Zimbabwe spearheaded by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) in September 1890 marked the start of socialisation processes in which community or individual identity constructions were to be based on racial superiority. Although the BSAC control of the territory was ended in 1923 when the British government granted self-governing colony status, historiography on Zimbabwe's colonial era illustrates the extent to which the granting of self-governing status motivated the White settlers to implement distinctive political policies based on racial prejudices.⁵³ Despite the British government reserving the right to veto the implementation of policies affecting the Black Africans, Jeffrey Herbst outlines how the British government never exercised its powers.⁵⁴ The ultimate consequence was increased White immigration as alluded to by Alois Mlambo.⁵⁵

The failure to restrain the self-governing colonial administration served to confirm that both the British and the settlers did not collectively care about the welfare of Blacks. This was demonstrated by the passing of legislation such as the Land Apportionment Act in 1930 that facilitated the removal of Africans from productive farming areas assigned to Whites; and the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934 that excluded Black Africans from definition of employee.⁵⁶ It was the creation of this exploitative and colonial environment based on a

⁵² JoAnn McGregor, 'The Making of Zimbabwe's New Diaspora', in JoAnn McGregor and Ranka Primorac, eds, *Zimbabwe's New Diaspora: Displacement and Cultural Politics of Survival* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), p. 6.

⁵³ See for example Reginald Austin, *Racism and apartheid in Southern Africa - Rhodesia: A book of data* (Paris: Unesco Press, 1975).

⁵⁴ Jeffrey Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1990) p.16.

⁵⁵ Alois Mlambo, 'Building a White Man's Country: Aspects of White Immigration into Rhodesia up to World War II', *Zambezia* Vol 25 (1998) pp.123-146.

⁵⁶ See Austin, *Racism and apartheid in Southern Africa*, pp.34-35, 63 ; Theodore Bull, *Rhodesian perspective* (London, Michael Joseph, 1967) pp.27-35.

racist discourse that was to provide the framework for future societal relations which were to be replicated during the colonial and post-colonial eras and exported to the diaspora.

Apart from race, ethnicity also emerged as a significant component used by the colonial administration to construct identities within African communities despite historiographical acknowledgment that colonisation did not invent the African ethnic groups. In support of the argument that tribal identities were a pre-colonial invention Gerald Chikozho Mazarire's essay, 'Reflections on pre-colonial Zimbabwe 850-1880s' presents pre-colonial Zimbabwe as a multi-ethnic society inhabited by people we refer to now as the Shona and Ndebele comprised of linguistic or sub-ethnic groups.⁵⁷ The Zezuru and Korekore (in what is now known as Mashonaland), the Manyika and Ndau (in present day Manicaland), and the Karanga (in the south-Masvingo) were the major linguistic groups who became collectively known as the Shona. However, the arrival of the Ndebele in Zimbabwe in the 1830s was to transform these pre-colonial Zimbabwe's demographics. The Ndebele had been once part of the Zulu nation and had been forced to migrate after altercations between their king, Mzilikazi and Zulu King Shaka. Pre-colonial relations between the Shona and Ndebele communities were to be characterised by conflicts which were to be exploited by the British.

On arrival in Zimbabwe the British were therefore confronted with an already multi-ethnic society of the Shona and Ndebele speaking communities divided by language dialects and loosely defined territories. Jeffrey Herbst points out how the British aggravated the ethnic split by reinforcing consciousness of ethnic differences through the creation of regional and

⁵⁷ Gerald Chikozho Mazarire, 'Reflections on pre-colonial Zimbabwe 850-1880s' in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo (eds), *A History From The Pre-Colonial Period to 2008* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009).

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administrative boundaries along ethnic lines.⁵⁸ Creation of ethnically named regions, primarily known as Mashonaland and Matabeleland, officially endorsed ethnic separation between the Shona and the Ndebele which fostered a sense of safety and belonging when among their own tribe. Reinforcing awareness of ethnic divisions had presented the colonial administration with a perfect environment to 'divide and rule' the Africans. By formally dividing the Africans the White administration was creating an awareness of ethnic identities which were to determine future relations between African communities.

By critiquing ethnic categorisation processes in colonial Zimbabwe the thesis will be complementing existing literature on the nature of British colonial rule on indigenous communities. This facilitates identification of any recurring pattern or political processes in Britain's approach to its colonies such as in British India. David McDermott Hughes' assertion that after the Zimbabwe natives' uprising in 1896-97, Whites pacified 'native polities, monopolising politics and the economy'⁵⁹ resonates with events in India after the mutiny in 1857. Ian Talbot presents an argument on how the British overemphasised historic communal differences to divide and rule Indians by reinforcing caste and religious stereotypes through census reports and army recruitment.⁶⁰

Whilst in British India the dislocation of the existing relationships was partly through the use of caste and religion in the decennial census from 1871,⁶¹ in Zimbabwe the sharpness of differences in society stemmed from the complementary effects of ethnically named geographical regions to officially sanctioned ethnic segregation. As Zimbabwe's ethnic communities (just like in British India) became aware of their numerical advantages,

⁵⁸ Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe* p.169.

⁵⁹ David McDermott Hughes, *Whiteness in Zimbabwe: Race, Landscape, and the Problem of Belonging* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.4.

⁶⁰ Ian Talbot, *Indian and Pakistan: Inventing the Nation* (London: Arnold, 2000) pp.22.

⁶¹ Judith Brown, *Modern India the Origins of an Asian Democracy* (Oxford: University Press, 1985), p. 158.

tensions were inevitable as they adjusted to their new identities thus allowing the infiltration of prejudices and allegiances which would inhibit future interactions.

Parallel to these internal initiatives of using geographical locations to reinforce awareness of ethnic divisions among the Africans, the colonial administration also elevated racial prejudices by officially categorising Zimbabwe's community into natives (Black Africans), Coloureds (Mixed Race), Asians (those of Indian origin) and Whites. The colonial administration's classification of the population was based on a hierarchical structure in which Whites were elevated to be masters, Coloureds and Asians occupying the second strand and Black Africans placed at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The racial hierarchical classification had therefore started a process of: consolidating identities based on race; allowing the implementation of policies in which race would be the main denominator in determining access to the country's wealth; and continuously reminding Black Africans that they were 'subjugated people' dependent on Whites.

The hierarchical racial categorisation of the population cannot be understood in isolation from June Ellis' assertion which points out how enacting colonial political legislation and socio-economic policies were usually driven by African myths characterising Africans as primitive, savage and trapped in 'ignorance, darkness and death'.⁶² This stereotypical thinking had emerged to be the driving force behind the racial categorisation, thus leading to the construction of what Ellis refers to as 'unbridled paternalism', built on the sense of civilising Africans.⁶³ Exposure of westernisation had therefore started a socialisation process of conditioning Africans to perceive the British way of life as a standard of civilisation. The

⁶² June Ellis, *Africans in Britain: A Meeting of Two Cultures* (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1978), p. 1.

⁶³ Ibid.

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consequence recognised in the thesis was the creation of Africans with identities which despised traditional values by elevating a European way of life.

Whilst the position of Whites allowed them to nurture racial superiority, the colonial racial categorisation of the population had also exposed Coloureds and Asians to potential marginalisation in a Black ruled independent Zimbabwe. Colonisation had deliberately placed Zimbabweans in an environment in which the ideologies of racism and tribalism would be germinated, nurtured and inevitably blossom. By exploring the multifaceted historical interludes of colonial racial segregation and ethnic prejudices the thesis will therefore establish why historic experiences developed during the colonial era should not be ignored when seeking to understand the construction of the Zimbabwean diaspora community.

Whilst it is undeniable that colonialism imparted serious problems to ethnic and racial relations in colonial Zimbabwe, the contribution of the nationalist movement cannot be omitted when analysing contemporary ethnic and racial relations within the Zimbabwean community. The dominant Zimbabwean nationalist movement's ideology that guided the prolonged liberation struggle for independence became 'bankrupt of ideas as it only succeeded in entrenching nostalgic thinking devoid of nation building in post-colonial Zimbabwe.'⁶⁴

The thesis will therefore establish that whilst the White community under colonial rule was unified by their White identity founded on racism and an idea of a nation which excluded the Black majority, the Black Nationalist movement had to contend with competing and often overlapping ethnic identity claims. The nationalist led struggle for independence

⁶⁴ Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'Dynamics of the Zimbabwean Crisis in the 21st Century', *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, Vol.3 (2003), pp. 99-134.

became embroiled in a series of ethnic conflicts between the Shona and the Ndebele. The thesis' interrogation of internal ethnic conflicts within the nationalist movement unravels how independent Zimbabwe was born with visible ethnic and racial conflict birthmarks that needed to be addressed in building a post-colonial national identity that would have formed the basis of diaspora relations.

Although the thesis recognises ethnic allegiances as being critical influences in the construction of diaspora relations within the Black community, there is a limited historiography on Zimbabwe's evolving internal ethnic relations in both the colonial and post-colonial eras. Despite the importance of ethnicity in creating national identities that influence communities' interactions, Enocent Msindo explains how Zimbabwean historians have been reluctant to critically engage the interaction of identity, ethnicity and nationalism in nation building.⁶⁵ Msindo's assertion has been affirmed by Brilliant Mhlanga who reveals how in post-colonial Zimbabwe any attempts to discuss ethnicity risked being labelled as 'tribalism' working against the creation of a united nation.⁶⁶ The perceived risk of politicisation and criminalisation when assessing the impact of ethnic relations in either colonial or post-colonial eras has inevitably undermined detailed assessment on post-colonial government initiatives in building a united nation.

The thesis will therefore capture how the construction of Zimbabwean personalities in Britain cannot only be explained as 'recent tragedies of colonialism'⁶⁷ but they also stem from the post-colonial initiatives to effectively deal with ethnic tensions between African

⁶⁵ Enocent Msindo, 'Ethnicity and Nationalism in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe: Bulawayo 1950-1963', *Journal of African History*, Vol.48 (2007), pp. 267-290.

⁶⁶ Brilliant Mhlanga, 'Ethnicity or Tribalism? The discursive construction of Zimbabwean national identity', Vol.11 *African Identities*, (2013), pp.47-60.

⁶⁷ William Ackah, 'Pan-African Consciousness and Identity: Reflections on the Twentieth Century', in Mark Christian, ed., *Black Identity in the Twentieth Century*, (London: Hansib Publication, 2002), p. 4.

communities and racial prejudices. At independence on 18 April 1980, the new government of Zimbabwe was beset with challenges of not only constructing a new united nation from the dungeon of colonial racial segregation, but also tactfully dealing with the significant and permanent boundary of ethnic polarisation between the minority Ndebele and the majority Shona oriented groups. Regrettably, just as it was during colonial rule, Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo express how 'in the era of post-colonial politics, the movement towards an unquestioned national identity was to prove to be a dangerous fantasy, one that could not conceal the faculties of ethnicity, class, gender and history'.⁶⁸ The absence of a clear, deliberate and effective mechanism to ensure ethnic or racial unity seems to endorse the argument which shows that the new nationalist Zimbabwean government measured its success with the replacement of minority rule with a Black led government.

The thesis' discursive construction of the Zimbabwean diaspora community reveals how early on into independence the nationalist government of Robert Mugabe undermined efforts to create a united Zimbabwe when it became embroiled in racial and ethnic conflicts.⁶⁹ The most notable was the outbreak of a violent civil conflict in Matabeleland (an Ndebele dominated region) after the Ndebele accused the Shona dominated government of marginalisation in military and civil service institutions and regional development. The politicisation of the conflict and criminalisation of the Ndebele by the Shona led government of Mugabe constructed and nurtured ethnic perceptions of resentment that were to be imported into the diaspora.

⁶⁸ Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, 'The Hard Road to Becoming National' in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, *A History from the pre-Colonial Period to 2008*, p. xvii.

⁶⁹ James Muzondidya and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'Echoing Silences: Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007', *African Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.2 (2007), pp. 257-297.

Whilst the colonisation of Zimbabwe irrevocably set in motion the construction of racial prejudices that cannot be ignored when exploring the socio-economic integration of the Zimbabwean community in Britain, the thesis recognises how the failure at independence to trigger an effective desensitisation of the colonial identities allowed the diasporic Zimbabwean community to migrate with identities and prejudices developed and nurtured in both the colonial and post-colonial era. Despite the positive post-colonial developments in gender equality, agriculture, education and health captured by Diana Auret, the first decade of independence became a decade of missed opportunities in crafting policies essential for the development of a more inclusive Zimbabwe.⁷⁰ It was during this era in which Zimbabwe was governed under the Lancaster House Agreement's Constitution signed in 1979, paving the way for a ceasefire and ultimately democratic elections in 1980. The thesis will establish how the provisions of the Constitution emerged to be a hindrance in the implementation of nation building initiatives essential in constructing a cohesive Zimbabwean immigrant community which rejected any colonial nurtured prejudices or identities.

The Lancaster House Constitution incorporated a series of compromises and political rights of the minority White community.⁷¹ The most notable compromise was introducing a two tier electoral system to allay the fears of the Whites on how a Black led government was to address the colonial injustices. Whites were guaranteed a political voice in post-colonial Zimbabwe's parliament by reserving twenty seats during the first decade of independence. However, the thesis will establish how a significant number of Whites could have used this as an opportunity to cling to the social and economic benefits they had inherited from the

⁷⁰ Diana Auret *A Decade of Development: Zimbabwe 1980-1990* (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1990).

⁷¹ Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 'The Hard Road to Becoming National', p. xxviii.

colonial era. This led to the reinventing and reinforcing of racial prejudices, whose impact resonates in interactions within multi-racial Zimbabweans residing in Britain.

A holistic understanding of the debate on inter-personal interactions between the Zimbabwean communities in Britain and with Britain's socio-economic structures could not have been fully appreciated without the thesis' analysis of the impact of farm invasions on the White community at the turn of the new millennium. The experience of not being able to protect their businesses or properties did not only highlight White Zimbabweans' vulnerability to Zimbabwe's nationalist violent attempts to resolve colonial injustices, but it also endorsed the stripping of their citizenship rights that would have guaranteed protection of their properties by politicians or the police.

Emigration had therefore emerged to be the only viable option that would potentially give White Zimbabweans opportunities to pursue economic integration processes to guarantee future socio-economic stability for themselves and their children. As immigrants, the thesis will establish how relations with other Zimbabweans (especially the Black community) and their economic integration would therefore be driven by a consciousness of the violent seizure of their properties in Zimbabwe which had robbed their children of their inheritance. The bitterness of the circumstances surrounding their immigration facilitated the reincarnation of a Rhodesian national identity that became a hindrance to both interactions with other Zimbabweans and their social integration.

Examining ethnic or racial relations within the Zimbabwean community in Britain helps to find answers to the questions: 'how far has colonialism and post-colonial governance influenced the construction of a visible community in Britain?;' and 'to what extent did Zimbabwe's prolonged period under colonial rule influence identity construction of

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Zimbabweans in the Diaspora?’ Addressing these questions is essential in evaluating the impact of unresolved historic conflicts of racism and ethnicity on those in the diaspora.

Zimbabweans in the diaspora have imported racial or ethnic personalities or prejudices constructed either during colonialism or the post-colonial era and they are now being (or have been passed) from generation to generation, thus influencing community relations and socio-economic integration patterns. The thesis therefore aims to make a contribution to the historiographical void by assessing whether the multiracial Zimbabwean community in the diaspora are a product of identities constructed in the colonial and post-colonial eras. The historical influences would be measured by two processes that would be examined in the thesis. The first one will be the level and nature of interactions between the diaspora communities demarcated by race and ethnicity. Secondly, it will be a comparative analysis of the communities’ economic and social integration patterns.

Thesis Outline

In developing the argument that explores the impact of historically developed identities and prejudices on the diaspora communities’ relations and socio-economic integration processes, the thesis consists of three thematic chapters which are chronologically structured. The chronological structure of the thematic chapters traces the progression of the development of ethno-racial identities and prejudices in the three phases of Zimbabwe’s history: pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial.

Divided in three sections, the first thematic chapter (that is, chapter two) forms the basis of historical debates exploring the influence of the historical socio-economic and political systems on the processes of creating a Zimbabwean national identity. The first section

examines the pre-colonial origins of Shona-Ndebele tensions which formed the basis of ethnic allegiances in subsequent generations and the implementation of a 'divide and rule' agenda by the colonial administration.

The chapter's second section exposes how race and ethnicity as identities promoted by the colonial administration and within the nationalist movement served to create boundaries and 'dichotomies' that were to demarcate mental spaces of Zimbabweans as they negotiate forging interactions.⁷² The evolving way of thinking during the colonial era entrenched in the hierarchical categorisation of the population had legitimised the recognition of the Africans as an inferior species who owed their existence to the civilising mission of the colonisers. It was this stereotypical thinking within the White community which activated the nationalist movement, ravaged by internal ethnic and regional conflicts, to spearhead the struggle of natives against racial injustices perpetuated by the colonial administration. However, the disunity within the nationalist movement had devastating consequences on nation building in post-colonial Zimbabwe whose impact was not to be confined within Zimbabwe's borders but was to extend to diaspora communities.

As the euphoria of 1980's Independence and hope of prosperity subsided, it is undeniable that the Shona dominated new government of Robert Mugabe faced insurmountable challenges in its attempts to build a united nation ravaged by racial injustices and ethnic divisions. The chapter's third section will therefore examine how the roots of ethnic and racial relations which were to characterise the Zimbabwean communities both in Zimbabwe and in the diaspora cannot be divorced from how the new government communicated its nation building policies to its citizens. The section also captures how the first decade of

⁷² Anias Mutekwa, 'Gendered Beings, Gendered Discourses: the Gendering of Race, Colonialism and Anti-Colonial Nationalism in Three Zimbabwean Novels', *Social Identities*, Vol.15 (2009), pp.725-740

independence turned out to be characterised by missed opportunities in reconciling the nation. The 1980s violent civil conflict, marginalisation of Coloureds and Asians in the political processes, and the continued economic dominance by Whites, reinvented and reinforced ethnic and racial divisions. The discussion of the reincarnation of post-colonial ethnic and racial divisions allows the thesis to identify imported memories of experiences that have been influential in the construction of community relations and socio-economic integration processes of the settled Zimbabwean communities in Britain.

By exclusively focusing on Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain, chapter three critically explores the impact of colonialism and post-colonial governance on the construction of relations within a racially and ethnically diverse community. The chapter will also recognise that the construction of Zimbabwean immigrant communities in Britain should not be solely analysed as a contemporary phenomenon. Britain's efforts to assist Black African students and political instability were contributory factors which also led to the rise of a multi-racial Zimbabwean immigrant community that peaked in the 1970s.

In recognition of Zimbabweans who migrated during the colonial era, the chapter's colonial immigration section briefly explores the extent to which homeland influences of racial discrimination and the activities of the national movement were significant factors in construction of community relations. Although colonial emigration was undertaken by all racial communities, the chapter will establish how the Black student community emerged to be the most visible. By virtue of being the largest and the most recognisable community during the colonial era, this chapter's comparative analysis will be largely biased towards the Black community.

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After a brief examination of homeland influences on the Zimbabwean immigrant community of the 1970s, the chapter will turn its focus to the contemporary community. The post-colonial section will develop a narrative that reveals the extent to which contemporary diaspora relations stem from the failure of post-colonial initiatives to effectively deal with historic ethnic tensions and racial prejudices

In exploring the dynamics of ethnic and racial interactions between the Zimbabwean communities each racial group will be discussed separately. Tackling the racial communities separately facilitates a comparative analysis of the reasons for migration and the extent of the impact colonial and post-colonial memories on different racial or ethnic groups. To avoid oversimplification in defining relations between Black Zimbabweans, the chapter will also examine the impact of historical experiences which were transmitted through different ways in the diaspora Shona and Ndebele communities.

Chapter four presents a critical perspective revealing how Zimbabweans' interaction with Britain's economic and social structures mirrors the identities, prejudices and experiences developed and nurtured by Zimbabwe's colonial and post-colonial past. The chapter's section analysing the economic integration of the diaspora Zimbabwean communities focuses on historical influences on education, nature of employment and entrepreneurship. The historical influence on language proficiency, religion and inter-marriage will be examined in the social integration section of the chapter.

In recognition of the racial and ethnic diversity of the Zimbabwean immigrant community, the chapter adopts a comparative analysis between the Shona, Ndebele, White, Coloured and Asian communities. Since these communities do not have shared or similar historic experiences, analysing each community separately allows the chapter to not only identify

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the reasons why integration processes differ between the communities, but also evaluates the impact of integration processes on each community.

After having explored the complex process in the construction of a Zimbabwean community in Britain, the concluding chapter provides a detailed comparative analysis showing the inextricable link between the construction of a diaspora Zimbabwean community and historical, social, political and economic systems. By assessing the impact of ethnicity and race on community relations, the thesis' conclusion will provide a critical perspective showing how imported historical memories of racial superiority, jealousy, mistrust and suspicions have undermined the construction of a national identity in Britain. It is this fragmentation of the Zimbabwean community identified in the conclusion chapter which triggers the question; Does a Zimbabwean diaspora community exist in Britain?

Methodology

To facilitate a detailed analysis on the impact of historical experiences on Zimbabwean's minority immigrant communities, the main part of the dissertation's findings were extracted from interviews with thirty-nine Blacks, eight Whites, seven Coloureds and five Asians. The racial mixture of the interviewees differentiated by gender, age and educational or professional qualifications illustrated in Table Two below provided an adequate cross-section of views on the relationship between colonial and post-colonial legacies on the construction of interactions between Zimbabwean immigrant communities and their socio-economic integration processes. Use of interviews therefore enabled the research participants to have what Brian Roberts described as a voice to interpret their historical life

memories⁷³ that would have been developed and nurtured during the colonial and post-colonial phases of Zimbabwe's history.

Table 2: Distribution of Interviewees by Race, Gender, Age and Country of Residence

	Race of Interviewees				Total	
	Blacks	Whites	Coloureds	Asians	Number	%*
Gender						
Males	25	5	3	4	37	63
Females	14	3	4	1	22	37
Age Range (Years)						
20-29	6	2	1	1	10	17
30-39	10	1	0	0	11	19
40-49	10	2	1	0	13	22
+50	13	3	5	4	25	42
Country of Residence						
Britain	36	8	6	4	54	92
Zimbabwe	3	0	1	1	5	8
Migrants' Era of Permanent Residence in Britain						
Colonial	2	0	1	1	4	7
Post-Colonial	34	8	5	3	50	93

*Percentage rounded off to nearest whole figure

Before the interview process had commenced it was imperative to explicitly recognise any of my potential prejudices or pre-suppositions that would have compromised the thesis' partiality. A conscious effort to set pre-suppositions aside had to be made so as to allow

⁷³ Brian Roberts, *Biographical Research* (Buckingham: Open University, 2002), p. 105.

being 'surprised by findings'⁷⁴. This was because: like most researches, the research topic was constructed from what Bruce Berg identifies as the researcher's oriented position influenced by knowledge of historical events or the researcher's past experiences.⁷⁵ My personal tragedy of having a parent killed by the Rhodesian security forces in 1978 and exposure to post-colonial media propaganda had the potential of blurring objectivity when conducting the research. It was therefore imperative that the interview process would ensure that my past experiences would not distort the interview process by viewing participants as human subjects to be manipulated to justify historically constructed pre-suppositions or prejudices.⁷⁶ Special attention had to be given to minimise the risk of premature ending of interviews. This was done by avoiding the use of prejudicial language or questions which participants could interpret as insensitive, personal and hypothetical.

To maintain a 'façade' of neutrality or objectivity that undermines my prejudices and suppositions, care was taken in regularising the interview process through four approaches: the sampling of interviewees; research design; the choice and construction of interview questions; and addressing the ethical issues. This approach did not only minimise the influence of presuppositions when interpreting data sourced from oral accounts, but also facilitated an interview structure to be devised that allowed both the interviewer and the participants the opportunity to interchange views in an informal way whilst not deviating from the core aims of the research. My historical experiences and knowledge of the internal dynamics of relations between Zimbabwean communities assisted in the development of

⁷⁴ Nigel King, 'The Qualitative Research Interview' in Catherine Cassell and Gillian Symon, *Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research A Practical Guide* (London: SAGE Publications, 1994), pp. 31.

⁷⁵ Bruce Berg, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*, (London: Pearson. 2004) pp.155-156.

⁷⁶ Bob Mathews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for Social Sciences*, (London: Pearson Education, 2010), pp.225-226.

interactive, flexible and informal interview sessions especially when interviewing Ndebele, Whites, Coloureds and Asian minority communities.

It would have been naïve for the interview process to ignore the potential challenges posed by the diverse nature of historical experiences between Zimbabwe's ethnic communities. The diaspora community, reflecting Zimbabwe, was still fractured along ethnic or racial lines with restricted interactions of the communities. The 1980s civil conflict had caused a significant number of the Ndebele to migrate with a separatist attitude from the Shona, whilst a majority of White Zimbabwean immigrants still harboured a sense of racial superiority developed and consolidated during the colonial era. However, regardless of these potential challenges, it was essential to identify ways of accessing potential participants reflecting the ethnic and racial diversity of the Zimbabwean diaspora community.

To circumvent the potential challenges, potential participants were initially drawn from those with whom I had an established rapport. These were acquaintances I had consulted during my MA research on the Zimbabwean and Somali communities in Leicester and those from everyday life interactions drawn mainly from family members, my local church, and former work colleagues.⁷⁷ It was from this initial pool of acquaintances that a network of potential interviewees was established thus initiating snowballing as more participants were identified. Being introduced to potential participants by already known contacts not only established a rapport prior to interview, but it also allowed individualisation of interviewing techniques with the hope of encouraging participants to confidently narrate their life experiences, especially on issues related to race or ethnicity.

⁷⁷ Christopher Roy Zembe, 'A Comparative Study on the Integration of Culturally Diverse Zimbabwean and Somali Communities in Leicester' unpublished De Montfort University MA thesis, 2012, pp. 76-79.

Using known contacts to identify potential interviewees also facilitated a more meaningful sampling process of identifying potential participants that was not too random to the extent of undermining the core aims of the research. This was because: advice from acquaintances was invaluable in identifying individuals who had the potential of contributing positively to the research as advised by Berg.⁷⁸

The racial profile of the interviewees shown in Figure Two in which Blacks are the overwhelming majority was (and is still reflective) of Zimbabwe's population. At independence, Blacks' share of the overall population was 97.6%; those of European descent at 2.1%; Coloureds at 0.3%; and Asians 0.2%.⁷⁹ The Zimbabwe Statistical Agency's statistics of the last census taken in 2012 showed the White population to have diminished in size to less than 1% of the overall population whilst the Black African population rose to 99.7%.⁸⁰ The violent evictions of White farmers from their farms were undoubtedly a contributory factor to the decline of the White population. The only minority communities which essentially maintained their overall share of the population were Coloureds and Asians. Just as it was at independence, they remained at less than 1% of the population.

⁷⁸ Berg, *Qualitative Research Methods*, pp.112.

⁷⁹ Lucy Mazingi and Richard Kamidza, 'Inequality in Zimbabwe', in Herbert Jauch and Deprose Muchena (Eds), *Tearing us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa* (Johannesburg: Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 2011), p. 326.

⁸⁰ Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency, Available at *Zimbabwe Population Census 2012* http://www.zimstat.co.zw/dmdocuments/Census/CensusResults2012/National_Report.pdf (Accessed on 9 April 2015).

Figure Two.





Figure Three



The ethnic diversity of the Black interviewees shown in Figure Three above is also reflective of the demographics in Zimbabwe. Historically, the Shona has been the dominant Black community with an approximate share of the population of 80% with the Ndebele being the second largest ethnic community at approximately 15%.⁸¹ The dominance of the Shona community who regarded themselves as the true natives of what was to be known as Zimbabwe had been the source of historic tension with the Ndebele. Reflecting on my position as a Shona, the interview process was therefore to be conducted in a way in which interpretation of the collected data of the minority Ndebele group would not be a product of what Nigel King describes as the 'researcher's prejudices and prior expectations.'⁸² As a member of the majority Shona these prejudices and expectations would have been consciously or subconsciously developed by historical events that defined relations between the two African ethnic communities.

As shown in the bibliography, the interview process had to be reflective of the uneven dispersal of the Zimbabwean population throughout Britain. This was essential in constructing a comparative discourse on how Zimbabweans in different British locations are constructing economic or social interactions with their host society and between themselves. Informal discussions with other Zimbabwean immigrants and the 2011 *Office for National Statistics'* census, showing regional distribution of Zimbabweans in the UK, assisted in identifying areas with a higher concentration of Zimbabweans.

The interviews were conducted in contrasting public and private spaces. Participants' workplaces in cafes, canteens, and Church buildings were public spaces utilised in the

⁸¹ Saliwe Kawewe 'Social Welfare of Indigenous Peoples in Zimbabwe', in John Dixon and Robert Scheurell(Eds), *Social Welfare with Indigenous Peoples* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 280.

⁸² King, *Qualitative Research*, p. 31.

research process, whilst offices and homes provided the private spaces. Within the comfort of their private spaces, participants assumed some control of the environment which was a way of undermining perceptions that they are taking part in a controlled experiment. This was because interviewing participants in what they perceived as a secure private environment crucially facilitated the nurturing of mutual relationships with the participants necessary for the discussion of sensitive racial, ethnic or political issues.

Interviewing people within the confines of their homes also provided a platform on which participants' everyday cultural identity norms were unconsciously expressed through the language spoken to other family members (present as non-participants) and the greeting procedures on arrival by both adults and children. Observing how participants' families interact or behave in the presence of a guest was essential in determining the extent to which imported historic influences have been significant catalysts in Zimbabweans losing their traditional cultural identities as they integrate into the British way of life.

Although it is undeniable that interviewing is an integral research method that captures immigrants' homeland stories and experiences that cannot be obtained in any other way, there are some historians who still view oral history with suspicion.⁸³ Since individual memory is a crucial component in oral history's reconstruction of the past, reliability of personal narratives can be compromised when interviewees deliberately alter past events so as to justify their contemporary way of life.⁸⁴ This is because human memory would tend to be selective when reconstructing and interpreting historical life experiences.

⁸³ As noted by Kathy Burrell and Panikos Panayi 'Immigration, History and Memory in Britain' Kathy Burrell and Panikos Panayi (Ed) *History and Memories: Migrants and their History in Britain* (London, Touris Academic Studies, 2006) p.14.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

Safeguarding reliability and validity was therefore an anticipated challenge when conducting interviews within a Zimbabwean community that had been grappled with memories of historic ethnic or racial mistrust and suspicions. In trying to justify contemporary behaviour or attitudes intrinsically linked to historical events, there was always the potential that what interviewees say may be different from other historical sources thus undermining their validity as historical evidence.

While it was conceivable that the interviewees' re-collection of historical events having an impact on their life experiences would have been correct, the validity of the information they narrated still had to be properly validated. The mechanism of validating information from the participants was based on Alice Hoffaman's assertion that a high degree of conformity between the oral historic reports of the events and the event itself as recorded by other historical sources provides credibility to the interview process.⁸⁵ To ensure the credibility of the participants' historical accounts, it was therefore essential to continuously validate information acquired during interviews against a range of other oral accounts, and primary and secondary historical sources.

To further minimise the thesis' conclusions based on subjective personal opinions, observations were also conducted to assess the reliability of the oral accounts describing how Zimbabweans of different ethnic, racial or social class background interact with each other. The observations were carried out according to what Roy Horn describes as 'unobtrusive observation' where the participants were unaware that they were being observed.⁸⁶ Over a period of six consecutive fortnightly meetings, observations were carried

⁸⁵ Alice Hoffaman, 'Reliability and Validity in Oral History' in David K Dunaway and Wila K Baum, eds, *Oral History: An Interdisciplinary Anthology* (London: SAGE Publications, 1996), p. 89.

⁸⁶ Roy Horn, *Researching and Writing Dissertations: A Complete Guide for Business and Management Students*, (London: Chartered Institute of Personnel Development, 2009), p. 129.

out on a Leicester based Asylum Seekers and Refugee Support Group. These observations were complemented by observing inter-ethnic interactions between Zimbabwean members of a Leicester based church.

Although the observed church was not a home grown Zimbabwean church, the demographics of the Zimbabwean congregants were essential in analysing the patterns of interaction. Statistically, both the Shona and Ndebele were adequately represented in the church, although the Ndebele were slightly in the majority. The membership demographics in the church were in contrast to most Zimbabwean home grown churches where those from the Shona community were usually the majority.⁸⁷ Revelations from both observations did not only assist in evaluating the reliability of the oral accounts on how Zimbabweans interact, but they also assisted in the compilation or modification of interview questions needed to clarify the recurring patterns of behaviour or interactions within the observed groups.

In support of Rutledge M Denis' suggestion, interview questions were not 'abstractly' constructed.⁸⁸ A combination of personal historical memories and experiences, and utilisation of colonial and post-colonial data from secondary and primary sources proved to be invaluable in the drafting of the interview questions. The interview questions were semi-structured around the themes of colonial and post-colonial era, migration and settlement, diaspora interactions and transnational links.⁸⁹ The semi-structured themed questions allowed participants to talk 'in the way that is meaningful to them, in a language that is not

⁸⁷ Zembe, 'A Comparative Study', pp.131-132.

⁸⁸ Rutledge M Denis, 'Participant Observation' in Jon Stanfield, (ed)., *Race and Ethnicity in Research* (London: Sage, 1993), p. 64.

⁸⁹ See Appendix 1 p.355.

imposed by questionnaire.’⁹⁰ Adopting a thematic approach when drafting the questions facilitated an informative exchange of views on sensitive issues such as those related to ethnicity. This allowed systematic and consistent critical evaluation on how the interview sessions were progressing in relation to the research’s aims and objectives.

When discussing post-colonial events, the participants were occasionally allowed to digress within the framework of the research’s theme of post-colonial governance. The digression was invaluable in assessing the level of frustrations Zimbabweans in the diaspora and those resident in Zimbabwe have against the Zimbabwean government. Allowing the participants to digress encouraged responses as it assured the participants that their opinions are respected and they are not being manipulated by the research process. One of the intended aims during the interview sessions was to always allow the researcher not to be perceived by participants as ‘merely interested in facts’ but as a means in which they can express their views on life’s experiences and what constructs their identity.⁹¹

Interviews can be a flexible tool for data collection that involuntarily enable ‘multisensory channels’ of communication to be used in interpreting information provided by interviewees. Louis Cohen, Lawrence Manion and Keith Morrison identify ‘verbal’ and ‘non-verbal’ cues as one of the most essential multisensory channels of communication during interview sessions.⁹² Interpretations of verbal and non-verbal cues did not only help to evaluate the progress of the interview session, that is, if the interviewees were still engaged with the interview session, but they also helped to identify the level of importance interviewees place on specific life experiences.

⁹⁰ John Griffiths, ‘Research and Religion’ in Laura Marks (ed.), *Qualitative Research in Context* (Henley-on-Thames: Admap Publications, 2000), p. viii.

⁹¹ Roberts, *Biographical Research*, p. 106.

⁹² Louis Cohen, Lawrence Manion and Keith Morrison, *Research Methods in Education* (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 409.

Interpretations of the verbal and non-verbal cues when interviewing a Zimbabwean community whose history was punctuated by episodes of ethnic or racial tensions allowed flexibility to the interview sessions. In some instances, interview sessions had to respond to the cues by modifying the interview questions or constructing follow-on questions to elicit responses on sensitive issues which would have been communicated via the cues. This flexibility made it possible to meet the interviewees in their own world rather than from abstraction and general opinions.⁹³ As a consequence, interpretation of these cues became an invaluable asset when discussing the sensitive issues mainly related to the impact of the 1980s civil conflict on the Ndebele community. The verbal and non-verbal cues from a significant number of Ndebele participants allowed what Mathews and Ross refer to as 'unanticipated' sensitive explanations to emerge and be explored.⁹⁴ Probing sensitive issues picked up from the cues therefore provided a platform for both the researcher and the participants to sensitively analyse the impact of ethnic mistrust and suspicions on the Zimbabwean community in Britain.

A group interview session of Zimbabwean youths aged between 21 and 28 years was also conducted to either complement or counter the information acquired from adult Zimbabweans' oral accounts. These were young Zimbabwean adults who were born after Zimbabwe's independence and would not have experienced or witnessed the political processes or historical events influencing the shaping of community relations or integration processes in the diaspora. To extract relevant information by encouraging collective discussion from young Zimbabweans who might be ignorant of Zimbabwe's history, it was essential to adopt a dual-method approach as a means of soliciting effective participation.

⁹³ King, 'Qualitative Research Interview', p. 14.

⁹⁴ Mathews and Ross, *Research Methods*, p. 219.

Prior to the group interview, the youths were asked to complete a simple questionnaire. The aim was to put them at ease, thus boosting their confidence to participate in the group interview.

A questionnaire entitled 'What Makes You Zimbabwean?' was deliberately constructed to assess the extent to which their awareness of Zimbabwe's history and knowledge of Zimbabwean cultural heritage is impacting on how they construct their identity and relations with other Zimbabweans.⁹⁵ The questionnaire's multiple choice questions were basic, with the majority of them requiring either dates, or a no or yes answer. Based on the questionnaire responses, semi-structured and open-ended questions were then constructed for the group interview. These explored issues such as celebration of Zimbabwe national events, intermarriages, transnational links and generational conflicts. The group's responses emerged to be invaluable when evaluating the extent to which historical events, especially those to do with ethnic conflicts, have now become part of a history that is failing to dismantle ethnic prejudices or tensions needed to construct cordial inter-community interactions.

Awareness of the inevitability of discussing sensitive colonial and post-colonial ethnic and racial conflicts made it imperative to manage and maintain a balance between what Cohen, Manion and Morrison identify as the demands of pursuing the truth and participants' values and rights to personal safety.⁹⁶ Discussing politically sensitive legacies of colonial rule or political events after independence had the potential of compromising the safety of the participants if the information becomes public. As a result, it was critical for the research process to safeguard confidentiality and anonymity of all participants. Whilst interviews

⁹⁵ See Appendix 2 p. 359.

⁹⁶ Cohen, Manion and Morrison, *Research Methods in Education*, p. 75.

conducted in the confines of private spaces such as participants' homes guaranteed some privacy, anonymity was safeguarded by ensuring that participants remain nameless through the use of pseudonyms.

The political and social risks of the information sought required mature individuals capable of making informed decisions on whether to participate or not in the research. As a result, the research process deliberately excluded children below the age of 18 years who might not fully comprehend the political consequences of the information if it becomes public. To make certain that all participants voluntarily took part, the principle of informed consent was applied. To guide them in making that informed consent, the participants were furnished with a summary of the research consisting of the research's title, aims, objectives, themes and key questions. All participants were therefore required to sign a consent form with contact details of both the researcher and the first supervisor. Signing of the consent form with contact details gave the participants control of how they could respond if they believed the research would be handled in a way which would not guarantee their anonymity and confidentiality.

Parallel to providing participants with information which would lead to voluntary consent to participate, the potential participants' were also assured 'self-determination' which was the right to withdraw their consent even after they have been interviewed.⁹⁷ In a Zimbabwean diaspora community riddled with mistrust and suspicions engrained in historical experiences, affirmation of self-determination was a crucial component of the interview process. The right to self-determination would empower the participants by giving them a voice to withdraw from the research process if after the interview session they believed the

⁹⁷ Ibid.

research's outcome might compromise their safety with community members who might not have similar shared historical experiences.

Although all participants had the right to withdraw their consent, it was also essential to provide clarity on the length of time the participants had to exercise the right to withdraw that consent. To deal with the dilemma of agreeing on the length of withdrawal rights and the researcher's aim of meeting thesis completion deadline, participants were provided with the research timetable. Access to the timetable was always preceded by explanation that the right to withdraw ceases when the write-up period commences. Participants' awareness of the timetable became an essential component in providing that clarity which leads to informed decisions on whether to participate or not.

It was also essential to recognise that migrating from a background of ethnic or racial tensions would have resulted in what Routledge M Denis described as conflicting and misleading reasons to be willing participants in sharing secrets of sensitive information.⁹⁸ He alludes to the fact that sharing of such information can be influenced by selfish reasons of either wanting to get back at individuals or as a means of correcting the perceived bias of existing written sources. Denis' argument was of relevance when interviewing Zimbabweans who believe they have been the victims of colonial racist policies and Zimbabwe's post-colonial failures in uniting the nation. The prospect of variances in the interpretation of Zimbabwe's history was always going to be feasible when discussing particular issues such as Whites' colonial privileges or civil conflict of the 1980s. Therefore, to avoid the research process becoming a source of instigating further ethnic disharmony, there was no sharing of

⁹⁸ Denis, 'Participant Observation', p. 68.

information given by one respondent or ethnic group with another. Further clarification of issues was only pursued by continuous modification of the questions during interviews.

Mathews and Ross point out how essential it is for interviewees to respond in their own way using their own words which can be expressed in the participants' language.⁹⁹ However, my inability to speak the Ndebele language failed to provide the platform for the Ndebele to express themselves in their natural language. Instead, there were instances when the failure to converse in the Ndebele language created uneasy moments during interview sessions with some Ndebele participants. The development of an uneasy atmosphere could have been associated with perceptions of language genocide during the 1980s civil conflict when the Ndebele people were forced to speak Shona.

To undermine any subtle language barriers, concerted effort was made to create an environment that would not resuscitate the post-colonial language sentiments. Greetings were always in the Ndebele language before asking the individual whether they would like to be interviewed in either English or Shona; even when it was known that the participant was fluent in Shona. Whether the participant opted to speak in either Shona or English, there was also deliberate and sporadic use of familiar Ndebele phrases. The effort to speak in Ndebele was instrumental in creating relaxed interview sessions, thus minimising language tensions as it would have consolidated mutual relationship. As a result, most oral accounts of those from the Ndebele community were provided in an interchangeable mixture of both Shona and English, punctuated by the use of Ndebele words or phrases to emphasize certain issues which the interviewee would immediately translate to either Shona or English.

⁹⁹ Mathews and Ross, *Research Methods*, p. 221.

Parallel to challenges of ethnicity within the Black community, the process of choosing potential interviewees also encountered racial challenges. With suppressed inter-racial interactions prior to emigration, it was an inevitable outcome that identifying visible communities of White, Coloured and Asian Zimbabweans in Britain would be difficult. Some of those identified were reluctant to participate in the interview process. Reasons for the reluctance to participate were a direct consequence of colonial legacies and the failure by the post-colonial government to facilitate the creation of a unified national identity.

The assertion explaining why Whites were reluctant to participate was made by one of the White interviewees, Elizabeth, who had been of great assistance in identifying potential interviewees. Six of the eight Whites interviewed were identified by her. These were her *Facebook* contacts whom she assumed would not harbour historical prejudices or bitterness to decline the invitation to be interviewed. However, despite her anticipation of positive responses only six of the fifteen potential interviewees indicated their willingness to participate. It was the high rate of decline that made her identify the circumstances surrounding Whites' emigration as the main reason they would want to participate in a research process conducted by a Black Zimbabwean.

Elizabeth's explanation of why so many Whites were refusing to participate was a plausible one considering that Whites who left in the early 1980s had failed to adjust to changes in the political environment that had ushered in a Black led government whilst the second wave of white migration at the turn of the new millennium consisted of those who migrated as a direct consequence of violently losing their farms. It was therefore inevitable for the diasporic White community not only to be bitter towards Blacks, but also to mistrust Blacks, especially if asked to provide oral accounts of their life's experiences. Refusing to be

interviewed was one way of channelling that bitterness and mistrust. It had therefore become a frequent occurrence that in addition to the formalities of guaranteeing anonymity and confidentiality, the older White participants would feel comfortable if the person who would have introduced them to me re-emphasised the guarantees.

To ensure a more detailed and comprehensive analysis on how the Zimbabwean community of Whites is constructing their identities and integration processes in Britain, the research also consulted the online *Facebook* community. The White Zimbabwean immigrants, still identifying themselves as Rhodesians, had established a strong virtual community on *Facebook* to provide information on events and news, and to offer a platform to discuss issues such as politics back in Zimbabwe, migration, employment or pensions. Consultation of the virtual community was essential in evaluating the extent to which some members of the white community have been willing to integrate with the Black community whilst stimulating that consciousness of a community identity based on past experiences.

Just like with Whites, identifying and accessing potential Coloureds and Asians interviewees was a challenge. With Coloured Zimbabweans, the issues of identity and perceptions of marginalisation by both the colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwean government had resulted in a significant number of those in Britain adopting a separatist attitude from other ethnic or racial Zimbabwean communities. Asians on the other hand imported their Zimbabwean attitudes of separation from other Zimbabwean 'races' by assimilating themselves into Asian communities in cities like Leicester and Slough where there is a large Asian population. The difficulties in identifying Coloured and Asian interviewees were further exacerbated by the demographics of the Zimbabwean population in which both communities accounted for less than 1% of the overall population.

Chapter 1

A rise of internet 'Diasporic Media' recognised by Winston Mano and Wendy Willems to have been set up by former Zimbabwean journalists to cater for the increasing Zimbabwean population in the diaspora provided a more critical perspective on how the Zimbabwean communities are constructing their identities in Britain.¹⁰⁰ Websites such as 'newzimbabwe.com' and 'newsdzezimbabwe.co.uk' were invaluable in covering a wide range of issues relating to the everyday life of Zimbabwean immigrants. The issues covered included: domestic or family problems; issues to do with immigration such as asylum applications; criminal activities; celebration of individual achievements and political activism. Discussions on the websites have also been invaluable in exposing the ethnic divisions within the Black community.

To ensure a broader and credible assessment of colonial or post-colonial events that have been influencing the construction of a Zimbabwean community in Britain, five interviews were also conducted in Zimbabwe. However, conducting interviews in Zimbabwe was not immune from what David Henige identifies as 'political' and 'cultural hurdles' of working in a different society.¹⁰¹ Hostile political relations between Britain and Zimbabwe since the farm invasions of 2000 carried the potential of raising suspicion from Zimbabwe's political and security authorities. Conducting interviews during the July 2013 presidential and parliamentary elections also required a high degree of caution to personal safety at a time when there was risk of unpredictable political violence. Therefore, to minimise any political suspicions that would have threatened the researcher's personal safety, potential interviewees were identified prior to travelling.

¹⁰⁰ Winston Mano and Wendy Willems, 'Debating Zimbabweanness in Diasporic Internet Forums: Technologies of Freedom' in Macgregor and Primorac, *Zimbabwe's New Diaspora*, p. 187.

¹⁰¹ David Henige, *Oral Historiography* (London: Longman, 1982), p. 60.

The envisaged access to Zimbabwe's archival records of newspapers exploring post-colonial political events also turned out to be a challenge. Without a computerised system of retrieving archived newspapers, I was only able to access limited number of newspapers. The accessed newspapers of the early 1980s period were invaluable in providing information on post-colonial reconciliation of a society which for ninety years had been defined by ethnic or racial prejudices. The information retrieved from the newspapers enabled the evaluation of post-colonial government initiatives in incorporating different ethnicities and races into the socio-economic and political echelons of the country.

The testimonies of the fifty-nine participants complemented by secondary and primary sources unravelled how the impact of ethno-racial prejudices and traumas developed and nurtured during the colonial and post-colonial phases of Zimbabwe's history facilitated the construction of memories whose influences were not to be restricted in Zimbabwe but were to extend into the diaspora. With post-war migration and settlement of immigrants continuing to attract academic historians, the overarching aim of the thesis will be to provide original arguments to academic debates seeking to understand the impact of historic memories or experiences on dynamics of community relations and integration processes.

Zimbabweans, as a relatively contemporary non-European immigrant community falls in the category of migrants with a lower academic profile than those from the Caribbean or South Asia. Focusing on the relatively small Zimbabwean immigrant community is therefore recognition of Britain's migrant communities becoming increasingly diverse. Seeking to understand the construction of the diaspora Zimbabwean community in the next three thematic chapters will be illustrated by three distinct, but overlapping themes. These are:

Chapter 1

colonial and post-colonial development of racial and ethnic consciousness; the influence of imported historical identities on relations between the diaspora Zimbabwean communities; and the historical significance on the dynamics of Zimbabweans' economic and social integration.

**The Dynamics of Ethnic Prejudices and Identities:
The Transformation of Society in Pre-Colonial, Colonial and Post-Colonial
Zimbabwe**

Zimbabwe's journey towards 'unquestioned national identity' has been described by Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo as a 'dangerous fantasy, one that could not conceal the faultlines of ethnicity, class, gender and race that marked the terrain of Zimbabwe's history.'¹ This was because: the socio-economic and political structures of the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods set in motion salient discourses instrumental in constructing prejudices and identities which determined interactions between Zimbabwe's multi-ethnic communities and Zimbabweans' interaction with the country's socio-economic structures. The chapter's critical examination of each phase of Zimbabwe's history is therefore essential in unveiling and engaging the prejudices and identities which have played a critical role in the constructions of relations between Zimbabwean immigrant communities in Britain and their socio-economic integration patterns.

The chapter's historical narrative of the transient nature of Zimbabwe's society (which form the basis of discussions in chapters three and four) is divided into three chronologically structured sections: pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial. The first section is a brief assessment on how the arrival of the Ndebele in Zimbabwe during the first half of the nineteenth century marked the start of the construction of a fragmented African community riddled by ethnic tensions. The ethnic tensions between the Shona, who saw themselves as the indigenous population of Zimbabwe, and the Ndebele, who the Shona perceived as

¹ Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, 'The Hard Road to Becoming National' in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, *A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008: Becoming Zimbabwe* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009), p. xvii.

invaders, evolved into an effective colonial apparatus which was to be used by the British in the colonisation process.

The chapter's second section, which focuses on the colonial era, starts by examining how the British colonial administration capitalised on the ethnic tensions by delivering the 'divide and rule' agenda needed to control the African community. Parallel to the implementation of the 'divide and rule' agenda was the colonial administration's response to changes in the racial demographics of the population. There were deliberate efforts by the administration to construct a society in which race would be a significant community identifier. The colonial population was racially categorised into three hierarchical graded categories consisting of: Europeans (Whites); Coloureds and Asians of Indian descent; and Natives.² It was this racial categorisation which became the basis upon which the colonial government was to introduce discriminatory legislation to determine access to the country's economic resources and political participation. The racial categorisation of the population had therefore placed colonial Zimbabwe on a racial path demarcated by racially exclusionary barriers which were naturally going to have an impact on future community relations.

It was under this racist discourse permeating colonial Zimbabwe's society that the Nationalist Movement was created to spearhead the struggle for independence. However, the chapter's second section's examination of ethnic relations establishes how the nationalist movement became a contradictory movement as it failed to develop ideologies of uniting polarised African communities. The Nationalist Movement comprising the Shona dominated Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) political party and Ndebele dominated

² James Muzondidya, 'Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans: Invisible Subject Minorities and the Quest for Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe' in Brian Raftopoulos and Tyrone Savage (Eds), *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation* (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2004), p. 214.

Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) political party became embroiled with ethnic allegiances as both parties galvanised support within their respective ethnic communities. It was the reincarnation of the ethnic tensions within the nationalist movement which were to put a strain on nation building policies in post-colonial Zimbabwe.

Upon attaining independence on 18 April 1980 the new Shona dominated ZANU PF government of Robert Mugabe faced insurmountable challenges in uniting a nation polarised by both racial and ethnic differences. The chapter's third section examines these challenges faced by Mugabe's government in redressing colonial injustices, prejudices and identities. However, section three's analysis of the challenges faced by the new government will be incomplete without recognising how post-colonial nation building initiatives were undermined by the complex political events leading to Zimbabwe's independence. Without an outright armed victory by the nationalist movement, the success of any post-colonial nation building policies were to a large extent dependent on how far the White community would be honest participants in the process of reconciliation.

Parallel to government initiatives in seeking reconciliation with the White community, was the need to deal with historical tensions between the Shona and the Ndebele. The Matabeleland military insurgency in response to what they perceived as persecution and marginalisation of the Ndebele by Mugabe's government emerged to be the most significant event in constructing post-colonial ethnic relations. It was the unfolding of post-colonial civil conflict during the first decade of Zimbabwe's independence which has led to conclusions that Zimbabwe's post-colonial reconciliation policies were devoid of nation building mechanisms needed to unite an ethnically polarised state. For most Africans it was

reconciliation with the Whites whilst putting less emphasis on dealing with historic Shona-Ndebele tensions.

The Pre-Colonial Era: Migration of the Ndebele

Drawing on research on pre-colonial Zimbabwe, David Beach concluded that prior to the arrival of the Ndebele, the Zimbabwean plateau was inhabited by communities of co-existing Shona speaking chieftaincies with a simple ethnic history.³ The term 'Shona' was a collective noun conflating the linguistic, cultural and political attributes of a community of people who did not identify themselves with that term until the late nineteenth century.⁴ Although the Shona were orientated in different directions by military and trading links, David Maxwell points out how they 'shared a common political and religious repertoire.'⁵ As a result, the pre-colonial Shona chiefdoms had escaped political instability or hostilities associated with competing religious systems or centralised political and military structures.⁶ Speaking the same language differentiated by regional dialects preserved a loose cultural identity which facilitated socio-economic interactions and political co-operation between the different Shona communities.

Under the religious guidance of ancestral spirits, the pre-colonial relations between the Shona speaking chiefdoms were often dynamic, characterised by complex relations of conflict and co-operation facilitated through marriages, political alliances and population

³ David Beach, *Zimbabwe Before 1900* (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1984), p. 5.

⁴ Gerald Chikozho Mazarire, 'Reflections on Pre-colonial Zimbabwe 1850-1880s', in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo (Eds), *A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008: Becoming Zimbabwe* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009), p. 3.

⁵ David Maxwell, *Christians and Chiefs in Zimbabwe: A Social History of the Hwesa People c. 1870s-1990s* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999) p.11.

⁶ Beach, 'Zimbabwe Before 1900', p. 5.

movement.⁷ The occasional clashes were not constructed by external non-Shona foreign forces, neither were they driven by ethnic or regional superiority. Instead, Gerald Chikozho Mazarire argues that they were usually internally constructed conflicts responding to socio-economic and political forces. With pastoralism and agriculture forming the basis of the economy as highlighted by Mazarire, it was inevitable that as human and livestock population increased, violent skirmishes would occur over control and ownership of pastoral, farming and hunting land.⁸

Maxwell brings out a political argument in reinforcing the argument that Shona conflicts were usually internally instigated. He notes how political succession was a critical time that often prompted internal instability. In polygamous societies, succession by means of collateral inheritance in which chieftaincy would be passed from brother to brother inevitably created conflicts.⁹ Although chieftaincy was expected to rotate between houses, peaceful transitions would end if one house forcefully retained title.

However, the arrival of the Ndebele in the nineteenth century ushered in a transformational phase in Zimbabwe's socio-economic and political structures by setting in motion the gradual development of antagonistic relations between the Shona and the Ndebele. The Ndebele originated as a small clan in South Africa under the leadership of Mzilikazi a trusted general under Zulu nation leader Shaka. Mzilikazi and his small Khumalo clan (later to be

⁷ James Muzondidya and Sabelo Ndlovu Gatsheni, 'Echoing Silences: Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007', *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, vol. 7(2007), pp. 275-297.

⁸ Chikozho Mazarire, 'Reflections on Pre-colonial Zimbabwe c850-1880s', in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, *A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008*, pp. 36-37.

⁹ Maxwell, *Christians and Chiefs in Zimbabwe*, p.11.

known as the Ndebele) were forced to emigrate after Mzilikazi refused to hand over to Shaka 'spoils' captured after a successful battle in June 1822.¹⁰

After years of migration, looking for a safe place to settle permanently, the small Khumalo clan managed to expand and 'broadcast' its power over people of different ethnicity through 'raiding, conquest, assimilation and incorporation.'¹¹ By the time they settled and occupied the south western part of the Zimbabwean plateau in 1839, Ndlovu-Gatsheni points out how the Ndebele had not only used their language Isindebele (Ndebele) as a uniting factor, but they had also inculcated Ndebele values over the different assimilated and incorporated people.¹²

Upon settling in south western Zimbabwe, the Ndebele used the advantage of a centralised political and military structure under the leadership of king Mzilikazi to consolidate their political presence by 'plunder, pillage and violent raids upon their Shona neighbours.'¹³ The absence of a centralised political or military Shona system allowed the Ndebele to exert their influence on the majority Shona communities. The fragmented Shona communities could not organise themselves into a unified force to resist Ndebele invasions. As a result, defeated Shona communities who resisted Ndebele excursions were either captured to work as slaves or herdsmen, or were forced to pay tribute.¹⁴

As the Ndebele consolidated their settlement, Ndlovu-Gatsheni acknowledges how the Shona started to view the Ndebele not only as foreigners, but also as an offshoot of the

¹⁰ Alfred John Wills, *An Introduction to the History of Central Africa*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p.63.

¹¹ Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'Nation-Building in Zimbabwe and the Challenges of Ndebele Particularism,' *African Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol.8 (2008), pp. 27-56.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

‘militaristic and brutal kingdom of Shaka.’¹⁵ A significant consequence of the skirmishes between the Shona and the Ndebele was a stimulation of a consciousness within the Shona communities that they were culturally different to the new arrivals; a particularistic consciousness which allowed the term Shona to gradually evolve from being a linguistic identifier to a major ethnic identifier.¹⁶ The violent nature of Ndebele-Shona early interactions had marked the beginning of antagonistic attitudes which were to determine future relations between the two communities.

With the Ndebele transforming the demography of the society, it was therefore not surprising that by the time the British arrived in Zimbabwe they were able to identify a tension riddled African community with linguistic, cultural and historical differences. Taking advantage of the diversity, the British colonial process of controlling the Africans would be based on the implementation of a ‘divide and rule’ agenda influenced by how they perceived the two communities. The Ndebele military excursions on the Shona would prove to be a crucial determinant in the development of perceptions the British would use in constructing strategies on how to colonise Zimbabwe.

Colonisation Process

The British developed a colonisation process based on a mythical conviction that the Shona were a defenceless community routinely brutalised by the Ndebele kingdom’s raids and were therefore appreciative to the Whites for stopping the brutality. It was this fictitious conviction which determined the implementation of the ‘divide and rule’ agenda the British would use to systematically annex Zimbabwe whilst minimising suspicion of their intentions.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Mazarire, ‘Reflections on Pre-colonial Zimbabwe c850-1880s’, p.3.

The 'divide and rule' process based on misguided perceptions was incarnated when the British exclusively approached the Ndebele as authoritative sole representatives of Zimbabweans by wielding what Ndlovu-Gatsheni refers to as 'stick and carrot diplomacy'.¹⁷ The rationale behind the divisive 'stick and carrot diplomacy' was that, unlike the Shona, the Ndebele posed a greater military threat and therefore needed to be appeased.

The British 'stick and carrot' diplomacy was embedded in the fraudulent and fictitious treaties signed with the Ndebele; treaties which were to pave the way for the colonisation of Zimbabwe. The most effective treaty in the colonial process was the Rudd Concession of 1888 in which Mzilikazi's successor Lobengula, gave Cecil John Rhodes' British South Africa Company (BSAC) permission to hunt, mine and trade in Ndebele territory.¹⁸ In return, Lobengula was deceived into a false sense of security when he was offered rifles, ammunitions and a steamboat.¹⁹ However, the most significant deception of the Rudd Concession was ingrained in the route the BSAC'S Pioneer Column was going to use to enter Zimbabwe. The Pioneer Column was a group of approximately one thousand White soldiers and settlers recruited by BSAC from the British inhabitants in neighbouring South Africa.²⁰

To avoid clashes with the Ndebele, the Pioneer Column moving north from South Africa started the colonisation process by annexing territories occupied by the Shona communities on the Eastern side of Matabeleland.²¹ The aim was to control Mashonaland and make it

¹⁷ Sabelo J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'The Post-Colonial State and Matabeleland: Regional Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations, 1980–2002', in Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra and Diane Abrahams (Eds), *Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2003), pp. 17-38.

¹⁸ Wills, *An Introduction to the History of Central Africa*, pp. 134-136.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ James R Arnold and Roberta Wiennar, *Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe* (Minneapolis: Twenty First Century Books, 2008), p. 15.

²¹ Ibid.

safe so as to allow the settlers to explore the region for mining and farming claims.²² Each member of the column had been promised 'to mark out a three thousand acre farm and peg up to fifteen gold claims' on arrival in Mashonaland.²³ Without much resistance from the Shona, the Pioneer Column raised the Union Jack flag on 12 September 1890 in Salisbury (Harare) to signify the annexation of Mashonaland.²⁴ By entering through what was perceived as militarily weaker Shona territories, the Pioneer Column did not only avoid confrontation with the Ndebele, but they also gave themselves enough time to consolidate their economic and political presence in Mashonaland whilst waiting for the perfect opportunity to attack the Ndebele.

It was not long before the antagonistic relations between the Shona and the Ndebele provided Rhodes with that opportunity to invade Matabeleland in 1893. The sequence of events which triggered the invasion started when the BSAC confiscated a herd of cattle in retaliation of Shona tribesmen's stealing telegraph wire in Fort Victoria area (Masvingo).²⁵ Although the cattle were returned after Lobengula protested that they belonged to the Ndebele (since the Shona were looking after the herd as proof of submission), Ndebele warriors on 9 July massacred the insubordinate Shona subjects as punishment for cattle rustling.²⁶ The attack and massacre of the Shona by the Ndebele gave Cecil Rhodes that long awaited legal mandate to attack the Ndebele on the pretext of protecting their economic interests since the Shona formed the bulk of the labour force on White owned farms and mines.

²² Ibid., p.15.

²³ Wills, *An Introduction to the History of Central Africa*, p. 140.

²⁴ Ibid, p.142.

²⁵ Stanlake Samkange, *Origins of Rhodesia* (London: Heinemann. 1968), p.243.

²⁶ Wills, *An Introduction to the History of Central Africa*, p. 148.

Despite encountering 'determined and better organised' Ndebele warriors, the Ndebele succumbed to British invasion when Lobengula fled north following the capture of his capital, Bulawayo on 4 November.²⁷ Within a few months after the departure and subsequent death of Mzilikazi in early 1894, Matabeleland came under British control and ceased to exist as an independent kingdom. However, the differences in the period of annexation and comparative analysis of the speed at which it took place between Mashonaland and Matabeleland, resulted in the development of a divisive military discourse between the Shona and the Ndebele. Encouraged by their military resistance, the Ndebele developed a narrative which stimulated a consciousness that unlike the Shona, their military prowess was the reason why Mashonaland was occupied (first) whilst Matabeleland was conquered last (because of Ndebele military resistance).²⁸

Consciousness of Ndebele military superiority over the Shona would be further reinforced during the unsuccessful 1896-1897 African uprisings. The uprising was described by Terence Ranger to have been started by the Ndebele in March 1896 with the Shona following suit in June.²⁹ Despite starting the uprising, Ranger points out how the Ndebele, even when faced with inevitable defeat, managed to negotiate a conditional surrender settlement.³⁰ Although the surrender ended the existence of a centralised Ndebele Kingdom, terms of the conditional settlement allowed the Ndebele leaders to assume positions as salaried chiefs in charge of local areas whilst paving the way for displaced Ndebele to return to their homes as tenants of the BSAC.³¹

²⁷ Ibid, pp.150-151.

²⁸ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'Nation-Building in Zimbabwe', pp. 27-56.

²⁹ Terence Ranger, *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia 1898-1930* (London: Heinemann, 1970), pp. 1-3.

³⁰ Ibid, p.26.

³¹ Ibid.

Despite living as tenants whilst paying rent to BSAC signalled the loss of title to their land, the terms of the settlement allowed the Ndebele to preserve their identity. In contrast to Ndebele's treatment, there was no provision of a negotiated settlement with the majority Shona community following their defeat. Undermining of Shona authority in comparison to the Ndebele was captured by Ranger when he explained how the Shona leaders of the revolt surrendered unconditionally and by 1898 most had been put on trial and hanged.³²

The process in the colonisation of Zimbabwe had therefore created a new frontier in Shona-Ndebele relations. Whilst the Ndebele gloated over what they perceived as military superiority over the Shona, Lobengula's signing of the Rudd Concession had also made them vulnerable to Shona accusations that they were foreigners who sold the country to the British. The 'divide and rule' agenda implemented during the annexation process had therefore created a favourable environment for mistrust, prejudices and ethnic allegiances to influence the progression of Shona-Ndebele relations throughout Zimbabwe's history; whose impact was to be felt by subsequent colonial and post-colonial diaspora communities.

The Colonial Era

After the successful annexation of Mashonaland and Matabeleland, the colonial administration officially stimulated and consolidated a consciousness of ethnic particularism to effectively divide and rule the African community.³³ As shown by the map below (Figure Four), the realisation of the diversity within the African communities resulted in the creation of ethnic named provincial administration regions. This formalisation of ethnicity did not

³² Ibid., p. 1.

³³ Jeffrey Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1990), p.170.

only raise the awareness of belonging to a particular community in which individuals would feel safe when surrounded by those of the same ethnicity, but it also created an environment in which communalism had the potential of evolving into an emotive and potent ideology.

Figure Four: Provinces in Colonial Zimbabwe



Source: British South Africa Police, 'Police Provinces and Districts with Principal Centres' Available on <http://bsap.org/images/rhodesiaprovinces.jpg> (First Visited 22 June 2014)

Ndlovu-Gatsheni affirms the significance of ethnic particularist ideology within the first three decades of colonial rule. He describes how associations such as the 'National Home Movement' and 'Matabeleland Home Society' that had been formed by the 1930s were

instrumental in defining Ndebele's particularism by regularly attacking the Shona working in Bulawayo claiming Ndebele is their city.³⁴ The name change of Bulawayo residential area from Rufaro Township (Rufaro is a Shona word meaning happiness) to Njube Township (Njube was one of the sons of Lobengula) served to consolidate Ndebele's particularism by excluding Shona references in Matabeleland.³⁵ The Shona also responded by forming their own ethnic based society, such as the 'Sons of Mashonaland Cultural Society'.³⁶

The creation of ethnic or sub-linguistic named regional and administration boundaries had therefore become a significant factor in defining relations within the confines of the colonial capitalist system that had forced Africans of different ethnicity to migrate into towns in search of employment. Enocent Msindo further argues that although the ethnic associations provided the perfect environment for the emergence of African nationalist leaders, they failed to stop the influences of ethnic allegiances in the Nationalist Movement.³⁷ Nationalism and ethnicity were now firmly established in the African community as co-determinants of future relations between the Shona and the Ndebele.

Parallel to the official stimulation of ethnic particularism was the colonial administration's response to the racial transformation of Zimbabwe's demographics. As the White population increased, Zimbabwe's population ceased to be homogenously classified as being Black. As a result, the colonial administration had to recognise the racial transformation of the population by implementing policies to ensure that racial boundaries were clearly defined. To facilitate this, the population was hierarchically classified into three

³⁴ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'National Building in Zimbabwe', pp. 27-56.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Enocent Msindo, 'Ethnicity and Nationalism in Urban Colonial Zimbabwe: Bulawayo, 1950 to 1963', *Journal of African History*, vol.48 (2007), pp. 267-90.

categories based on presumptions of racial purity and fears of transgressed racial boundaries.

The hierarchical classification of the colonial population was an effective catalyst in the creation of imagined racial boundaries which were not to be transgressed when competing for the country's resources. Whites were placed at the top of the hierarchical ladder with Africans condemned to the lowest threshold. Coloureds and Asians as occupants of the second place became part of a small but significant intermediate category. Access to the colonial state's economic resources or political participation was determined by the position within the racially graded hierarchical structure of the population.³⁸ Racial categorisation of the population had therefore established itself not only as a dominant signifier of community identity, but also a determinant of the individual's position in a society where Africans would subtly be constantly reminded that they were now subjugated people.

The pervasive nature of racism embedded in the hierarchical categorisation of the population meant that Africans would experience the worst racial discrimination in the economic, social and political structures of the colonial society. Lucy Mazingi and Richard Kamidza point out how Blacks had limited access to basic social services such as education, health and other social amenities while the best services were accorded to the White settler communities.³⁹ As occupiers of the second strand in the hierarchical structure, Mazingi and Kamidza further disclose how Asian and Coloured communities accessed the medium-range

³⁸ James Muzondidya 'Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans: Invisible Subject Minorities and the Quest for Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe', in Brian Raftopoulos and Tyrone Savage, *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation* (Cape Town: Institute for Justice, 2004), p. 214.

³⁹ Lucy Mazingi and Richard Kamidza, 'Inequality in Zimbabwe' in Herbert Jauch and Deprose Muchena, eds *Tearing us Apart: Inequalities in Southern Africa* (Johannesburg: Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 2011), p.323.

services.⁴⁰ The classification of the Zimbabwean colonial population had therefore not only condemned Africans to restricted upward social mobility, but had also placed Zimbabwe on a racial path punctuated by exclusionary barriers which were to determine future relations between the racially segregated communities.

Whilst the racial categorisation of the population created racial boundaries, it failed to recognise the complexities of pre-colonial relations between the Shona and the Ndebele. Classifying the Shona and Ndebele as natives negated the historical fact that the Shona perceived the Ndebele as an immigrant ethnic community which settled in Zimbabwe during the early part of the nineteenth century. The unilateral classification of both the Shona and the Ndebele as natives was therefore not only redefining the indigenous population, it was also a creation of an African community with historical differences that needed to be addressed in any future nation building project.

Although Coloureds had emerged to be a visible community within the population structures of the colonial state with clearly defined privileges over Blacks, Julie Kate Seirlis argues that the use of the name Coloured was 'problematic' as it implied people with no colour or too much colour.⁴¹ The rise in the Coloured population after 1901 was according to what Munyaradzi Mushonga described as a consequence of 'rampant sex between white men and black women' a trend that continued into the 1940s.⁴² These sexual relations with Black women were inevitable in an environment in which White men far exceeded the number of White women. For example in Bulawayo in 1895 there were 1 329 White men

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Julie Kate Seirlis, 'Undoing the United Front? Coloured Soldiers in Rhodesia 1939–1980', *African Studies*, vol. 63 (2004), pp. 73-93.

⁴² Munyaradzi Mushonga, 'White power, White desire: Miscegenation in Southern Rhodesia', *Journal of History and Culture*, vol. 5 (2013), pp. 1-12.

and 208 White women, whereas in Salisbury (Harare) there were 505 White man and 134 White women.⁴³ However, sexual relations between Black men and White women were greatly curtailed by the passing of legislation such as the 'Immorality and Indecency Suppression Ordinance' of 1903. The Act that criminalised sexual encounters between White women and Blacks was aimed at protecting White females from what was perceived as the 'uncontrollable sexual drive of the non-white races and their limitless fertility'.⁴⁴ The laws were therefore facilitating the development of racist stereotypes or prejudices which carried the potential of hindering intermarriages between Blacks and Whites.

With most Coloureds being the offspring of relations between White men and African women, the colonial administration found it necessary to stimulate a Coloured consciousness guided by a philosophy that Coloureds were innately superior and more civilised than Africans. James Muzondidya states that Coloured children were removed from the rural African environment and placed in exclusive residential foster homes under the foster care of the White missionaries.⁴⁵ With privileged access to health and education, the fostered Coloured children were conditioned to erase or undermine any potentialities of reclaiming their African identity by adopting English names and being forced to speak only English.⁴⁶

Pamela, a product of these residential homes from the age of eight, pointed out that there was a deliberate policy to create perceptions among Coloured girls that Black men were

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Munyaradzi Mushonga, 'White power, white desire: Miscegenation in Southern Rhodesia', *Zimbabwe African Journal of History and Culture*, Vol. 5, (2013), pp. 1-12.

⁴⁵ James Muzondidya, *Walking a Tightrope: Towards a Social History of the Coloured Community of Zimbabwe* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005), p. 25.

⁴⁶ Pamela, Interview, 13 October 2013.

dangerous.⁴⁷ She recalled how for their own safety they were instructed to 'flee from a Black man towards a White man if they were to meet both men in a secluded area'.⁴⁸ It was therefore inevitable that like most Coloured children, Pamela found her experience in the residential foster homes 'psychologically traumatic.' She struggled to construct an identity which disassociated herself from her African family; the only family she knew from birth.⁴⁹

Pamela identified the deliberate instillation of the fear-factor towards Africans as one of the major reasons why most Coloured children faced an 'identity crisis' as the families they knew as 'loving and caring' were now being demonised as evil. The colonial state's deliberate policy of separating Coloured children from their African families had evolved into a 'divide and rule' tactic by the colonial state. Coloured children had been indoctrinated to appreciate the constructions of identities and interactions with Black Africans based on a racial superiority attitude of 'them and us'.

With a superiority mentality over Africans, it was therefore not surprising that a majority of Coloured children placed a premium on wanting to have white skin and straight hair.⁵⁰ Commenting on the 'want to be White', Esther a Leicester based Coloured immigrant in her sixties explained how fairer skinned coloured children were envied as they were seen to be not indistinguishable from Whites. In contrast, those who were darker skinned with curly hair were usually despised as they were perceived to be indistinguishable from Blacks.⁵¹ The ultimate consequence according to Fay Chung was that some Coloured teenage girls spent

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Fay Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga Memories from the Liberation Struggle in Zimbabwe* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute 2006), p. 36.

⁵¹ Esther, Interview, 10 June 2013.

‘an inordinate amount of time trying to make their skins lighter and their hair straightened’.⁵²

However, it would be misleading to conclude that all Coloured children escaped socio-economic disenfranchisement by being placed in residential homes. Sixty year old Anita was one of those who could not be identified by the colonial administration or missionaries’ efforts of placing Coloured children in the residential foster homes. She identified the complexities of the circumstances surrounding her birth and up-bringing as the main reasons why she could not be identified for relocation into the residential homes.⁵³ Her British born father had committed suicide before she was born following the exposure of the affair with her mother who was a farm labourer. Suicide had seemed to be the only option for her father who could not only not deal with the stigma of having an affair with a Black girl, but also with the expected punishment of being called up for military service.⁵⁴

The action by Anita’s father demonstrated the extent of the perils faced by White men attracted to African women who could not officialise the relationship because of pressure by those who wanted to maintain racial purity. John Pape illustrates the perils by highlighting how most White fathers often failed to acknowledge or support their Coloured children. This explains why as early as 1930 of the 1,138 Coloured children born from White fathers only 379 were acknowledged and supported; 139 were acknowledged but not provided for; 297 known but not acknowledged, and the rest did not know their father.⁵⁵

⁵² Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga Memories*, p.36.

⁵³ Anita, Interview, 26 July 2013.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ John Pape, ‘Black and White: The “Perils of Sex” in Colonial Zimbabwe’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 16, (1990), pp. 699-720.

With Anita's mother dying shortly after birth from what she was told was a stress related illness caused by raising a child in a society that stigmatised single mothers with children born outside of marriage, she found herself being raised by her maternal grandparents.⁵⁶

Regrettably, her grandparents who were both illiterate failed to obtain a birth certificate that would have facilitated her registration as a Coloured. This would have allowed her to access government welfare privileges reserved for Coloured children such as exclusive education and health services. Without the opportunity to pursue education she got married to a Black businessman at sixteen. It was only after she took her eldest son to the hospital in the early 1970s that she became aware of the registration of Coloureds. This was after the White hospital administrator enquired why her son was being treated at an all-Black wing of the hospital. By that time, her identity had been so engrained in the Black community that she did not attempt to identify herself with Coloureds of her generation.

However, it has to be acknowledged that Anita's experiences were not the norm. As occupiers of the second place in the population hierarchy, Muzondidya alludes to the fact that from an early age Coloureds had the potential of escaping economic disfranchisement experienced by a majority of Black Africans.⁵⁷ It was a combination of these economic privileges and the creation of Coloured identity which made Coloureds vulnerable to Africans' accusations that they could not be trusted as they had been modelled to be a buffer zone between the Black community and Whites. It had become an irrefutable fact that some Africans would develop perceptions that a majority of Coloureds would rather collaborate with the colonial system than support any Black led political movement whose victory might lead to a potential loss of their privileges. The creation of a colonial Coloured

⁵⁶ Anita, Interview, 26 July 2013.

⁵⁷ Muzondidya, 'Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans' p. 216.

community had therefore made it imperative that any future nation building initiatives would have to deal with the 'dubious loyalties' tag attached to the community by some within the Black community.

Despite being recipients of socio-economic privileges not accessible to Blacks, Kelly Nims' describes how a majority of Coloureds placed education at the periphery of their lives.⁵⁸ Trivialising education was a gradual process that happened when the quest of attaining economic mobility and stability by attaining better educational qualifications demonstrated by earlier generation of Coloureds failed to resonate with subsequent generations of the colonial era.⁵⁹ These earlier generation Coloureds were described by Nims as individuals who had either been born in Zimbabwe or migrated from Cape Town.⁶⁰

Awareness of sustained marginalisation by Whites who were at the pinnacle of the hierarchical population structure created and consolidated the desire in subsequent generations to preserve Coloured consciousness and to have control over their own destiny by making choices that naturally trivialised self-development through education.⁶¹ There was general contentedness by a significant number of Coloured males to acquire technical skills that would allow them to be self-employed tradesmen.⁶² Patrick a fifty-year old ex-Zimbabwean Coloured businessman living in Northampton pointed out that in most cases their skills would have been acquired through on the job training with no formal qualifications to prove their competence.⁶³

⁵⁸ Kelly M Nims, 'The Goffal Speaks: Coloured Ideology and the Perpetuation of a Category in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe' (Unpublished PhD Thesis Columbia University 2013), p.182-184.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid p.181.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Patrick, Interview, 20th January 2015.

The ultimate result of placing education at the periphery Coloureds' lives was the construction of a consciousness within some that 'education is simply not important for Coloureds.'⁶⁴ Nurturing of that consciousness was to continue to be reinforced throughout Zimbabwe's colonial and post-colonial era. The long term consequence of failing to dismantle the consciousness of trivialising education emerged to be a significant factor that would influence the economic integration of the older members of the community in Britain (to be discussed in chapter four).

To reinforce Coloured consciousness, young Coloureds were also able to use their verbal agility to reinforce their identity by developing a secret language known as 'Kabid'.⁶⁵ Developing the language was evidence of the growth of a young politicised Coloured community that was determined to preserve their identity even if it meant going against the values of their parents or wider society. Development of the secret language would naturally result in mistrust of the Coloured community, especially when conversations would be conducted entirely in 'Kabid' in the presence of other ethnic communities. Using language to distance themselves from other Zimbabweans had therefore created a wedge with other ethnic communities which needed to be dismantled if a national identity was to be constructed in future generations of the post-colonial era.

A majority of Asians, the co-occupants of the intermediate category with the Coloured community, have been identified by Floyd Dotson and Lillian Dotson as Indian immigrants who started settling in Zimbabwe in the nineteenth century.⁶⁶ The 1911 census showed the

⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 186.

⁶⁵ Seirlis, 'Undoing the United Front?'

⁶⁶ Floyd Dotson and Lillian Dotson, *The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 35.

'Asiatic' population to be 870.⁶⁷ Bella, a Zimbabwean based Asian in her late fifties spoke of how her grandfather was one of the early Indian immigrants to permanently settle in Zimbabwe as labourers seeking economic opportunities.⁶⁸ A majority of these Indian immigrant labourers would have been motivated or assisted by kinsmen already established in neighbouring Mozambique and South Africa where they had settled to work on sugar cane plantations as labourers.⁶⁹ Using their entrepreneurship skills Dotson and Dotson explain how the settled Indian immigrants quickly established themselves as a close knit community of successful traders and shop-owners competing with White entrepreneurs for African customers and labour supply.⁷⁰

However, it was not long before Asian business activities emerged to be the main determinant in influencing the nature of relations with both Black Africans and Whites. As Asians were establishing their businesses, Dotson and Dotson allude to the fact that Africans were simultaneously constructing perceptions that Indians were not different from the White settlers in regards to the exploitative treatment of Blacks.⁷¹ Using an Asian shopkeeper as an example to highlight the exploitation of Africans, Dotson and Dotson reveal that a master-servant relation developed between Asians and Africans in which Africans were either seen as a customer across the counter or as a shop assistant employee.⁷² Using their entrepreneurial skills especially in buying and selling to the Black population, Dotson and Dotson explain that it was not long before the settled Indians

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Bella, Interview, 1 August 2013.

⁶⁹ Dotson and Dotson, *Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi*, pp.35-6.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 37.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid, p.269.

started competing with Whites for a niche within the developing economy as market gardeners, traders and shop-owners.⁷³

Describing the master-servant relationship, Gutu, a Black Zimbabwean in his sixties spoke of how the phrase *huya tingapangane* (come let us negotiate) became synonymous with Asians' tricks of wanting to exploit African customers or employees.⁷⁴ The exploitation would either be in the form of underpayment of wages or being sold over-priced cheap quality products.⁷⁵ This master-servant relationship between Asians and Africans had therefore placed Africans in a position to persuade themselves to believe that they would always be at risk of exploitation by Asians. This marked the development of relations between the two communities based to a large extent on suspicion and mistrust, with no intent of establishing interactions outside the business environment.

Despite their shared category as occupiers of the second threshold in the racial categorisation of the population, Dotson and Dotson describe the relations between Coloureds and Asians as not always intimate.⁷⁶ Asians' negativity towards Coloureds was usually triggered by perceptions that Coloureds (because of their mixed heritage) were a representation of cultural abyss which can be seen as too Europeanised.⁷⁷ Asians saw themselves as 'puritanical' in principle and practice, and therefore any limited interaction with Coloureds would safeguard them from moral or cultural contamination.⁷⁸ Asian attitudes towards coloureds and the nature of their socio-economic relationship with Blacks

⁷³ Ibid. p. 37.

⁷⁴ Gutu, Interview 24 July 2013.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Dotson and Dotson, *Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi*, pp.286-186.

⁷⁷ Ibid p. 286.

⁷⁸ Ibid, pp.289-291.

made them vulnerable to greater scrutiny on whether they would be honest participants in future nation building initiatives both in Zimbabwe and in the diaspora.

Although Coloureds and Asians would have been accorded better privileges and rights than Africans they were usually on the periphery in any socio-economic propaganda by the colonial state. The Rhodesian propaganda seemed to promote images of White and Black soldiers serving in the army as happy comrades whilst Coloureds and Asians were completely left out.⁷⁹ The representation of Coloureds and Asians in the military denied them the opportunity to build political credibility necessary to develop a strong national identity. Building a strong identity as Zimbabweans would have been a critical prerequisite in how Coloureds and Asians were going to manage the political transition from Colonial Zimbabwe to independent Zimbabwe.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

The creation of a Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 that united the British Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) with Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) also had a significant impact on colonial Zimbabwe's racial demographics. The transformation of the population was to a large extent inextricably linked with the economic reasons for the establishment of the Federation. Alois Mlambo argues that the need by the British settlers to utilise the economic benefits of Northern Rhodesia's copper mines and Southern Rhodesia's diversified economy of manufacturing, mining and agriculture was an important factor which influenced the creation of the

⁷⁹ Seirlis, 'Undoing the United Front?', pp. 73-93.

Federation.⁸⁰ However, the diversity of Southern Rhodesia's economy resulted in the country emerging to be the main economic beneficiary with the fastest and strongest growth in manufacturing industries.⁸¹ It was this imbalance in economic benefits between the member countries of the Federation which triggered the racial transformation of the Southern Rhodesian population.

The inevitable consequence of the rapid expansion of the Southern Rhodesia economy was an influx of Whites from neighbouring South Africa and from Europe, all hoping to gain access to the country's economic prosperity.⁸² Mlambo identifies the majority of European economic immigrants during the Federation period as demobilised British soldiers and ordinary British citizens fleeing the harsh post-war living conditions in Britain.⁸³ The economic benefits provided by Zimbabwe had become what Fay Chung described as a 'haven for Whites' particularly the White working class who were enjoying a higher living standard than their compatriots in Britain.⁸⁴

It was this rapid increase in White immigration from within Africa and Europe that resulted in the Zimbabwean White community becoming culturally diverse. The diversity was captured by Katja Uusihakala when she pointed out that in the 1969 census, out of the 228,296 Europeans, 40% were born in colonial Zimbabwe; approximately 23% born in Britain and 22% in South Africa, with the rest coming from different parts of the world.⁸⁵ The arrival of Whites from different parts of the world created a White Zimbabwean

⁸⁰ Alois Mlambo, 'From World War II to UDI, 1940-1965', in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, *A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008*, p. 76.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga Memories*, p. 60.

⁸⁵ Katja Uusihakala, The AnthroGlobe journal (2007) *Opening Up and Taking the Gap. White Road to and from Rhodesia* Available at http://www.anthroglobe.info/docs/white_road.pdf (Accessed on 7th February 2014).

community that could be described as a cosmopolitan community as those who had been born in Zimbabwe were joined by immigrants from within Africa, Europe and America.⁸⁶

The diverse post-colonial ancestral links was reflected within the research's White participants who were the children or grandchildren of the original migrants. Elizabeth who was born in Zimbabwe was of Greek heritage; Patrick who migrated to Zimbabwe from Somalia in the early 1960s had Italian roots; Gareth was of Irish descent; Alison a Zimbabwean by birth had English background; and Kenneth also born in Zimbabwe was a Welsh descendant.

Despite the diversity of the White population, Jeffrey Herbst argues that they were all united by the awareness that they were numerically outnumbered by Africans.⁸⁷ As a result, they would not accommodate any community divisions which would jeopardise resistance against any threat to dislodge their privileges on the productive sectors of mining, manufacturing or agriculture.⁸⁸ The construction of a Rhodesian identity to repel any external or internal threats to dislodge their privileged status would not have been possible without the development of a 'sense of nationalism' within the White community.

Nurturing a sense of nationalism indicated the determination Whites had in ensuring that Zimbabwe would be transformed into a White man's country with a permanent White population. Josephine Fisher acknowledges how creating an identity of seeing themselves as a nation allowed subsequent generations of Whites to gradually lose attachment with countries of their ancestors.⁸⁹ The loss of attachment to their ancestral roots became

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, p.21

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 18

⁸⁹ Josephine Lucy Fisher, *Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles* (Canberra: ANU E Press 2010), p. 9.

apparent at independence in 1980 when a significant number of them chose to remain in the country as they were prepared to be part of post-colonial nation building initiatives. Chapter four will establish how the failure to dismantle a sense of belonging to a nation emerged to be a hindrance in the social integration of White Zimbabweans who found themselves in Britain.

A combination of seeing themselves as a nation and the need to preserve their privileged status set in motion the development of racial prejudices whose impact was to influence future racial interactions with other Zimbabwean communities. By virtue of their privileged status within colonial Zimbabwe's economic, social and political structures, Whites were placed in a prestigious situation as providers of essential expertise and skills needed in an expanding colonial economy. The contribution of the White immigrants to the economy became a source of racial prejudice against the Blacks as they perceived themselves as indispensable to the economic needs and success of Zimbabwe.

The rapid increase of a settled White immigrant population in Southern Rhodesia inevitably resulted in a disproportionate distribution of the White population across the Federal states. By the time the Federation ended in 1963, the combined White population of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was significantly lower than that of Zimbabwe as shown by the table below.

Table 3: Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland White population

Year	Number of Whites Southern Rhodesia	Number of Whites Northern Rhodesia	Number of Whites Nyasaland
1951	135 596	37 079	1 948
1956	177 124	65 277	6 732
1961	221 504	74 549	*8 750

*Preliminary census figures

Source: Floyd Dotson and Lillian Dotson, *The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) pp. 42, 48, 51

With Malawi and Zambia gaining independence in 1964, White Zimbabweans' awareness of their minority status forced them to come up with a political solution to delay majority rule. That political solution was to be implemented by Ian Smith on 11 November 1965 when he unilaterally declared Independence from Britain. Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) did not only mean that Rhodesia was an independent state outside Britain's jurisdiction, it also meant that the minority 230,000 Whites would govern the Black population of over 4 million Blacks.⁹⁰ Denying Africans political power would allow Whites to continue implementing policies to protect their socio-economic privileges and interests. Support of Smith's UDI which ultimately delayed Zimbabwe's independence showed the extent to which nurturing a sense of nationalism by White Rhodesians had strengthened the determination to make Zimbabwe a White man's country. It was therefore an inevitable

⁹⁰ Wills, *An Introduction to the History of Central Africa*, p.369.

outcome that UDI marked the start of a protracted dispute between the White Rhodesian and the British governments, and the Africans; disputes which consolidated the desire to protect the White Rhodesian identity of being a nation.

The British government's response to Ian Smith's UDI was to impose sanctions on the Rhodesian government. Although the economic sanctions imposed in 1966 led to a trade ban and an embargo on financial dealings between Rhodesia and British territories, they failed to end minority rule.⁹¹ The Rhodesian government was able to adapt its economy by encouraging internal agriculture and manufacturing industry. As a landlocked country it was also able to manage its exports and imports through neighbouring South Africa and the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola.⁹² The ability to manage the economy under economic sanctions emerged to be the basis upon which subsequent generations of Zimbabweans would compare the competence of White led Smith's government and that of Mugabe's post-colonial government. The consequence of that comparison emerged to be a significant determinant on how the diaspora Black community in Britain would perceive businesses owned by Blacks.

UDI and the failure of the economic sanctions had not only denied the Black majority independence, but it also consolidated racial segregation in accessing Zimbabwe's natural resources. With Blacks being denied the right to participate in politics, racially driven legislation to ensure some legitimacy in the inequitable distribution of the country's resources were passed with little or no opposition in parliament. For example, legislation such as 'The Land Tenure Act' of 1969 (previously known as the Land Apportionment Act of

⁹¹ House of Commons Select Committee on Economic Affairs Second Report, Available at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldeconaf/96/9606.htm> (Accessed on 7 October 2013) Published in April 2007.

⁹² Ibid.

1930) became one of the most effective legislative tools in enforcing racially inequitable distribution of the country's natural resources.⁹³

The 1969 'Land Tenure Act' provisions legitimised racial categorisation of land in the countryside.⁹⁴ The displaced Africans were given control of only 41.7 per cent of poor quality land. By contrast, Whites who were 5 per cent of the population had access to 40 per cent of the best arable land.⁹⁵ The Act's racial demarcation of the land had therefore disregarded the demographics of the population by allocating close to an equal amount of land to both Blacks and Whites irrespective of the size of the population.⁹⁶

The inevitable consequence of the racial categorisation of the land was consolidation of a dual agricultural structure. Blacks by virtue of being forced into areas with poor or less fertile soil experienced depressed agricultural production in comparison to White farmers. Increased productivity by White farmers naturally created an environment that encouraged the development of perceptions that Whites were indispensable to the agricultural needs of the country. Comparative statistics of Africans and Whites presented by James Barber showed the extent to which the land reform had efficiently organised White farming for cash crop production while African farming was to be perceived as inefficient. This was because: the value of agricultural produce sold was nearly £48 million for Whites and that of Blacks just above £3 million.⁹⁷

⁹³ Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, p. 17.

⁹⁴ James Muzondidya, 'Jambanja Ideological Ambiguities in the Politics of Land and Resource Ownership in Zimbabwe', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 33 (2007), p. 329.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ James Barber, *Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 119.

The plight of Black peasant farmers gradually worsened when the colonial administration failed to readjust the size of the land categories in line with the population increase of the Black community. As a result, land reserved for Blacks became overpopulated, thus creating a growing class of landless Black Africans in rural areas. With depressed agricultural production and a growing landless peasant population, colonial land distribution had firmly placed Zimbabwe on a racial collision course when dealing with the racial imbalance in land ownership. The success of any future nation building agenda would therefore be determined by either: the extent White farmers would be willing to address the racially skewed ownership of agricultural land, or the methods Blacks would adopt in addressing the land imbalances.

African peasants' response to declining agricultural returns and increased landlessness was to migrate into urban areas in search of employment. The colonial administration responded to the growing number of Blacks in the urban areas by passing the 'Vagrancy Act' of 1968 and the 'Area Accommodation Act' of 1972.⁹⁸ These laws enforced rigid racial boundaries by not only restricting movement of Blacks, especially within cities' central business districts, but by also enforcing separate residential areas for Whites and Blacks. Black access to White residential areas was restricted to domestic workers.⁹⁹ For the convenience of their White employers, a majority of domestic workers lived on the employers' residential premises. They were accommodated in separately built one or two roomed domestic quarters (with a toilet, which also served as bathroom) situated on the fringes of the back yard garden so as to be as far away as possible from the main house.

⁹⁸ Innocent Chirisa and Smart Dumba 'Spatial Planning, Legislation and the Historical and Contemporary Challenges in Zimbabwe: A Conjectural Approach', *Journal of African Studies and Development*, vol. 4 (2012), pp. 1-13.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

With large gardens and excellent provision of health and electricity, exclusive white residential areas, referred to as 'Low Density Residential Areas', were a stark contrast to Black' residential areas.¹⁰⁰ Black residential areas, known as 'High Density Residential Areas' were usually ravaged with sewer and electricity problems, and limited access to health or education facilities.¹⁰¹ The racial segregation of residential areas started nurturing perceptions within some in the Black community that any socio-economic success should be measured with the lifestyle or material possessions of Whites.

Reminiscing on the impact of European living standards on Africans, Gutu explained how uses of phrases like *dzimba dzechirungu* (White man's house), *Kudya kwechirungu* (White man's food) or *doro rechirungu* (White man's beer) started to be used by Blacks to commend or congratulate each other.¹⁰² Notable success which deserved congratulations ranged from: the ability to speak English, building a brick walled house in rural areas to changing food or eating habits to imitate a European lifestyle.¹⁰³ Adopting Whites' lifestyle became a dream for a majority of Africans, thus indirectly consolidating the superiority of Whites over them.

The colonial racist discourse that manifested itself in the hierarchical classification of the population had therefore marked the subtle indoctrination process of perceiving Whites' way of life as a bench mark of socio-economic status. Tolerance of some traits of the European way of life gradually became more visible within an emerging African middle class. The belief that a European lifestyle was something to be aspired to by some within the Black

¹⁰⁰ Livison Mutekede and Noah Sigauke, *Housing Finance Mechanisms in Zimbabwe* (Nairobi: UN-HABITAT, 2009), p. 14.

¹⁰¹ Cyril A. Rogers and C. Frantz, *Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia: The Attitudes and Behavior of the White Population* (London: Kennikat Press, 1973), pp.19-20.

¹⁰² Gutu, Interview 24 July 2013.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

community started the construction of personal identities which were to influence social integration patterns in Britain.

The Rise of African Middle Class

Mlambo identifies the introduction of European education and a monetary based capitalist economy as being instrumental in creating a small African middle class community of educated professionals in colonial Zimbabwe.¹⁰⁴ Teaching, nursing, clerical and small scale entrepreneurship emerged as the main professions of the emerging African middle class.¹⁰⁵ Although the creation of a small but well-defined African middle class was essential for managing and sustaining the socio-economic and political structures of the colonial state, it also marked the start of an evolutionary process that would have a profound impact on the educational aspirations of Africans linked to socio-economic status. Traditional values would inevitably be challenged as individuals within the emerging African middle class tried to establish an identity in a capitalist system riddled by exploitation and undermining of those occupying the lower echelons of society.

Although Mlambo acknowledges that the colonial capitalist system had created a small African middle class, it would be naïve to think that they were at economic parity with Whites. By virtue of occupying the lowest position in colonial Zimbabwe's population hierarchy, Herbst alludes to the fact that Blacks (whether educated or not) were constantly subject to discriminatory systems which were curtailing their economic advancement.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Mlambo, 'From World War II to UDI', p. 77.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, p. 18.

The colonial state's economic system had managed to stifle the entrepreneurial potential of Blacks in major economic activities like mining, manufacturing or agriculture.¹⁰⁷

Blacks' entrepreneurial activities were mainly restricted to grocery shops, bottle stores, maize grinding mills and transport. These were businesses which had been deliberately set up to serve the Black population either in rural or Black residential areas. Protecting Whites from entrepreneurial Blacks had therefore marked the start of a subtle construction of a mind-set in which Africans were gradually being conditioned to express their entrepreneurial skills by owning or managing small scale businesses instead of large corporate companies.

The economic subjugation had placed a majority of Africans in what Austin describes as 'an economically weak position' from which it was virtually impossible to recover unless changes were made.¹⁰⁸ Understanding the economic activities of the Black diaspora community in Britain could therefore not be achieved outside the context of colonial economic systems that denied Blacks the opportunity to express their entrepreneurial potential deemed to threaten White economic dominance.

Political determination in stifling Blacks socio-economic progression was well articulated in a speech by Godfrey Huggins, Southern Rhodesia's Prime Minister from 1933-53 and the Federation's Prime Minister from 1953-56. In the speech he was emphasising that Black Africans' participation should be that of assisting Whites as labourers and not to compete with them. He stated:

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Austin, *Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa*, p.35.

.... The European in this country can be likened to an island of white in a sea of black ... with the artisan and the tradesman forming the shores and the professional classes the highlands in the centre. Is the native to be allowed to erode away the shores and gradually attack the highlands? To permit this would mean that the leaven of civilisation would be removed from the country, and the Black men would inevitably revert to barbarism worse than before.¹⁰⁹

To consolidate politicians' determination to maintain racial superiority within the economic structures, Anias Mutekwa expresses how adult Black employees were usually 'infanticised'.¹¹⁰ This was apparent when White employers would not address them by name, but as 'boys' or 'girls' regardless of age.¹¹¹ For example, titles like 'house-girl' 'garden-boy', 'house-boy', 'spanner-boy' or 'tea-boy' were used to refer to Black employees. Use of such derogatory titles resulted in a significant number of Blacks being subtly conditioned to believe that relations between Blacks and Whites should be on the basis that Whites are superior and therefore they should be respected. The development of such perceptions would have an impact on the construction of post-colonial Black-White relations both in Zimbabwe and in the Diaspora.

The colonial education system was also a critical component in creating an environment of pseudo meritocracy for Africans. The colonial education system gave pretence of equal opportunity by creating an environment in which Africans would identify education as the

¹⁰⁹ Quote in Munyaradzi Gwisai, 'Revolutionaries, Resistance and Crisis in Zimbabwe' in Leo Leo Zeilig, (Ed)., *Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2009), p. 224.

¹¹⁰ Anias Mutekwa, 'Gendered Beings, Gendered Discourses: The Gendering of Race, Colonialism and Anti-Colonial Nationalism in Zimbabwean Novels', *Social Identities*, vol. 15 (2009), pp. 725-740.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

only route to escape the entrapment of colonial induced poverty.¹¹² Edward Shizha identifies The Education Act of 1966 as one of the most effective laws in giving Africans a false sense of equal opportunities by excluding a majority of them from attaining skills which would allow them to compete with Europeans on the job market.¹¹³ The Act legitimised the marginalisation of African children in the education system by screening and limiting the number of African children who could proceed to secondary school.¹¹⁴ Placing limits on African children who could proceed with their education had therefore constructed a deliberate hierarchical socio-economic stratification of the Black community which had the potential of determining the relations within the Black community.

Embracing education as the most significant and realistic access to upward social mobility was to be a major catalyst influencing how Africans were to construct their personal identities. Personal success for a majority of individuals was to be measured by academic or professional qualifications. However, with limited opportunities to pursue education, a significant number of ambitious and academically gifted Africans were forced to train locally as teachers or nurses or wait for scholarship opportunities to leave the country to pursue their studies. Scholarships offered by the British Council and the Commonwealth to study at British Universities or Colleges emerged to be an escape route for the academically gifted Blacks who wanted to pursue further education but would have been denied the opportunity by racial policies.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Rungano Zvobgo, *Colonialism and Education in Zimbabwe* (Harare: SAPE Books, 1994), p. 14.

¹¹³ Edward Shizha and Edward Kariwo, *Education and Development in Zimbabwe: A Social, Political and Economic Analysis* (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2011), p. 22.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ 'How Britain Aids Africans from Rhodesia', *The Times*, 5 October 1974.

The colonial education system did not only create a sense of meritocracy within the Black community, it also legitimised the creation of racial cliques which were to determine future interracial interactions. This was made possible by embedding a racist discourse in the educational provisions so as to allow them to mirror the hierarchical classification of the population. The colonial state's education system insisted on the creation of a well-funded and resourced separate education for Whites, Coloureds and Asians which was being subsidised by underfunding in African schools.¹¹⁶ African education provisions were effectively bankrupted when education expenditure for Africans was reduced from 8.6% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1965 to 2% in 1967.¹¹⁷ By 1972, £16.60 per student was being spent on African in comparison to £160.70 for Whites, Coloureds and Asians.¹¹⁸ The better funded schools for the Whites, Coloureds and Asians were classified as 'Group A' schools, whilst the poorly resourced 'Group B' schools were for Africans.¹¹⁹ The imperial education system had therefore been designed to create White hegemony since reduced funding for African education meant that most Africans would be trapped in menial jobs.

Africans as occupiers of the lowest threshold in the hierarchical classification of the population were not allowed to enrol at the 'Group A' schools and neither were Coloureds and Asians allowed to enrol at Whites only schools. Educating children separately also created interaction barriers which needed to be dismantled when implementing nation building initiatives in a post-colonial Zimbabwe. However, success of reconciliation initiatives in independent Zimbabwe depended on the extent to which respective ethnic communities were willing to be desensitised from inherited colonial prejudices. Failure to

¹¹⁶ Reginald Austin, *Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa - Rhodesia: A Book of Data* (Paris: UNESCO Press, 1975), pp.44, 45.

¹¹⁷ Shizha and Kariwo, *Education and Development in Zimbabwe*, p.23.

¹¹⁸ Austin, *Racism and Apartheid in Southern Africa*, p.45.

¹¹⁹ Shizha and Kariwo, *Education and Development in Zimbabwe*, p.24.

dismantle race-prejudices in independent Zimbabwe would mean memories of racial boundaries would inevitably be exported into the diaspora thus inhibiting interactions between different ethnic communities.

The educational experience of Jonah, one of the Black participants, revealed the extent of the impact of racial segregation in the colonial education system.¹²⁰ Despite being adopted by a 'White Jewish' Rhodesian couple he recalled how in the 1960s he was forbidden to attend Founders High, a Bulawayo based secondary school for Coloureds and Asians.¹²¹ He had to cycle fifteen miles to the nearest African secondary school. Even after the completion of his 'O' Levels he was not allowed to enrol for a 'book keeping course' at the White dominated Bulawayo Technical College. However, despite his education experiences, he was able to become the first Black bank clerk at one of Bulawayo's 'Founders Building Society' branches in the early 1970s; a position which he believed he could not have attained without his White parents' influence.

The experiences of Jonah ran parallel to those of the oldest male White participants in the research, Gareth and Robert who all started their education in the 1960s.¹²² In 1968, despite not having excelled particularly well at school, Gareth explained how he was able to join the police at a higher rank than Blacks. As for Robert, although he did not have a qualification apart from his 'O' Level, he was still able to secure a job ahead of Blacks in Zimbabwe's financial sector in 1967. By the time Zimbabwe became independent in 1980 he had risen to middle-management level, a position reached through on the job training in which Blacks were naturally overlooked.

¹²⁰ Jonah, Interview, 24 March 2013.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Gareth, Interview, 28th November 2013; Robert, Interview, 13th November 2013.

The health sector, as pointed out by Diana Auret, was also not immune from the impact of colonial pluralistic socio-economic systems based on race.¹²³ Like in other sectors of the colonial society, the racial classification of the population had facilitated the establishment of separate health facilities for Whites (with separate wards for Coloureds and Asians) and Blacks. The major white-only referral hospitals were Harare's Andrew Fleming (now known as Parirenyatwa) and Bulawayo's United Hospitals of Bulawayo. The disparity was clearer in health expenditure and distribution of personnel. For example, in 1979 thirty-two per-cent of the Z\$54.2 million health budget was allocated to Harare's Andrew Fleming.¹²⁴ With regards to personnel distribution, Bulawayo offered a good example. This was when the city's 410,000 Blacks in 1976 were served by one hospital whilst 69,000 Whites had three hospitals.¹²⁵

This racial demarcation in health delivery was also complemented by a two tier-training system for health personnel in which few Blacks, unlike Whites, had the privilege of completing secondary education to enrol for a full three year nurse training which would have entitled them to qualify as a 'State Registered Nurse.'¹²⁶ On the contrary, a majority of Africans who had wanted a career in nursing ended up enrolling for a two year course usually offered by mission schools to gain a lower State Certified Nurse qualification.¹²⁷ The privileges accorded to Whites had therefore not only facilitated White-only hospitals to be manned by White nurses and doctors, they also facilitated the creation of an environment in

¹²³ Diana Auret, *A Decade of Development in Zimbabwe* (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1990), pp.39-40.

¹²⁴ Ibid p.40.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ A. K. H. Weinrich, *Black and White Elites in Rural Rhodesia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1973), p.146.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

which Whites would be placed at the pinnacle of the profession.¹²⁸ These privileges accorded to Whites in the health sector emerged to be a litmus test in determining whether Whites were prepared not only to work with Blacks as equals, but also how far they were prepared to provide health care to those they had accepted to be below them in the hierarchical classification of the population.

Although European formal education pioneered by missionaries facilitated the equipping of Africans with academic or technical skills to improve their economic status, it also has to be recognised that it prompted Africans to either despise or become ignorant of their historic civilisation. By depicting Africans as an illiterate group of people who could not even write their own history, the introduction of formal education positioned itself as a constant reminder to the African community that they should be thankful to colonisation. In the absence of written sources on Africa's history or civilisation it was therefore critical that formal education was to be presented in a way which would ensure that it was a creation and product of a superior European culture.

Describing the Europeanization (and Americanisation) of Africans by the colonial education system, sixty-one year old Edison, a beneficiary of the colonial education system in the 1960s, said:

Shaka the great Zulu warrior was demonised as Shaka the Savage whilst Napoleon was described as Napoleon the Great in history lessons. In geography we knew more about the Alps and the Rocky Mountains... Children at a very young age were taught English

¹²⁸ Rudo Gaidzanwa, *Voting with Their Feet: Migrant Zimbabwean Nurses and Doctors in the Era of Structural Adjustment* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1999), p.16.

Rhymes like *Baa Baa Black Sheep* and *Humpty Dumpty* instead of Shona or Ndebele folk songs...it was therefore not surprising that for most Zimbabweans, being educated did not only mean competently speaking and writing in English, but it was also about how much European or American geography and history you know.¹²⁹

Edison's assertion indicates how the colonial education curriculum had created an African who subconsciously would have started to be sceptical of the relevance of their traditions or history in the face of what appeared to be the modern and progressive culture of Europeans. It was therefore crucial that at independence any nation building initiatives had to be implemented with the aim of freeing Africans from a colonial mentality that national or personal identities should mirror European political or socio-economic structures. Failure to dismantle the colonial constructed African mind-set that the European way of life was more civilised would have an impact on how African immigrants would construct social or economic integration patterns.

Trivialising or undermining African traditions was not only restricted to the colonial education system. Ndlovu-Gatsheni also describes how Christian missionaries both positioned themselves as bearers of Christian ideology and also became agents of cultural imperialism by identifying themselves with an Anglo-Saxon civilising culture.¹³⁰ The introduction of Christianity was based on demonising, despising and undermining traditional African religious beliefs and ways of life. For example, the role of ancestral spirits in African

¹²⁹ Edison, Interview, 17th January 2013.

¹³⁰ Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni 'Mapping Cultural and Colonial Encounters 1880s-1930s', in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, *A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008*, p. 40.

worship was not only equated with demonic worship of people possessed with evil spirits, but was also blamed for stifling social development.¹³¹

To further alienate Africans from their traditions, Christian teachings exposed certain traditional practices as morally wrong and stifling social development. The despised African traditional practices included: the role of ancestral spirits in exposing witchcraft, with those identified being executed even without adequate proof; issues of arranged marriage; and the killing at birth of twins, as twins were believed to be a bad omen.¹³² It was therefore inevitable, as argued by Ndlovu-Gatsheni, that Christian Missionaries' activities were effective in stimulating African consciousness of seeing some aspects of African traditional customs as irrational and oppressive.¹³³

Africans embraced Christianity as a superior emancipating religion which provided refuge against the oppressive and irrational traditional customs. Belittling of ancestral spirits, who had been an integral part of Africans' socio-economic and political systems, was essential in creating an African community which saw itself as a fortunate and grateful recipient of European civilisation. African Christian converts had started a transformation process which made them objects of European civilisation by ceasing to be active and rational participants in the preservation of their history and identity. Christianity had therefore emerged to be an important component in determining any future identity constructions of Black Africans that was to extend into the diaspora.

The Spread of Christianity

¹³¹ Ibid, p.42.

¹³² Ibid

¹³³ Ibid., p.43

Understanding the impact of historically constructed identities and prejudices on Black Zimbabwean immigrants cannot be divorced from the disparity in the spread of Christianity between Shona and Ndebele dominated regions. As suggested by Chengetai Zvobgo's *A History of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe 1890-1939*, there were significant differences in the conversion rate to Christianity between the Mashonaland and Matabeleland regions during the nineteenth and early twentieth century.¹³⁴ The vicissitudes of missionary activities in Shona and Ndebele dominated regions can be attributed to four variable factors: the initial response of the Ndebele to Christianity; the colonisation process; the Anglo-Ndebele war of 1893; and the 1896-97 uprisings.

The diverse nature in the spread of Christianity in the late nineteenth century is shown in Table Four below. Of the fourteen mission stations opened in Zimbabwe during the first decade of colonial rule (1890 to 1900), twelve were in Shona areas. This was despite the pioneering mission work of the London Missionary Society in Matabeleland from 1859.

¹³⁴ Chengetai J M Zvobgo, *A History of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe 1890-1939* (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1996), pp.1-81

Table 4: Spread of Christianity 1860 to 1900

Church	Mashonaland/Manicaland Mission Stations	Matabeleland Mission Stations
London Missionary Society		Inyati (1859) Hope Fountain(1870)
Roman Catholic	Chishawasha(1892) Mzondo (1898)	Empandeni Mission (1879)
Anglican	St Augustine (1891) St. Faith(1891)	
Wesleyan Methodist	Hartleyton Mission (1891) Epworth (1892) Nengubo (1892) Kwenda (1892)	Tegwane (1897)
Dutch Reformed	Morgenster (1891)	
American Board Mission	Mt. Selinda (1893)	
American Methodist Episcopal	Old Umtali (1898)	
Seventh Day Adventist		Solusi (1894)
Salvation Army	Howard Institute(1891)	

Sources: Chengetai J M Zvobgo, *A History of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe 1890-1939* (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1996) ,pp.1-81; Herbert Chimhundu 'Early Missionaries and the Ethnolinguistic Factor during the Invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe' *Journal of African History*, vol. 33 (1992), pp. 87-109

Nineteenth century Ndebele resistance to Christianity marked the start of a process which would lead to diversity in the spread of the religion between Mashonaland and Matabeleland. Zvobgo argues that Ndebele negative response to Christianity had become apparent before colonisation when the pioneers of missionary enterprise in Matabeleland, the London Missionary Society failed to win a single convert between 1859 and 1880.¹³⁵ Ndebele consciousness of their autonomy and the divine nature of their king were

¹³⁵ Zvobgo, *A History of Christian Missions* p .1.

instrumental in the rejection of Christianity.¹³⁶ It was this initial resistance by the Ndebele which naturally stifled the implementation of plans by other missionaries to evangelise the Matabeleland region during the first decade of colonial rule.

The colonisation process which was started by the Pioneer Column in 1890 marked the beginning of the diverse transformation of the Christian missionary enterprise that was to have a long lasting impact on the socio-economic way of life of the Shona and the Ndebele. When the Pioneer Column set off for Mashonaland in 1890, Father Andrew Hartmann, a Jesuit Missionary of the Roman Catholic Church, together with Canon Balfour of the Anglican Church, were Chaplains of the Column.¹³⁷ Upon settling in Mashonaland, the BSAC gave the Anglican Church £600 to cover the expenses of establishing missions in Mashonaland.¹³⁸

The BSAC's generous support, which was extended to other missionaries mainly through the allocation of land, paved the way for an influx of missionaries in Mashonaland before Matabeleland. Working in partnership with the secular BSAC, the missionaries were able to open mission stations in the region. The mission centres as unveiled by Zvobgo's 'A History of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe 1890-1939' had two main objectives; to evangelise and to introduce western education. The objectives of the missionaries were not only invaluable in enabling the new converts to read the bible and church instructions, but they were equipping the Africans with skills to integrate in the colonial socio-economic structures.

Whilst missionary activities were taking off in Shona dominated regions, the progress in Matabeleland was either halted or slowed down in some areas by the Ndebele uprising of

¹³⁶ Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni 'Mapping Cultural and Colonial Encounters 1880s-1930s', p.42.

¹³⁷ Ibid, p. 3.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

1893 and the insurgency of 1896-97 which was carried out by both the Shona and the Ndebele. Although the defeat of both the Shona and the Ndebele in the 1896-97 uprising was followed by an intensification of missionary activities in both Shona and Ndebele regions, the Shona were deemed to be more receptive to Christianity.

Ranger presents an argument showing why the receptiveness of the Shona to Christianity should not be understood outside the context of the manner in which they were defeated in the uprising. Unlike in Matabeleland, he describes how the brutal suppression of the 1896-97 rebellion had caused disillusionment among the Shona.¹³⁹ With the spiritual leaders surrendering unconditionally and suffering the humiliation of being put on trial and executed, a significant number of the Shona turned to the Christian God.¹⁴⁰ Their Shona spiritual leaders had been portrayed as being weak and ineffective when confronted by an enemy worshipping the Christian God.

The epitome of the Shona receptiveness to Christianity according to Zvobgo was the translation of the Bible into the Shona language ahead of the Ndebele language.¹⁴¹ By 1907 the translation of the Bible's New Testament into Shona had been completed. With early European education being pioneered by the missionaries it was inevitable that positive receptiveness to Christianity had resulted in the Shona attaining literacy skills earlier and at a faster rate than the Ndebele. As a result Zvobgo acknowledges that, unlike the Ndebele, 'translation of the scriptures into vernacular enabled literate Shona converts to understand

¹³⁹ Terence Ranger, *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia 1888-1930*, (London: Heinemann, 1970), p. 1

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 3.

¹⁴¹ C J Zvobgo, 'Aspects of Interaction Between Christianity and African Culture in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1893-1934', *Zambezia*, vol. 13 (1986), pp. 43-57.

the teachings of the scriptures better than before' thus triggering more conversions as some Shona took on the role of evangelising.¹⁴²

As more Africans converted to Christianity, Ndlovu-Gatsheni points out how the arrogant attitude of White missionaries triggered a formation of African churches.¹⁴³ Maxwell argues how the Africanised versions of Pentecostalism to emerge from the 1920s had their roots in the Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM) whose first recorded entrance into Southern Rhodesia was in 1916.¹⁴⁴ Although AFM's first mission was in Matabeleland, it was in Mashonaland where there was a rapid growth of African churches. With a high conversion rate in Shona dominated provinces, it soon became apparent that literate entrepreneurial Shona Christians would have the confidence to establish churches to counter the arrogant attitudes displayed by some missionaries.

Maxwell's engagement of the origins of the rise of African Pentecostalism in Southern Rhodesia therefore affirms how Entrepreneurial Africans established Pentecostal Movements which had an ethnic bias in its leadership.¹⁴⁵ As shown in Table 5, the six major African churches to have originated in Southern Rhodesia only two had Ndebele founders. It was this ethnic identity within the African church which started a process of constructing congregations which would mirror the ethnicity of the founder members in subsequent generations including those who migrated to Britain.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'Making Cultural and Colonial Encounters', pp.71-72.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid p.45.

¹⁴⁵ David Maxwell, *African Gifts of the Spirit: Pentecostalism and the Rise of a Zimbabwean Transnational Religious Movement* (Oxford: James Currey, 2006), pp.45-63.

Table 5: African Churches Established 1900-1960

Church	Founder	Established
Zion Apostolic Faith Mission	Samuel Mutendi (Shona)	1925
John Marange, African Apostolic Church	John Marange (Shona)	1932
Gospel Of God Church (Johane Masowe-Chishanu)	Johane Masowe (Shona)	1932
*Apostolic Faith Church of Southern and Central Africa	Morgan Sengwayo (Ndebele)	1955
*Harvest House International Church	Colin and Sarah Nyathi (Ndebele)	1955
Forward in Faith (ZAOGA)	Ezekiel Guti (Shona)	1960

*Established in Matabeleland

Sources: M L Daneel, 'The Growth and Significance of Shona Independent Churches' in M F C Bourdillion, *Christianity South of THE Zambezi* (Gweru, Mambo Press, 1977) pp. 177, 192; M F C Bourdillion, T Mashita and M Glickman, 'Traditional Religion and Independent Church in M F C Bourdillion *Christianity South of THE Zambezi*, p.193; Religion in Zimbabwe, Pentecostal and African Initiated Churches <http://relzim.org/major-religions-zimbabwe/pentecostal-aic/> (First Visited 22 June 2014); David Maxwell, *African Gifts of the Spirit: Pentecostalism and the Rise of a Zimbabwean Transnational Religious Movement* (Oxford: James Currey, 2006), pp.52-54

Shona entrepreneurship that was manifested in the establishment of African churches was also extended to other sectors of the economy. This was a consequence of accessing western education (provided by the mission schools) earlier and at a wider scale than the Ndebele. Embracing western education allowed the Shona to attain numeracy and literacy skills which gave them the confidence to be entrepreneurial by being self-employed or opening businesses thus positively engaging with the socio-economic structures of the colonial state. This became apparent when the earliest recorded licensing of African traders

in 1900 was in Shona regions.¹⁴⁶ There were two African hawkers in Salisbury (Harare) and Fort Victoria (Masvingo).¹⁴⁷

Between 1910 and 1920, Mashonaland's largest city, Harare, continued to experience a growing number of licensed African general-retail shops including the opening of the first ever catering business when a licence was obtained to operate a 'native eating house' in 1921.¹⁴⁸ Two decades into colonisation the Shona in the vicinity of Harare owned a diverse range of businesses which included market gardening, transport businesses using wagons and donkeys, bricklaying, carpentry and tailoring. To emphasise the inextricable link between Christian mission schools and Shona entrepreneurship, Wild points out how those engaged in bricklaying, carpentry or tailoring had taken advantage of the introduction of western education by being trained at the Chishawasha Jesuit Mission near Harare.¹⁴⁹

Although Wild acknowledges that there were a few African market gardeners in Bulawayo, African entrepreneurial activities were not as visible or aggressive as in Harare. A few general-dealers licenses had been issued to a few Africans during the period 1910 to 1921 compared to Harare. The businesses were not as diverse as in Harare during the 1920s as most of the African traders were 'petty commodity producers such as boot-makers and tailors.'¹⁵⁰ The slow progress in the Ndebele became apparent when a survey between 1949 and 1950 revealed that of the ninety shops run by Africans only twenty were run by the

¹⁴⁶ V, Wild, 'An Outline of African Business History in Colonial Zimbabwe', *Zambezia*, vol. 19 (1992), pp. 19-46.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

Ndebele.¹⁵¹ This was because many of the African shop keepers hailed from Northern Rhodesia (Zambia).¹⁵²

The diverse growth of African businesses in Shona and Ndebele regions had therefore created an environment in which there would always be a disproportionate ethnic representation in business ownership throughout the phases of Zimbabwe's history. This marked the development of Shona arrogance and prejudices against the Ndebele by viewing them as being less entrepreneurial. The consequence of the attitudes surrounding the disproportionate ethnic representation in Black Zimbabwean businesses was not to be restricted to colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe, but was to extend into the diaspora.

The Nationalist Movement

Table 6: Nationalist Movement Profile

Nationalist Party	Founded	Leader	Status
Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC)	1957	Joshua Nkomo	Banned 1957
National Democratic Party (NDP)	1960	Joshua Nkomo	Banned
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)	1960	Joshua Nkomo	Split/ Active
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)	1963	Ndabaningi Sithole:1963-1974) (Robert Mugabe:1976-present)	Active

Sources: Alois Mlambo, 'From the Second World War to UDI 1940-1965' in Brian Roftopoulos and Alois Mlambo (Eds), *A History From the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008: Becoming Zimbabwe* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009) pp-104-109

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

The formation of Nationalist Parties (shown in the Table 6 above) from the 1950s signalled a significant transition in Zimbabwean politics. The consequence was the creation of an environment that facilitated development and consolidation of ethnic allegiances and racial prejudices that would be a hindrance to future communities' relations. The split of ZAPU party to form the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in August 1963 marked the beginning of the development of a nationalist ideology which was bankrupt of nation building ideas needed to evade the fragmentation of the nationalist movement along ethnic lines.¹⁵³ The formation of ZANU emerged to be a significant catalyst in constructing an ethnic identity in the nationalist Movement as it challenged Joshua Nkomo's credentials as 'Father of Zimbabwean Nationalism' enjoying relative support from both the Shona and the Ndebele.¹⁵⁴ This was because: the formation of ZANU presented itself as a Shona political party when a significant number of Shona leaders in ZAPU revolted against the leadership of Ndebele speaking Joshua Nkomo. They had become disillusioned by what they perceived as Nkomo's insistence in pursuing non-militant or passive methods of resistance.¹⁵⁵

Besides the fundamental disagreement over methods to be implemented in the liberation struggle, many within what was to be the ZANU leadership criticised Nkomo for eliciting assistance from Asian businessmen and recruiting White advisors.¹⁵⁶ Some of his White advisors identified by Chung included 'Terence Ranger and John Reed from the University of Rhodesia, Leo Baron, a respected lawyer in Bulawayo, and Peter MacKay, a British military specialist'.¹⁵⁷ ZANU's initial resistance to non-Black participation in the nationalist

¹⁵³ Sabelo, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'Dynamics of the Zimbabwe crisis in the 21st century', *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, vol. 3 (2003), pp. 99-134.

¹⁵⁴ Peter Stiff, *Cry Zimbabwe: Independence Twenty Years On* (Johannesburg: Galago, 2000), p. 17.

¹⁵⁵ Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, p.28.

¹⁵⁶ Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, p.61.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

movement courted perceptions of being an anti-White party that could not be trusted in nation building initiatives in an independent Zimbabwe.

Relations within the Nationalist Movement were to undergo further transformation when both nationalist parties embraced the idea of military armed struggle by 1965; a move which resulted in the creation of military wings to spearhead the armed resistance. Shona dominated ZANU's military wing was known as Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and ZAPU's military wing was Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). The respective military wings did not escape the clutches of ethnic identities which permeated the political structures of the nationalist movement.

ZANLA as a military wing of Shona dominated ZANU had the privilege of recruiting from 80% of the African population, mainly in Mashonaland, Masvingo, Manicaland and parts of Midlands.¹⁵⁸ In contrast, ZIPRA's recruitment drive was heavily dependent on 15% Ndebele population mainly residing in Matabeleland and parts of Midlands and West Mashonaland.¹⁵⁹ Access to a larger recruitment area did not only allow ZANLA to operate over a larger geographical area, but they also had significantly more guerrilla fighters than ZIPRA. The glaring difference of the size of the two forces was exposed by Norma Kriger when she noted that of the estimated 28 000 guerrillas fighting in Zimbabwe in 1979, 20 000 were ZANLA fighters.¹⁶⁰

Until 1975 both ZANU and ZAPU with their military wings were based in Lusaka, Zambia. However, this changed in 1975 when the new Mozambican government provided sanctuary

¹⁵⁸ Statistics cited in Saliwe Kawewe, 'Social Welfare of Indigenous Peoples in Zimbabwe', in John Dixon and Robert Scheurell, eds, *Social Welfare with Indigenous Peoples* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 280.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Norma Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. xvii

for ZANU. Mozambique became the administrative and operational external headquarters for ZANU and ZANLA. Using the vast borders of Mozambique, ZANLA entered Zimbabwe through the Shona concentrated eastern and northern borders thus allowing it to operate on a larger scale. Summarising how significant the independence of Mozambique was to Shona dominated ZANU, Fay Chung says 'a black government in Mozambique brought the prospect of thousands of miles of border territory opening up to guerrilla infiltration, so that the defeat of the Rhodesian regime on the battlefield was only a matter of time.'¹⁶¹ Meanwhile, ZAPU continued to be based in Zambia, allowing ZIPRA to enter Zimbabwe through western borders.

Having clearly defined operational regions demarcated by ethnic boundaries exacerbated ethnic tensions between the military wings of the nationalist parties. Violent clashes often occurred when the military wings encroached each other's territory.¹⁶² An ethnic identity within the nationalists' resistance to colonial rule had entered a new phase in which violence, hate speeches and slogans that were once exclusively reserved for the White community were now being used by Blacks against each other.

The disparity in the size of the military wings and having clearly defined geographical areas of influence further provided the platform for the development of ethnic influenced rhetoric in explaining which military wing was contributing the most in the liberation armed struggle for independence. It is undeniable that analysis of contributions to the liberation struggle would have planted a seed of insecurity within the Ndebele community on how they would be treated in a post-colonial Zimbabwe ruled by a Shona dominated government.

¹⁶¹ Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, p. 84.

¹⁶² Zivanayi, Interview, 17th January 2013.

As a minority ethnic community, the Ndebele would not have been naïve of the impact on any historical interpretations in post-colonial Zimbabwe which minimised the contribution of ZAPU or ZIPRA during the armed struggle for independence. The nationalist movement's armed struggle had therefore succeeded in entrenching nostalgic ideas devoid of ethnic unity whose significance was not to be restricted in post-colonial Zimbabwe's borders but was to extend to the diaspora Black community.

Both ZANLA and ZIPRA needed to mobilise mass support to ensure the supply of basic necessities on the frontline. However, Joseph Mtisi, Munyaradzi Nyakudya and Teresa Barnes argue how on many occasions the impoverished peasants already reeling under the oppressive colonial political system were often forced to provide shelter and food.¹⁶³ Failure to provide the expected support would lead to accusations of being a collaborator with the White administration. Regrettably, as argued by Mtisi, Nyakudya and Barnes, there were instances in which personal rivalries or jealousy would result in peasants falsely labelling each other as collaborators with the colonial state.¹⁶⁴ With death or torture being the ultimate punishments of those labelled as collaborators with the colonial regime, there were a significant number of innocent victims of the war.

These methods and disciplinary measures to ensure support were constructing a Black community which was not only fearful of the colonial state's security forces, but also fearful of each other. It was therefore imperative that post-colonial Zimbabwe had to be politically stable so as to build a nation in which relations with the political establishment would not be based on ethnic allegiances or political intimidation. While the nationalist struggle for

¹⁶³ Joseph Mtisi, Munyaradzi Nyakudya and Teresa Barnes, 'Social and Economic Developments During the UDI Period' in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, *A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008*, pp. 154-156.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

independence was promoting and consolidating communalism and fear within Africans, it also undermined race relations necessary for the development of a national identity.

Despite Seirils' references to Coloured nationalists such as Gerry Raftopolous, Elaine and Joseph Culverwell and Herbert Foya-Thompson, the community's involvement in the liberation struggle either as guerrillas or political activists was rare.¹⁶⁵ Ellen, a widowed Coloured Zimbabwean in her sixties once married to one of the Black Nationalist leaders admitted that she was one of the few Coloureds who chose to align with the struggle for independence in 1958.¹⁶⁶ She cited nationalists' attitudes toward Coloureds for playing a significant role in restricting their participation in the armed struggle.¹⁶⁷ She recalled how she had 'to fight for recognition within the nationalist movement because of her mixed race background.' This was despite proving her allegiance to the nationalist cause by quitting her nursing job so as to support her husband who was part of the nationalist movement leadership.¹⁶⁸ For her, this was an expected response since a significant number of Blacks within the nationalist movement regarded Coloureds (and Asians) as beneficiaries of the colonial state and therefore as individuals should not be trusted.

The issue of (mis)trust is reinforced by Mtisi, Nyakudya and Barnes when they point out that Coloureds were perceived by most Blacks as being vulnerable to shifting allegiances.¹⁶⁹ It had become an irrefutable fact among Africans that a majority of Coloureds and Asians would rather collaborate with the colonial systems than support any Black led political movement whose victory might lead to a potential loss of their privileges.

¹⁶⁵ Seirils, 'Undoing the United Front?', pp. 73-93.

¹⁶⁶ Ellen, Interview, 7th March, 2013.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Mtisi, Nyakudya and Barnes, 'Social and Economic Development During the UDI Period' pp. 154-156.

With insignificant support from Coloureds and Asians against White colonial rule the nationalist movement's construction of the idea of a nation evolved into racist rhetoric.¹⁷⁰

The wide use of the Shona slogan *mwana wevhu* (child of the soil) within ZANU as reference to the indigenous population naturally delegitimised claims of being Zimbabwean by Whites, Asians, Coloureds, and to some extent those from the Ndebele community.¹⁷¹ The use of these Shona slogans had therefore served to confirm how ZANU, as the biggest nationalist movement, was bankrupt of nation building policies. The slogans were helping send subtle messages, undermining the prospect of equal opportunities in a future independent Zimbabwe. ZANU was constructing perceptions of being anti-White, Coloured or Asian with the potential of practicing reverse racism once in power in a post-colonial Zimbabwe.

The Post-Colonial Era

The decolonisation of Zimbabwe in 1980 cannot be solely attributed to the national movement's armed struggle. The Lancaster House Constitution agreed at cross party negotiations held in London from September to December 1979 emerged to be the most significant event which ensured a peaceful transition from colonial rule to multi-party democracy.¹⁷² During the first decade of independence, Zimbabwe was to be governed under the terms of the Lancaster House Constitution. Amendment to the constitution

¹⁷⁰ Ibid p.124.

¹⁷¹ Ezra Chitando 'Towards Land Answers? Spirituality, Reconciliation and Resettlement in Zimbabwe', *Bulletin for Contextual Theology in Africa*, Vol. 5, (1998), pp.55-60.

¹⁷² Tor Sellstrom, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa*, Vol. II, *Solidarity and Assistance 1970-1994* (Stockholm: Nordiska Afrika Institute, 2002), p.225.

during the ten years required a unanimous parliamentary vote from the one hundred cross party parliamentarians in Zimbabwe's new parliament.¹⁷³

Without an undisputed armed struggle victory, Mugabe's government had inherited a bruised but undefeated settler state which contained anachronistic elements that had the potential of becoming hostile to the political project of the new regime.¹⁷⁴ Implementing nation building initiatives to promote cordial relations between Whites and Blacks would reflect the fact that colonial rule had not been solely terminated by an outright nationalist's armed struggle victory but by the Lancaster House Constitution agreement.¹⁷⁵

Although the Lancaster constitution paved the way for a manageable transition to multi-party democracy, the constitution embodied a series of compromises which involuntarily gave the minority White community racial protection.¹⁷⁶ In the first decade, in which Zimbabwe was to be governed under the constitution, Whites were not only guaranteed continuous ownership of land acquired under colonial rule, but, more significantly, they were also granted a political voice.¹⁷⁷ Of the one hundred seats in the newly established National Assembly, twenty seats were reserved for Whites.¹⁷⁸ Reserved parliamentary seats for Whites could not be abolished within seven years of independence without a hundred per-cent vote in the parliament.¹⁷⁹ The political and economic protection of Whites under the terms of the Lancaster House Constitution proved to be that litmus test for determining

¹⁷³ James Muzondidya, 'From Buoyancy to Crisis 1980-1997', in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, *A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008*, p. 172.

¹⁷⁴ Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, p.30.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Muzondidya, 'From Buoyancy to Crisis 1980-1997', p.172.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid p.173.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

if members of the White community would be genuine participants in dismantling their historical privileges in independent Zimbabwe.

Despite securing the political and economic protection of Whites, the Lancaster House Constitution failed to explicitly address how the economic and political welfare of Coloureds and Asians would be managed in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Instead, Martyn Gregory explains how the communities were grouped together with the White community on the Voter's Roll for the 1980 multi-party democratic elections.¹⁸⁰ In a subtle way, the outcome of the Lancaster House negotiations had therefore set in motion the potential marginalisation of the Coloured and Asian communities in independent Zimbabwe. By being grouped with Whites, both communities were being placed at the periphery of society's social strata without official recognition that they had exclusive needs which needed to be catered for if they were to attain upward social mobility in post-colonial Zimbabwe.

Failure to officially recognise Coloureds and Asians at the Lancaster House negotiations had placed the respective communities in a precarious and complex position when attempting to construct a post-colonial identity. The Lancaster House Constitution had unwittingly started the construction of perceptions within the Coloured and Asian communities that post-colonial Zimbabwe would be a bifurcated society of Blacks and Whites, with Coloureds and Asians as invisible occupancies. This perceived bi-polarisation of Zimbabwe's complex multicultural society was always going to bring much scrutiny on how the reconciliation project in independent Zimbabwe was to cater for both the victims and beneficiaries of Zimbabwe's colonial past.

¹⁸⁰ Martyn Gregory, 'The Zimbabwe Election: The political and Military Implications', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 7 (1980), pp. 17-37.

The Lancaster House Constitution's racial partnership agreement between Whites and Blacks could not be translated to the ethnically polarised nationalist movement. The only symbolic gesture of the nationalist movement's unity was when ZANU and ZAPU delegates attended the Lancaster House negotiations under one umbrella known as the Patriotic Front (PF). However, without a sustainable unity pact agreement, the Patriotic Front coalition collapsed when the two nationalist parties resolved to contest the first multi-democratic elections in February 1980 as rivals. The decision to contest the elections as rivals trivialised the adoption of the term Patriotic Front by both parties. ZANU led by Robert Mugabe became known as ZANU PF and ZAPU under Joshua Nkomo known as PF ZAPU.

The decision by the two parties to contest the elections as rivals placed their supporters on a collision course with each other in the run-up period to the elections. Peter Stiff describes how ethnic driven intimidation as a method of electioneering became endemic in both ZANU PF and PF ZAPU controlled areas.¹⁸¹ Just as it was during the liberation struggle, any opposing election agents who ventured into either ZANU PF or PF ZAPU controlled areas were either harassed or in extreme cases murdered.¹⁸² The violent clashes between supporters of the major nationalist political parties exposed how trivial a nation building agenda was within the leadership of the nationalist movement. The violence only served to confirm that the Nationalist Movement's leadership had been too focused in removing minority rule to the extent that they negated the urgency of formulating policies to deal with ethnic conflicts.

¹⁸¹ Peter Stiff, *Cry Zimbabwe: Independence Twenty Years On* (Johannesburg: Galago, 2000), p. 23.

¹⁸² Ibid, p. 23.

Zimbabwe's ethnic demographics proved to be a major determinant in defining the outcome of the elections within the Black electorate. With the Shona constituting 80% of Zimbabwe's population, the Shona dominated ZANU PF party emerged as clear winners with 63% of the votes while PF ZAPU managed only 24%.¹⁸³ Mugabe ZANU PF's landslide victory meant that out of the eighty seats reserved for Blacks in the one hundred seat national assembly, ZANU PF had a majority with fifty-seven seats, Nkomo's PF ZAPU controlling twenty seats, while Unite African National Council (UANC) led by Abel Muzorewa, Prime Minister of the short-lived 1979 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government only three seats.¹⁸⁴ The election results had therefore theoretically given Mugabe the mandate to control the entire country including the two Ndebele Matabeleland provinces where at most only ten per-cent of the electorate had voted for him.¹⁸⁵

Despite the Commonwealth Observers' Group (COG) describing the elections as 'free and fair', Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Terence Ranger reveal how a significant number of the Ndebele rejected ZANU PF victory.¹⁸⁶ These were individuals who convinced themselves that a combination of Shona numerical advantage, foul play, favouritism of ZANU PF by the British and neglect of PF ZAPU had led to ZANU PF's victory.¹⁸⁷ However, one outcome which was certain was that the election results confirmed that Nkomo's

¹⁸³ Masipula Sithole and John Makumbe, 'Elections in Zimbabwe: The ZANU PF Hegemony and its Incipient Decline', *African Journal of Political Science*, Vol.2 (1997), pp. 122-139.

¹⁸⁴ Mtisi, Nyakudya and Barnes, 'War in Rhodesia 1965-1980', p.166.

¹⁸⁵ Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, p .3.

¹⁸⁶ Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Terence Ranger, *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the Dark Forests of Matabeleland* (Oxford: James Currey, 2000), pp. 180-181.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

credentials as ‘father of Zimbabwe nationalism’ had been rejected by all except the Ndebele ethnic community.¹⁸⁸

Whilst the Black electorate voting pattern reinforced ethnic allegiances, the White voters were creating a new dimension in post-colonial racial relations by voting for Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front party. The Rhodesian Front won all twenty seats reserved for Whites.¹⁸⁹ The Rhodesian Front’s monopoly of the reserved seats for Whites meant that the White electorate had given Ian Smith the political mandate to represent them despite being the architect of UDI which had prolonged minority rule. Victory by Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front had therefore made the White community vulnerable to accusations by Blacks that they were not ready to abandon the architecture of the undemocratic political system which had prolonged colonial rule. The development of such racial perceptions would naturally bring much scrutiny on how Whites would respond to government’s reconciliation policies in the nation building project.

Political Reconciliation Policy

The outcome of Zimbabwe’s first democratic elections exposed historic ethnic and racial polarisation which carried the potential of undermining community relations essential in creating a national identity. Martins identified the political outcome in the 1980 elections as a major contributory factor to the political naivety of a majority of older Whites.¹⁹⁰ He remembered how his parents and many other Whites were petrified when Mugabe won the elections. They had hoped that Nkomo, whom they perceived as a ‘moderate’, would win

¹⁸⁸ Stiff, *Cry Zimbabwe*, p. 17.

¹⁸⁹ Norma Kriger, ‘ZANU (PF) Strategies in General Elections, 1980–2000: Discourse and Coercion, *African Affairs*, Vol. 104 (2005), pp. 1–34.

¹⁹⁰ Martins, Interview, 17th January, 2013.

the elections.¹⁹¹ Martins believes it was the outcome of the elections which undermined the resolve by some Whites to be part of a non-racial nation, hence the continuation by some to live on their farms with very little interaction with Blacks until they were violently evicted in 2000.¹⁹²

Therefore, to allay any fears of those who felt politically insecure under a ZANU PF government, Mugabe in his maiden speech on 4 March 1980 called for reconciliation and national unity. The speech was aimed at stimulating a national consciousness by encouraging Zimbabweans to think beyond racial and ethnic boundaries which had polarised the country for over ninety years. Emphasising the need for reconciliation, Mugabe said:

I urge you whether black or white, to join me in a new pledge, to forget our grim past, forgive others and forget, join hands in a new amity and together as Zimbabweans, trample upon racism, tribalism and regionalism.¹⁹³

To practically implement the reconciliation drive, the first cabinet of independent Zimbabwe did not only consist of victorious ZANU PF members but it also included individuals from both PF ZAPU and the white community. In an attempt to appease PF ZAPU supporters, six of the thirty-five cabinet seats were reserved for PF ZAPU.¹⁹⁴ The most significant PF ZAPU

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Quoted in Josephine Lucy Fisher, *Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles: The Decolonisation of White Identity in Zimbabwe* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010), p. 28.

¹⁹⁴ Gregory, 'From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe', pp. 17-37.

cabinet member was Joshua Nkomo who assumed the role of Home Affairs minister with a remit of controlling the police.¹⁹⁵

In a significant conciliatory gesture towards the White community, Mugabe appointed the former Rhodesian Front Finance Minister, David Smith, as the new Minister for Commerce and Industry, and the president of the White commercial farmers' National Farmers Union, Dennis Norman, as the new Minister of Agriculture.¹⁹⁶ The appointment of Whites into the cabinet reassured Whites who feared that Mugabe's ZANU PF would implement the anti-White rhetoric popularised during the colonial era. The immediate visible impact of Mugabe's reconciliation policy on the White community was the slowing down of White emigration which had peaked at 1 558 in May 1980 compared to 1 278 in April of the same year.¹⁹⁷

Coloureds and Asians were also part of the reconciliation drive. Although Coloureds were not given any cabinet ministerial posts, they felt represented in the Government when Joseph Culverwell (Coloured community leader) was appointed a Senator in 1980 and Deputy Minister of Education and Culture between 1981 and 1988. To allay the fears of the Asian community, Mugabe, at an Asian organised fundraising dinner in 1984 encouraged Asians to maximise their business skills as members of 'one unified nation'. Whist making reference to the expulsion of Ugandan Asians in 1972 he reassured them they were 'citizens of the country' and had an important part to play in the nation building project.¹⁹⁸

The Matabeleland Civil Conflict (Gukurahundi)

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ *The Herald Newspaper*, '1 558 Quit in May', 20 August 1980, p.1.

¹⁹⁸ Fisher, *Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles*, p. 32.

Despite political initiatives to pacify PF ZAPU supporters under Mugabe's reconciliation policy, it was not long before the envisaged nation building project started to be derailed by the re-emergence of historic politically driven ethnic tensions.¹⁹⁹ With Mugabe's ZANU PF government pursuing nation building policies based on the party's socialist ideological framework of 'absolute power and moral authority within a one party state political and ideological framework', PF ZAPU and its Ndebele supporters were at risk of being accused of derailing any nation building processes spearheaded by a Shona dominated government.²⁰⁰ The vulnerability of the Ndebele in the process of building a new nation became a reality in February 1982 when military weapons were discovered on properties owned by PF ZAPU. Responding to the discovery of the arms cache, Mugabe accused PF ZAPU of harbouring a pre-independence hidden agenda of wanting to dispose a Shona led government if they lost elections.²⁰¹

Mugabe's treason accusations against PF ZAPU's leadership undermined any prospects of finding a peaceful solution to the discovery of weapons. This was after the government started a coordinated and ruthless process of ending PF ZAPU's participation in the coalition government. PF ZAPU leaders were arrested and detained without trial, and former Ndebele ZIPRA fighters were side-lined in the newly integrated Zimbabwe National Army.²⁰² By the

¹⁹⁹ Muzondidya and Gatsheni, 'Echoing Silences', pp. 275-297.

²⁰⁰ Ndlovu-Gatsheni 'The Post-Colonial State and Matabeleland: Regional Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations, 1980-2002', in Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra and Diane Abrahams, *Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2003), p. 22.

²⁰¹ *The Herald Newspaper*, 'Mugabe to Grill ZIPRA Command about Weapons', 8 February 1982. p.1.

²⁰² Ndlovu-Gatsheni 'The Post-Colonial State & Matabeleland: Regional Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations, 1980-2002' in Williams, Cawthra and Abrahams (eds), *Ourselves to Know*, p. 24.

end of February 1982, Mugabe had sacked Nkomo, removed all PF ZAPU members from the coalition cabinet and confiscated PF ZAPU properties.²⁰³

The arrest and sacking of PF ZAPU leaders (a majority of whom were Ndebele) became part of government propaganda in stimulating awareness that the Shona would not tolerate any political forces which were bent on destabilising the country. An example of an ethnic dimension in the conflict was evident when the state controlled national newspaper, *The Herald*, reported that hundreds of people in the Shona regions of Harare and Mashonaland cheered and demonstrated in support of Mugabe's sacking of Nkomo.²⁰⁴ The flaring up of ethnic suspicions and tensions subtly engineered by the state media undermined the sincerity of Mugabe's reconciliation narrative in addressing the historical ethnic tensions. Zimbabwe, two years into independence, was on the brink of a violent political upheaval that was to radically determine post-colonial ethnic relations within Zimbabwe's Black community.

In protest at what they believed was deliberate persecution and polarisation of the Ndebele by Mugabe's government, a group of disgruntled former ZIPRA fighters took up arms against the government. Although the bulk of the dissidents consisted of ex-ZIPRA fighters, Alexander, McGregor and Ranger note that some Ndebele opportunist civilians also joined the disgruntled dissidents, taking advantage of the situation to commit crimes or carry out personal vendettas.²⁰⁵ Without a clear political ideology and operating in former ZAPU controlled areas Alexander, McGregor and Ranger describe how the dissidents carried out acts of sabotage on government institutions, dams and communication and transport

²⁰³ *The Herald Newspaper*, 'Mugabe Sacks Nkomo –All ZAPU out of Cabinet', 18 February 1982 p.1

²⁰⁴ *The Herald Newspaper*, 'Hundreds Cheer Nkomo's Fall', 19 February 1982, p.1.

²⁰⁵ Alexander, McGregor and Ranger, *Violence and Memory*, p. 192.

networks.²⁰⁶ Civilians such as White commercial farmers, members of the Shona community and foreign tourists were attacked and in some cases murdered.²⁰⁷

Faced with the possibility of the newly independent Zimbabwe disintegrating into political turmoil, Mugabe had to act decisively against insurgents and their supporters whom the government had identified as the Ndebele. There were two major reasons why the Ndebele were identified as supporters of the dissidents. These were: the dissidents had chosen a tribalism discourse by attacking the Shona when expressing their disgruntlement; and they were operating in Matabeleland or areas with a significant Ndebele population where they would have been guaranteed the support they needed to carry out their operations.

To dismantle the perceived civilian dissident support network, Mugabe authorised the sending of the North Korean trained soldiers of the Fifth Brigade into Matabeleland province to 'apply a military solution to the dissident problem'.²⁰⁸ The Fifth Brigade, which was only answerable to Mugabe, was entirely a Shona crack unit 'with carefully chosen Ndebele speakers who were incorporated because of their knowledge of Matabeleland provinces terrain and language'.²⁰⁹ With knowledge inherited from the liberation struggle on guerrilla tactics, the army's objective was to decisively eliminate the source of dissident support that had been identified as Ndebele civilians.

The process of dismantling dissident support would therefore include ruthless and brutal attacks on the Ndebele community. These attacks left lasting physical and psychological effects on the Ndebele community. It is estimated that twenty thousand members of the

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, p.169.

²⁰⁹ Ndlovu-Gatsheni 'The Post-Colonial State and Matabeleland', p. 25.

Ndebele community were murdered by the security forces between 1985 and 1987.²¹⁰ To instil fear, community members would be forced to come and witness torture and murder so as to discourage them from supporting the dissidents. Rape, depriving people of food by burning granaries and closing grocery shops in rural areas and detentions without trial were also methods used to deter people from supporting the insurgency. To undermine Ndebele particularism, the Ndebele were forced to speak Shona or risk being murdered or tortured.²¹¹

The attacks carried out by the Fifth Brigade on the Ndebele were known by a Shona word 'Gukurahundi' translated as 'the rain that washes away chaff from the last harvest before the spring'.²¹² To the Ndebele this meant that the harvest was the achievement of independence and the Ndebele were the chaff that was to be washed away before the spring rain which was the establishment of a one-party state in a united Zimbabwe under the control of a Shona government.²¹³ The brutal suppression of dissidents and the use of a Shona word to describe it only served to exacerbate post-colonial ethnic tensions.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that the response by the Fifth Brigade had evoked pre-colonial memories of the Ndebele raids on the Shona which became a hindrance in unifying an ethnically polarised state. Some within the Ndebele community struggled with how they could be active participants in nation building when the Shona led military forces were carrying out what they believed were punishments for their pre-colonial transgressions

²¹⁰ Ian Phimister 'The Making and Meanings of the Massacres in Matabeleland', *Development Dialogue* Vol. 50 (2008), pp.197-214.

²¹¹ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'The Post-Colonial State and Matabeleland', p.25.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

against the Shona.²¹⁴ Gukurahundi had therefore placed the country on a tribal mode which was to determine the construction of future relations between the Shona and the Ndebele.

Parallel to the military campaign in Matabeleland was the continuation of a sustained government propaganda campaign based on a biased narrative of the liberation struggle. National events meant to unite the nations like Independence and Heroes day celebrations degenerated into ZANU PF political rallies where Mugabe and ZANU PF were presented as the only authentic heroes of the liberation struggle. Mugabe and ZANU PF were elevated as heroic liberators or nation builders whilst Ndebele dominated PF ZAPU's contribution was trivialised, downplayed or denigrated.²¹⁵ PF ZAPU's leadership was being depicted as cowards and villains who were a threat to Zimbabwe's hard won independence made possible by Mugabe's ZANU PF.²¹⁶

With increasing Ndebele civilian casualties and with the Ndebele leadership in prison or under house arrest, there was need for a peaceful solution to end the Matabeleland insurgency. On 22 December 1987 a 'Unity Accord' was signed between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU. Under the unity agreement, the two parties merged to form a new ZANU PF party led by Mugabe with Nkomo assuming the party's vice president post. However, to most ordinary Ndebele the 'Unity Accord' was a non-event since it failed to erase the bitterness and memories of the Fifth Brigade atrocities.²¹⁷ Neither did the 'Unity Accord' end Shona dominance in the country's socio-economic structures.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Brilliant Mhlanga, 'Ethnicity or Tribalism? The Discursive Construction of Zimbabwean National Identity' *African Identities*, vol.11 (2013), pp.47-60.

²¹⁶ Alexander, McGregor and Ranger, *Violence and Memory*, p. 1.

²¹⁷ Sobantu Sibanda 'The Quest for Unity, Peace and Stability in Zimbabwe', in David Kaulemu, ed., *The Struggles After the Struggle* (Washington: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2008), p. 55.

Post-Gukurahundi continuation of Shona dominance was not only restricted to Shona regions but also in Matabeleland as highlighted in 1999 by Abel Siwela, the mayor of Bulawayo. He bemoaned the fact that 'the civil service and the private sectors are staffed up to 80% or 90% with non-residents. Out of 15 to 20 bank managers in Bulawayo only two are Ndebele; an environment which some Ndebele community leaders described as shonalisation of the region.'²¹⁸

The economic marginalisation of Matabeleland during the Gukurahundi civil conflict and the atrocities committed by the army on the Ndebele as noted by Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni would have undoubtedly consolidated feelings of despondency when pursuing economic integration processes to compete with the Shona.²¹⁹ Linda, a Ndebele immigrant now living in Leicester claimed how under the pretext of Gukurahundi, the government would frustrate entrepreneurial Ndebele by requiring them to send their business plans to Harare for approval.²²⁰ The centralisation of business applications in Harare undermined the nation-building project by creating the right environment in which the Ndebele would develop perceptions of being discriminated against.

The development of Ndebele perceptions that they were being economically marginalised could not have been avoided since a majority of their business applications were being handled by Shona civil servants who were subject to Gukurahundi propaganda of demonising the Ndebele. For Linda, her perceptions of economic discrimination became justified when an acquaintance working at the offices confided in her by revealing how at

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Muzondidya and Gatsheni, 'Echoing Silences', pp. 275-297.

²²⁰ Linda, Interview, 1 September 2013.

times ‘they were instructed not to approve Ndebele business applications’.²²¹ The rapid rise of Shona-owned businesses especially in transport and retail shops in Bulawayo during Gukurahundi validated perceptions that the government was deliberately frustrating potential entrepreneurial Ndebele who could have challenged Shona dominance in the business sector. With this ethnic disparity in business enterprise the Shona were presented as more entrepreneurial than the Ndebele, thus allowing historic identities and prejudices to be consolidated; identities and prejudices which were to be exported to the diaspora.

Even at the University of Zimbabwe, the Ndebele felt they were not being fully incorporated into the Shona dominated student community. Taku who was a student in the early 1990s recalled how the proportional representation of the Ndebele students was ‘not a true reflection of Zimbabwe’s Ndebele population’.²²² Without any success of being represented in the Student Union because of their low numbers Taku explained how a majority of them ended up being assimilated into the Shona student body.²²³ With depressed Ndebele visibility at the university, the Shona continued to nurture colonial developed perceptions that they were more inclined to pursue higher education than the Ndebele.²²⁴

Lenny, a Zimbabwean based business executive who in the 1990s was part of a taskforce which was asked to identify reasons for under representation of the Ndebele in Zimbabwe’s economic structures, blamed the Ndebele’s response to socio-economic marginalisation.²²⁵ He pointed out how migrating to South Africa and not pursuing higher education had always been the most viable option for a majority of Ndebele young men and women who were

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Taku, Interview, 21 March 2013.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Lenny, Interview, 28 July 2013.

seeking upward social mobility. Although he acknowledged Ndebele marginalisation during Gukurahundi, he was able to draw parallels with the Shona's responses to marginalisation during the colonial era. Whilst the Shona were seen to be embracing education, he argued that for a majority of the Ndebele young generation

...there was not so much emphasis on education attainment as a means of facilitating upward social mobility. On completion of Form Four ['O' level] *eZansi* [South Africa] was the next destination for a significant number. In contrast the Shona did not have the luxury of a country they could find solace in as they did not have a country they shared ancestral links with. For the Shona, education attainment and entrepreneurship had always been their escape route.²²⁶

The post-colonial era political events had therefore jeopardised the implementation of a cohesive nation building process by facilitating the reincarnation of historical ethnic allegiances. Shona dominance in the country's socio-economic and political structures had created the right environment that would make the Ndebele feel insecure in an environment in which the Shona dominated. By being numerically superior, Shona dominance had subtly made the claim that they were the legitimate indigenous people of Zimbabwe.

Racial Reconciliation: Economy

²²⁶ Ibid.

At independence, the new government inherited a well-developed economy with an annual growth rate averaging 3.4% during the 1980s.²²⁷ However Mazingi and Kamidza disclose how this well-developed economic structure still moulded by colonial racist policies was controlled by Whites with Blacks at the periphery of the economic structures.²²⁸ The racial imbalances in the economy were well represented in the distribution of wages and salaries. Blacks who accounted for 97.6% of the population received a disproportionate 60% of the wages and salaries with the rest being distributed among Whites, Coloureds and Asians who were less than 3% of the population.²²⁹

This racial disparity in the distribution of wealth became a critical baseline to evaluate whether Zimbabwe's independence was all about political independence for Blacks with insignificant economic empowerment. Success of the reconciliation discourse depended on the extent the economy would be transformed so as to allow Blacks to participate in the productive sectors of mining, farming and manufacturing. Therefore, for Zimbabwe's post-colonial nation building project to be meaningful for Africans, Whites had to undertake personal transformation by supporting any initiatives to economically empower Blacks. This would be an essential component in the process of liberating themselves from a sense of colonial superiority within the socio-economic structures.

Regrettably, Karen Alexander alludes to the fact that the Lancaster House Constitution's economic and political provisions subtly encouraged a majority of Whites not to positively

²²⁷ Tony Addison and Llsa Laakso, 'The Political Economy of Zimbabwe's Descent into Conflict', *Journal of International Development*, vol.15 (2003), pp. 457-470.

²²⁸ Mazingi and Kamidza, 'Inequality in Zimbabwe', pp.326-327.

²²⁹ Ibid, p.326.

engage with nation building initiatives of economically empowering Blacks.²³⁰ This became evident when the rapid 'Africanisation' of the public sector could not be replicated in the private sector where the government had no direct influence.²³¹ Muzondidya attributed this to difficulties most entrepreneurial Blacks experienced in their attempts to obtain loans from the White controlled banks to challenge the economic dominance of Whites.²³²

Ninety years of economic marginalisation had meant that a majority of entrepreneurial Blacks did not have the collateral to act as protection if they wanted any bank loans to start large scale businesses. As a result, the productive sectors of the economy continued to be closed to a majority of Black entrepreneurs.²³³ Without the financial means to participate in the most productive sectors of the economy, aspiring Black entrepreneurs continued to be visible in the sectors of the economy which had become synonymous with Black businesses (identified earlier in the chapter). Regrettably, the environment allowed the subtle continuation of colonial constructed perceptions that Whites were indispensable to Zimbabwe's economic success.

Perceptions that Blacks could not competently run the economy were further consolidated when the government took over the management of twenty public enterprises spread across all sectors of the economy which had been successfully run during the colonial era.²³⁴ These included the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (Rhodesia Iron and Steel Company), the Grain Marketing Board, National Railways of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia Railway Lines), Air

²³⁰ Karen Alexander, 'Orphans of the Empire: An Analysis of Elements of White Identity and Ideology Construction in Zimbabwe', in Brian Raftopoulos and Tyrone Savage, (eds), *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation* (Cape Town: Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, 2004), p.194.

²³¹ James Muzondidya 'From Buoyancy to Crisis 1980-1997', p. 171.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Gideon Zhou 'Three Decades of Public Enterprise Restructuring in Zimbabwe: A Will-Of-The-Wisp Chase?' *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, vol. 2 (2012), pp. 175.

Zimbabwe (Rhodesia Airlines), the Cotton Marketing Board, and Cold Storage Commission, among others.²³⁵ These public enterprises, especially those in agriculture, had become a bastion of the colonial administration and a buffer against the threatening international sanctions by 'subsidising inputs and promoting access to credit facilities to White commercial farmers.'²³⁶

However, against this colonial backdrop of economic success Gideon Zhou describes how the newly acquired state companies started to operate under 'untenable operational frameworks of dilapidated infrastructure and equipment, huge debts, undercapitalization, skills deficits, vandalism and looting by top ranking government officials and politicians...operating below optimal levels, failing to service bills and facing frequent threats of industrial action from employees.'²³⁷ It was therefore not surprising that the decline of once thriving state enterprises dented the credibility of Blacks to run public or large corporate companies whilst inadvertently endorsing colonial constructed perceptions that Whites were better in managing macro businesses. For most Black participants these perceptions were justifiable as they would make comparisons with companies under White ownership such as Olivine, Lever Brothers, and Rio Tinto.

Land ownership emerged to be the most contentious issue, symbolising the reluctance by some Whites to dismantle their colonial economic privileges and the accompanying prejudices that they were more economically competent than Blacks. Taking advantage of the 'willing-buyer' and 'willing-seller' principle enshrined in the Lancaster House Constitution, a significant number of White farmers frustrated any redistribution of land to

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid, p.182.

the landless Black population.²³⁸ With very few willing to sell their vast farms, a majority continued to hold on to their productive arable land. As a result, most Black farmers continued to be trapped in subsistence or semi-commercial farming on land inherited from the colonial era.

As the Black population increased, the urgency of addressing the land issue is captured by Muzondidya when he points out that by 1987 'the population in the Communal Lands had risen to 5.1 million and the national average population density was 36 people square km, up from 3.9 million and 27 in 1982. The failure by the government to deliver land...posed a challenge to national stability as peasants became more militant in their demands.'²³⁹

White farmers' abdication from an honest engagement with land redistribution gradually evolved into racial tensions based on perceptions of mistrust, with the potential of derailing nation building initiatives. The indifferent attitude of Whites towards the land reform programme had put them on a collision course with the landless Black population who believed reclaiming the land was one of the most significant missing pieces in the independence jigsaw puzzle. For Blacks, any post-colonial sustainable and meaningful racial reconciliation could not take place without a White supported land reform programme to economically empower the Blacks.

With Blacks continuing to dominate the periphery of the productive sectors of the economy by the end of the first decade, Zimbabwe's independence had failed to translate to Black economic empowerment. Whites continued to enjoy socio-economic luxuries they had been accustomed to during the colonial era, thus failing to release themselves from the colonial

²³⁸ James Muzondidya, 'From Buoyancy to Crisis 1980-1997', p.171.

²³⁹ Ibid, p. 190.

mentality of being economically superior to Blacks. A significant number of Black Zimbabweans had therefore migrated with a mind-set that put entrepreneurship at the periphery of their integration patterns as they would not have had the opportunity to engage in business activities to challenge Whites.

However, it would be naïve to conclude that continuation of a mind-set in which Whites were made to feel indispensable to the economic viability of post-colonial Zimbabwe could only be attributed to reluctance by some Whites to dismantle their colonial economic privileges. Herbst also identifies the Nationalist Movement as playing a part in the economic marginalisation of Blacks during the early years of independence. He points out how the Nationalist Movement's focus on removing White rule through armed struggle negated the need to develop a comprehensive ideology and manpower to effectively manage the inherited sophisticated and efficient agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors.²⁴⁰ Therefore, as a means of preventing a collapse of the inherited infrastructure and economy, the new government was to be indebted to the expertise of the whites to continue to run the economy. The result was the continuation of a mind-set among Zimbabweans that Whites were better administrators of the Zimbabwe's economy.

The perceived invaluable role of Whites in Zimbabwe's economy was recognised by the Minister of Labour and Social Services, Kumbirai Kangai, in an address to White commercial farmers in 1980. In his attempts to discourage White emigration he expressed how he was amazed that after fighting so bravely during the war they were now emigrating from peaceful Zimbabwe by saying: '...through thick and thin you persisted in carrying on and were able to produce substantial outputs. I am extremely concerned to hear that there are

²⁴⁰ Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, p.32.

quite a number of farmers already giving up, and many more thinking along the same lines...This is your home. We want you to stay.'²⁴¹

The government's message encouraged officials of the White Commercial Farmers Union to tour the country reassuring their members and asking them not to emigrate.²⁴² With Whites feted by the new political establishment, there was a slow process in the disengagement of the colonial mentality of seeing themselves as being custodians of Zimbabwe's economy. The integration of Whites in the diaspora (to be discussed in chapter four) would therefore not escape the influence of the socio-economic privileges and prejudices developed in the colonial and continued to be relevant in independent Zimbabwe.

Racial Reconciliation: Education and Health

To redress colonial inequitable practices in education, the Zimbabwe government committed itself to universal accessibility to educational opportunities by abolishing primary school tuition. This was to allow African children from lower socio-economic backgrounds to attend school. However, post-colonial democratisation of the education system by making it accessible to all failed to dismantle the remnants of the colonial two tier education system characterised by elite institutions.²⁴³ Without legislation to control the building of private schools, standardisation of tuition fees or school development levies, inequities between the former Group A and B schools continued to exist.

²⁴¹ *The Herald*, 'Kangai calls on farmers to stay', 18 July 1980 p.1.

²⁴² Fisher, *Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles*, p. 32.

²⁴³ Zvobgo, *Colonialism and Education in Zimbabwe*, p. 95.

Former 'Group A' and private schools were permitted to charge significantly higher fees than former 'Group B' schools. Some of the private schools like Lomagundi College in Mashonaland West Province, built in 1983, were constructed on donated White owned farms. By virtue of charging higher fees, the schools could afford better facilities to suit the elite of society. As a result, the former all White 'Group A' government schools and the newly established private schools (most of them still administered by White head-teachers), experienced slow transformation in racial demographics of their pupils. For most of the 1980s the schools continued to be dominated by White children who were gradually being joined by non-White children whose parents could afford the high tuition fees and school development levies. Attending these schools for most Black children became a status symbol which gradually evolved into a determining factor when constructing interactions both in Zimbabwe and in the diaspora.

The exorbitant tuition and school development fees charged by the former 'Group A' schools or the private schools naturally precluded a majority of Black children from attending the schools. With Mazingi and Kamidza highlighting that a majority of Blacks' income was one-tenth of that of Whites it was inevitable that a majority of Blacks could not afford to send their children to these exclusive private schools or former 'Group A' schools.²⁴⁴ The former 'Group A' schools and the newly established private schools had therefore manipulated the education system by allowing some Whites to continue with a separatist agenda which only allowed them to co-exist with Blacks without meaningful interactions to foster nation building.

²⁴⁴ Mazingi and Kamidza, 'Inequality in Zimbabwe', p.326.

The democratisation of education had therefore failed to dismantle colonial nurtured perceptions and identities that ‘everything western is good and particularly everything local or native is inferior...even deemed inappropriate’.²⁴⁵ The experiences of Timothy demonstrated how the impact of colonial discourses of racial purity which exalted western lifestyles was mainly visible within the Black community especially the emerging class of the Black elite. Timothy used to teach French in the 1990s at one of the few private secondary schools built after independence for both White and Black children from affluent families. As the only Black teacher at the school, he recalled how the few affluent Black parents with children enrolled at his school would not shy away from expressing verbally to him that having their children at the school was a status symbol and his presence there was ‘spoiling their kids’.²⁴⁶

Timothy’s experiences were reaffirmed by Panganayi who did not have the opportunity to attend a former White only Group ‘A’ school until 1988 when he was in sixth form; by then most White parents had withdrawn their children.²⁴⁷ For Panganayi, attending a Group ‘A’ school was something he had always aspired to. He recalled how these aspirations had been nurtured by his parents who made him believe that English was superior to the indigenous languages. He wished to speak English with an accent to imitate Whites; a trend which was common in Blacks who were attending former White only schools.²⁴⁸ The attempt to speak or act like Whites led to the popularisation of the phrase ‘nose brigade.’ The ‘nose brigade’ phenomenon was a product of assumptions within urban Black youths that Whites have a nasalised way of speaking.

²⁴⁵ Ellis, *West African Families in Britain*, p.7.

²⁴⁶ Timothy, Interview, 10th May 2013.

²⁴⁷ Panganayi, Interview, 24 March 2013.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

The discontinuation of a racially segregated health system at independence also highlighted the lack of unwillingness by Whites to interact with Blacks as equals. Democratisation of the health sector facilitated the development of an environment in which the nursing profession gradually ceased to be a desirable alternative profession for White nurses. It would have been inconceivable for them to work alongside Black nurses as equals whilst looking after patients from communities they had historically perceived to be below them in the colonial social hierarchy.

Their responses to the democratisation of the health sector according to Sharai, who completed her midwifery training in 1985, were threefold: resigning from government hospitals to work in White doctors' surgeries; changing careers to work in White owned companies; or moving abroad with neighbouring South Africa being a preferred destination because of the Apartheid system.²⁴⁹ By the end of the first decade of independence Sharai confirmed that White nursing students and nurses in Bulawayo during the time of her training had virtually disappeared in State run health institutions.²⁵⁰

Racial Reconciliation: Coloureds and Asians

Prior to independence, a majority of Coloureds would have been excused for envisaging more recognition as they had a maternal kindred relationship with Blacks. However, in a subtle way, the outcome of the Lancaster Constitution had set in motion the marginalisation of the Coloured and Asian communities in post-colonial Zimbabwe. This was evident when the communities were made to feel insecure by some politicians whose references to colonial privileges only succeeded in reinforcing nostalgic thinking devoid of uniting a

²⁴⁹ Sharai, interview, 14 March 2013.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

racially polarised nation. For example, in a speech on 29 October 1982, Zimbabwe's first Health Minister Herbert Ushewokunze classified Coloureds and Asians as part of the Rhodesian White community which exploited blacks.²⁵¹ Instead of assuring these communities that their past would not make them socially or economically disenfranchised in a new Zimbabwe, Ushewokunze coerced Asians and Coloureds into supporting the ruling party as a condition to be fully accepted as citizens of independent Zimbabwe.²⁵² Being criminally labelled as co-participants in exploiting Blacks had therefore become the basis for marginalising Coloureds and Asians in Zimbabwe's economic empowerment programmes.²⁵³

Parallel to economic marginalisation was the government's failure to address colonial racial prejudices by building more schools in Coloured residential areas as highlighted by Fisher.²⁵⁴ The inevitable consequence was that very few children from the community were motivated to pursue higher educational attainment, thus creating an environment in which there was under-representation of Coloureds within Zimbabwe's academic establishment and middle-class professions. A majority of Coloureds found themselves anchored at the lower echelons of Zimbabwean socio-economic structures.²⁵⁵

With restricted professional or economic opportunities, their socio-economic positions were now being threatened by the emerging Black middle class. Being placed at the periphery of society by Zimbabwe's Black led government naturally forced some members of the Coloured community to re-evaluate and redefine their identities and relations with Blacks.

²⁵¹ Herbert Ushewokunze, *An Agenda for Zimbabwe* (Harare: College Press, 1984), p. 16.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Fisher, *Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles*, p. 138.

²⁵⁴ Ibid, p.139.

²⁵⁵ Nims, 'The Goffal Speaks', p.181.

The nature of the relations and identities were not to be confined within Zimbabwe's borders, but were to extend into the diaspora.

The government had failed to recognise that Coloureds and Asians had priorities that needed to be catered for if they were to be socially or economically integrated in independent Zimbabwe. While Asians had always been successful retail entrepreneurs, Coloureds, by contrast, became more vulnerable to the impact of exclusionary government economic policies. Despite some within the Coloured community having historically occupied positions of prestige as teachers and nurses, Coloureds in post-colonial Zimbabwe continued to be overwhelmingly self-employed and unemployed.²⁵⁶

Patrick, one of the few successful Coloured business owners to migrate from Zimbabwe, illustrated how, unlike Asians, members of his community did not have the capital; neither were they a close knit or affluent enough community to support each other in building a visible and strong business presence.²⁵⁷ As in the colonial era, a majority of individuals within the community continued to deal with their marginalisation by acquiring technical skills as electricians, motor mechanics or plumbers. These were skills that would allow them to be self-employed tradesmen.²⁵⁸

The uncertain position of Coloureds and Asians was further complicated by failure by some within the Black community to accept them as fellow citizens of an independent Zimbabwe with equal socio-economic opportunities. The social disenfranchisement of Coloureds and Asians was captured in the *Sunday News* of August 1987. The newspaper reported uproar from the mainly Black audience when two Coloured girls and an Indian girl won 'Miss Teen'

²⁵⁶ Ibid, p.181.

²⁵⁷ Patrick, Interview, 20 January 2015.

²⁵⁸ Nims, 'The Goffal Speaks' pp.181-182.

beauty contest in Bulawayo.²⁵⁹ Such explicit expression of racial hatred was a sign that Zimbabwe's nation building project had failed to usher stimulation of a consciousness which encouraged Zimbabweans to think beyond racial lines. Seven years into independence, reverse racism by Blacks towards other minority races was emerging to be one of the determinants in the construction of community relations.

Political utterances, the disparity in the treatment of the minority communities and incidences of society's anti-Coloured or anti-Asian rhetoric had made it apparent that peaceful transition to multiparty democracy had not been followed by a clear framework of reconciling a nation ravaged by colonial racial injustices. Whilst a significant number of Whites continued to hold on to their colonial privileges, Coloureds and Asians were made to believe that they were in the periphery of the society with limited equal opportunities. It was the evolving nature of the experiences of privileges and marginalisation which became salient discourses in determining relations within Zimbabwe's communities in Britain.

National Symbols

For a country polarised for years on racial and ethnic grounds, there was a need to create new visual or verbal national symbols to unite the people. It was therefore inevitable that the early years of independence were marked by the successful removal of colonial identities. The process would involve renaming of street names, towns and cities, the 'Africanisation' of the public service, and the removal of colonial statues.²⁶⁰ However, the removal of colonial symbols was not reciprocated by implementation of new national symbols to engrain a sense of citizenship. As the first decade of independence progressed it

²⁵⁹ A report in the *Sunday News* Newspaper cited in Raftopoulos and Savage, *Zimbabwe*, pp.222-3.

²⁶⁰ Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Do Zimbabweans Exist? Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Post-colonial State* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2009), pp.88-9.

became apparent that the government was not in a hurry to establish recognisable national symbols necessary to nurture national pride. With the exception of a new national flag, there was little progress or emphasis in developing national symbols such as a national anthem or national dress.

It was this lack of urgency in developing national symbols which resulted in the national anthem exclusive to Zimbabwe being used for the first time in 1994. Prior to that, the African National Congress' official anthem 'God bless Africa' ('*Ishe komborera Africa*') during South Africa's apartheid era was Zimbabwe's national anthem. Even the introduction of the new national anthem failed to trigger a consciousness of a national identity as pointed out by Bella, a fifty-five year old Zimbabwean Asian. To stress her point she revealed that few Zimbabweans across the racial divide took the initiative of learning the new national anthem 'as it was with *Ishe Komborera Africa*, which was known by a majority'.²⁶¹

Without a nurtured shared sense of identity that would have been developed and consolidated by national symbols, multi-ethnic Zimbabweans were posed to create communities based on their own interpretation of what it means to be Zimbabwean (in independent Zimbabwe). Memories of a colonial and post-colonial environment of ethnic and racial prejudices, mistrust and suspicions would form the basis of these interpretations. Migrating without experiencing the construction of national symbols to unite Zimbabweans would therefore carry the potential of undermining the need to establish a cohesive multicultural Zimbabwean community that could be identified as a nation in the diaspora.

Summary and Conclusion

²⁶¹ Bella, Interview, 1st August 2013.

Whilst the pre-colonial advent of the Ndebele incarnated tensions between the Shona and the Ndebele, it was the formal politicisation of ethnicity and race during the colonial and post-colonial eras which triggered complex and interrelated multifaceted processes on the construction of community interactions. Therefore, by analysing the transformation of Zimbabwe's society during the different phases of the country's history, the chapter has developed a narrative essential in understanding the impact of past experiences on the construction of contemporary interactions and identities within the Zimbabwean diaspora community.

The colonial creation of ethnic named administrative boundaries and racial compartmentalisation of the population into three categories of Whites, Coloureds and Asians, and Blacks, served to stimulate a consciousness of ethnic allegiances and the creation of racial boundaries. To ensure there would be no transgression of racial boundaries or privileges, Whites as occupiers of the top threshold in the hierarchy were sheltered from competing with other races in the colonial socio-economic structures by legislation such as the Education Act (1966), the Land Tenure Act (1969), the Vagrancy Act (1968) and the Area Accommodation Act (1972).

By having privileged access to the country's resources, Whites emerged to be the main contributors to the country's economy in which a majority of Coloureds and Blacks had been condemned to semi-skilled or unskilled labour. The colonial discriminatory policies had facilitated the creation of an environment in which Whites would feel indispensable to the economic needs of the country; a privileged economic position which would have the potential of nurturing perceptions of racial superiority. As a result, any successful post-

colonial nation building project would be determined by the extent to which Whites were willing to relinquish their constructed economic privileges.

The colonial racial categorisation of the population had also exposed Coloureds and Asians to potential marginalisation in a Black ruled independent Zimbabwe. As occupiers of the second position in the colonial social hierarchy, the Coloured and Asian communities were not as disenfranchised as Blacks. Instead, as a divide and rule tactic by the colonial administration, Coloureds and Asians were deliberately made to feel superior to Blacks by having separate and better equipped schools, and residential areas than a majority of Blacks. In addition, Coloureds that had a kindred relationship with Blacks were forcibly removed from an African environment and placed in residential homes with access to better facilities. In the residential homes they would be indoctrinated to align themselves with Whites. It was this privileged colonial position which provided justification for the development of perceptions within most Africans that Coloureds and Asians were communities who are vulnerable to shifting allegiances and therefore could not be trusted.

This chapter has also recognised the emergence of Black Africans who were becoming increasingly sceptical of the relevance of their traditions or history. These were Africans who were beginning to entertain racial ideologies that any future African way of life or socio-economic systems should be modelled around European socio-economic and political systems if upward social mobility was to be attained. A majority of these were Christian converts or beneficiaries of a western education system. The development of a Black African middle class and emphasis on western education started the stratification of the African community which would not only determine future relations between the Zimbabwean

communities, but would also determine socio-economic interactions with host communities in the diaspora.

The chapter also acknowledged that the processes involved in the construction of contemporary relations within Zimbabwe's community cannot be solely attributed to tragedies of socio-economic and political policies instituted by the colonial administration. The Black Nationalist Movement's leadership and the provisions of the Lancaster House Constitution were also essential in determining the construction of community relations. For example, the 1980s Matabeleland civil conflict served to confirm how the Nationalist Movement's obsession with overthrowing the White minority government had resulted in little effort being put in to developing a nation building agenda that would have overridden historical ethnic tensions between the Shona and Ndebele.

In acknowledging the multifaceted reasons for contemporary interactions between Zimbabwean communities, the chapter critically examined the complexity of political events which led to Zimbabwe's independence. The Lancaster House Constitution undermined the nation building agenda by failing to provide a clear framework on how to reconcile a nation ravaged by colonial injustices.

With the Constitution guaranteeing Whites' political participation and protection of economic privileges, a majority of the Whites continued to enjoy the luxuries they had been accustomed to during the colonial period. The racial partnership embedded in the Constitution also set in motion processes in which post-colonial Zimbabwe would be described as a bifurcated society of Blacks and Whites with Coloureds and Asians being subtly relegated to the invisible periphery of the society. The post-colonial failure to

disengage from the colonial privileges and the perceived marginalisation of Coloureds and Asians set the tone of inter-racial relations in the diaspora.

In the absence of a defined policy on what Zimbabwe's reconciliation entailed, Zimbabwean communities prior to migration continued to co-exist with minimum social or political interactions. Without any evidence of political urgency to develop national symbols apart from the national flag, the first decades of independence were largely defined by failure to release communities from colonial memories of being superior or inferior to each other. It was therefore left for respective communities to interpret what it means to be Zimbabwean; interpretations which would be based on colonial and post-colonial prejudices. It was the importation of these interpretations which would ultimately determine the construction of relations between Zimbabwe's multi-ethnic communities in Britain.

The Impact of Colonial and Post-Colonial Identities and Prejudices on Interactions between Zimbabwean Immigrant Communities in Britain.

Historiography of the different phases of Zimbabwe's history has not shied away from unveiling socio-economic and political systems which were instrumental in erecting community boundaries riddled with ethno-racial identities and prejudices. JoAnn McGregor in her essay 'The Making of Zimbabwe's New Diaspora' acknowledges the long term consequence of these historical influences on Zimbabwean immigrants by pointing out that:

Diaspora communities should not be understood as reified groups with fixed essence, but as the outcome of historical, political and cultural processes through which the ideas of belonging come to be defined primarily in terms of attachment to a distant homeland and shared imaginaries.¹

Zimbabweans just like all immigrants in all societies migrated with identities and prejudices which were constructed by the social, economic and political structures in the country of origin. These imported identities and prejudices were to play an integral role in the construction of relations between multi-ethnic Zimbabwean immigrants classified into the following five categories: visitors, students, those with dual nationality or ancestral heritage, political asylum seekers and those on work-permits.² With such distinct categorisation, the chapter's comparative analysis of the impact of the imported identities and prejudices on the diaspora Zimbabwean communities will reveal how the complexities in the construction

¹ JoAnn McGregor 'The Making of Zimbabwe's New Diaspora' in JoAnn McGregor and Ranka Primorac, (eds). *Zimbabwe's New Diaspora: Displacement and the Cultural Politics of Survival* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010) p.6.

² Dominic Pasura, *African Transnational Diasporas: Fractured Communities and Plural Identities of Zimbabweans in Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp.43-47.

of relations were not only determined by shared historic commonalities, but also three inter-related variables: the period in which migration took place; circumstances surrounding emigration; and age of individuals on arrival in Britain.

In recognition of historiographical evidence that migration to Britain by Zimbabweans was not a post-colonial phenomenon, the chapter starts by briefly examining the construction of ethnic and racial relations during the colonial era; with a particular focus on the 1970s. Britain's efforts to assist Black African students and the protracted political instability (exacerbated by the armed struggle for independence) led to a steep rise in the Zimbabwean immigrant population in Britain in the 1970s. The increase in the Zimbabwean immigrant population was revealed in the 1981 census statistics which indicated that between 1971 and 1981 the Zimbabwean-born residents in Britain increased by 109% from 7 000 to 15 000.³

The circumstances surrounding colonial migration allowed the emergence of a Zimbabwean community that was racially diverse. With scholarships being the most popular route used by those migrating to Britain, the racial demography of the growing Zimbabwean immigrant community was dominated by the Blacks who were the sole beneficiaries of British scholarships. In contrast Zimbabwe's minority communities' emigration usually consisted of young men fleeing forced conscription in the Rhodesian army. Without financial sponsorship from external sources a majority of those who travelled were either from: affluent families who could sponsor the journey; those with dual nationality; or those with family networks in Britain. As a result, there was a significant and visible Black immigrant community

³ Office for National Statistics, *Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011*, Available at <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census-analysis/immigration-patterns-and-characteristics-of-non-uk-born-population-groups-in-england-and-wales/story-on-immigration-patterns-of-non-uk-born-populations-in-england-and-wales-in-2011.html?format=print> (Accessed on 3rd March 2014).

compared to Coloureds, Asians and Whites. The disproportionate racial representation of the colonial immigrant population allowed imported memories of colonial injustices to create an environment which was to restrict inter-racial interactions between the immigrant communities that shared different pre-emigration experiences.

By virtue of being the largest community, discussion of Zimbabwean immigrant communities' relations in Britain during the colonial era starts with the Black student community and then moves on to other Zimbabwe's minority communities. To fully appreciate the impact of pre-emigration experiences in the construction of diaspora relations, circumstances surrounding emigration of each community will be discussed. Discussion of the reasons for migration also helps to understand why decisions to relocate back home during the early years of independence differed between the ethnic communities.

After having explored the construction of interactions between Zimbabwean immigrant communities during the 1970s, the chapter will then move on to examine the impact of historically constructed prejudices and identities on the contemporary Zimbabwean communities fragmented along racial lines. Discussing the significance of homeland experiences in the construction of relations between contemporary Zimbabwean immigrant communities will unveil why the nature of interactions should not be solely explained as tragedies of colonial racial policies between Blacks, Whites, Coloureds and Asians.

Whilst it is undeniable that the imperial racist discourse fragmented Zimbabwean communities along racial lines, examination of diaspora relations between the Shona and the Ndebele also captures the failure by the post-colonial Zimbabwean government to erase historically constructed ethnic allegiances and prejudices within the Black community.

Differences in ethnic demography due to diverse immigrations patterns facilitated the creation of a perfect diaspora environment for the resuscitation of allegiances and prejudices which carried the potential of hindering interactions between the Shona and the Ndebele. Exploring the influence of pre-emigration variables on African ethnic relations will therefore illustrate why the Black Zimbabwean immigrant community should not be understood as a monolithic community with shared historic experiences.

Colonial Immigrants

The Commonwealth Secretariat and British Government decided to create opportunities for academically able Black Zimbabweans to study in Britain as a response to colonial Zimbabwe's discriminatory and restrictive educational policies which had stifled the educational progression of Blacks.⁴ From 1969, Black Zimbabweans were granted full scholarships to pursue their education at nineteen British Universities and Polytechnics.⁵ The impact of the scholarship scheme was immediate as approximately 1000 Black students left the country between 1969 and 1974.⁶ The 1000 beneficiaries of the scholarship programme were part of 60 000 Zimbabwean Blacks who were qualified for further education but were denied by the colonial discriminatory education policies.⁷ With Hakim Adi describing how there had been a steady increase of mainly West African students since the beginning of the twentieth century;⁸ the Black Zimbabwean students became part of an already established community of African students.

⁴ *The Times*, 'How Britain Aids Africans from Rhodesia', 5 October 1974, p.7.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ *The Times*, 'Rhodesian Student Influx is a Challenge to Government', 26 September 1975, p.4.

⁸ Hakim Adi, 'West African Students in Britain, 1900-60: The Politics of Exile', in David Killingray, ed., *Africans in Britain* (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 107.

Black Zimbabweans' access to British educational institutions was not only restricted to the recipients of the scholarships. There was also a surge of successful independent applications by individuals who had failed to obtain Commonwealth or British scholarships because of the tough competition. The increase of students arriving without any sponsorship became apparent in 1975 when, in less than a year, of the 1500 students arriving from Zimbabwe only 200 had been awarded scholarships.⁹ The British government was therefore forced to react to the influx of Black Zimbabwean students who were arriving with no scholarships, grants or access to external sources of income to sustain themselves. At an average cost of £1 000 per student a year, the British government agreed to finance studies and the maintenance of Black African Rhodesian students who had been offered places to study at British institutions but had not been granted scholarships.¹⁰

In addition to the financial assistance, the government also implemented measures to facilitate access to a steady income by removing visa restrictions which would have prevented the students from seeking employment.¹¹ The relaxation of visa rules allowed prospective students like Edison who had arrived in 1978 without a scholarship to find employment so as to enable them to pay tuition fees whilst earning money to meet their living expenses. Edison acknowledged that if it was not for the relaxation of visa rules, he would not have been able to fulfil his ambition of studying economics at Aberdeen University as his family back in Zimbabwe would not have been able to finance his studies.¹²

The enrolment of the students by various education institutions dotted all over Britain resulted in the dispersal of the student population across the country with London having

⁹ *The Times*, 'Government to aid Rhodesian students', 11 October 1975, p.2.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Edison, Interview, 17 January 2013.

the largest population. Zivanayi, one of the recipients of the scholarship in 1978 recalled how London had emerged as the 'receiving city' and temporary destination for Zimbabwean students who were processing their immigration status before relocating to universities or polytechnics that had offered them places.¹³

The influx of the African students spread across Britain's education institutions and the transient nature of the Zimbabwean student population in London necessitated the formation of the National Union of Zimbabwean Students (NUSZ). This was a national organisation to unify the students by coordinating support networks and social events for the students. One major function of the NUSZ according to Edison was to offer support to the students who were arriving with no extra cash needed to meet their daily living expenses.¹⁴

Having inadequate funds according to Edison was an inevitable situation directly linked to the racist discourse in the socio-economic structures back home. He described how the colonial discriminatory policies made it difficult for their families to engage in viable commercial farming or other economic activities which would have enabled them to financially support their children in the diaspora.¹⁵ It was therefore inevitable that for those with no scholarships or government grants, the support networks established through NUSZ emerged to be invaluable sources of support in providing temporary accommodation and assisting new arrivals with advice on where and how to gain employment. The NUSZ had firmly established itself as a catalyst to unite the Black student community with shared pre-

¹³ Zivanayi, Interview, 17 January 2013.

¹⁴ Edison, Interview, 17 January 2013.

¹⁵ Ibid.

emigration identities which had been created and nurtured by the racial policies of the Rhodesian government.

The function of the support networks were not solely for providing financial or employment advice for the new arrivals. They were also essential for organising social events such as parties. Edison described the parties as the most significant social events where they would socialise whilst giving each other advice and reminiscing on past experiences. The students would also interact with other non-Zimbabwean communities (especially West African students) by organising or attending political meetings in which they would be sharing 'Pan-Africanist' views on how Africa should be liberated.¹⁶ Participation in Pan-Africanism allowed the Zimbabwean student community to forge a sense of unity with people from all over the world who according to William Ackah were united by the belief of dismantling colonial systems.¹⁷ The Zimbabwean students had therefore become part of a post-war new generation of African students whose political activism according to Adi was 'strongly influenced by growing nationalist movements within the colonies'.¹⁸

In explaining the significance of socialisation within and outside the Zimbabwean student community Edison said:

Those already settled in Britain welcomed newcomers regardless of ethnicity. They showed us around places such as the Africa Centre in London where we had the opportunity of meeting other Africans. It was at these meetings where a Pan-African identity which superseded tribal

¹⁶ Adi, 'West African Students in Britain', p.107.

¹⁷ William Ackah, 'Pan-Africa Consciousness and Identity: Reflections of the Twentieth Century', in Mark Christian, ed., *Black Identity in the 20th Century Expressions of the US and UK African diaspora* (London: Hansib Publications, 2002), pp.4 -5.

¹⁸ Adi, 'West African Students in Britain', p. 107.

issues was promoted...The tragedies of colonial rule had made us realise we needed each other for moral support if our life in Britain was to be bearable...People could travel from all over Britain to attend a party or function.

In reiterating Edison's assertion on unity, Zivanayi explained how the Zimbabwean African student community shared a common binding feature embedded in the circumstances which had led to their emigration. To emphasise the unifying forces of circumstances surrounding emigration, Zivanayi explained how they did not view themselves as political refugees or asylum seekers, but as students who had been denied opportunities to attain higher education qualifications because of the oppressive nature of the colonial education system.¹⁹ It was therefore inevitable that the construction of their identity and interactions were to be influenced by memories of injustices Black Africans were experiencing under colonial administration back home.

Although the student body consisted of individuals from both the Shona and the Ndebele communities, the political situation back home created the consequential sameness which would not tolerate historic ethnic tensions. Shared memories of colonial injustices stimulated a consciousness of the need to construct a non-tribal Zimbabwean community engaged in collective political activism to remove colonial rule.

By the mid-1970s the Zimbabwean students were increasingly becoming outspoken in denouncing the Rhodesian government whilst being equally critical of Britain's failure for not taking a tougher line against Ian Smith following his unilateral declaration of

¹⁹ Zivanayi, Interview, 17 January 2013.

Independence in 1965.²⁰ Britain's timid response to the Rhodesian government was the main reason the NUZS leadership used to justify their support of the armed struggle back home. For Zimbabwe's diaspora student body, Britain's failure to use its military to force Ian Smith to reverse UDI had legitimised the nationalist led armed struggle as the only viable means of liberating Zimbabwe.²¹

Driven by a policy of non-alignment to any nationalist party or ethnic community, the NUZS viewed itself as another Front in the Zimbabwe Liberation struggle, hence the use of 'Zimbabwe' instead of 'Rhodesia' in its name. They recognised the hardships faced by Rhodesian students, especially those without grants as a 'necessary sacrifice for themselves and for their country.'²² For a majority of the students, the difficulties they were facing were necessary since they were part of a process of attaining invaluable skills they would need in managing the country's economic, political and social structures when independence was achieved. However, they recognised that their dream of relocating back to an independent Zimbabwe would be dependent on the success of the liberation struggle. Therefore, to increase pressure on the colonial regime so as to hasten independence, the students realised that they had to be actively involved in supporting the nationalist led liberation struggle back home.

To support and raise public awareness of Zimbabwe's struggle for independence, Edison pointed out how the students working together with the NUZS organised fundraising activities, rallies, protests and demonstrations marches.²³ He explained how coaches would be hired from different cities to London where the protest marches and fund raising

²⁰ *The Times*, 5 October 1974, p.7.

²¹ Ibid.

²² *The Times*, 26 September 1975. p.4.

²³ Edison, Interview, 17 January 2013.

activities were usually held. Describing one of the NUZS organised journeys to protest marches in London in which he was a participant Edison said:

Travelling by coach from Aberdeen where I was doing my economics degree we will be chanting slogans and singing revolutionary songs praising ZANU such as *ZANU chete ndiyo ichatonga* (ZANU alone will rule Zimbabwe). On arrival in London we would congregate with other Zimbabweans and sympathisers at the Marble Arch. From there we would march along Oxford Street on to Regent Street, singing and denouncing Ian Smith. We would finally assemble at Trafalgar Square where we would be addressed²⁴

Edison's narration of the demonstration's events subtly revealed the ethnic demographics of Zimbabwe's student population of the 1970s. Singing Shona songs praising Shona dominated ZANU indicated that Shona students outnumbered those from the Ndebele community and supporters of the Ndebele dominated ZAPU. However, despite the ethnic demographics, Edison expressed that there were cordial relations between the Shona and the Ndebele students. He justified his claim of cordial ethnic relations by highlighting that a majority of the Ndebele students would join in the singing of the Shona revolutionary songs when they were either demonstrating or travelling to protest marches.²⁵

Sixty-two year old Jacob who initially migrated to Britain in 1973 before relocating back home in 1980 also endorsed the existence of cordial relations within the ethnically bifurcated student community by referring to interactions held outside the remits of the unifying activities held under the banner of political activism. He indicated how individuals

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

from both the Shona and Ndebele communities would interact well in social gatherings such as parties despite the Shona being the majority.²⁶ As a Shona speaking student, his interpretation of the reason why Ndebele students were willing to interact with the Shona was that a significant number of Ndebele students seemed to have become resigned to the fact that they were the minority.²⁷ Therefore, resuscitating historic ethnic tensions would be a futile exercise which would only serve to weaken their influence within the Zimbabwean student community whose members needed each other for moral and financial support.

Parallel to the noticeable increase of Zimbabwe's Black immigrant student population in Britain during the 1970s was the immigration of Zimbabwe's Coloureds, Asians and Whites. Whilst a majority of Blacks were migrating as students, young White, Coloured and Asian Zimbabweans were fleeing forced enrolment for military service. Julie Kate Seirlis points out how, in 1976, the National Service Act prohibited White, Coloured and Asian men between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five from leaving the country before completing their first eighteen months phase of military service.²⁸ By 1978 all White, Coloured and Asian men between eighteen and 38 years old were required to 'serve 190 days per year' in the military.²⁹ It was this forced participation in the military service which naturally triggered emigration.

However, Coloured emigration during colonial rule was very low in comparison to other races. In addition to lack of financial resources, Seirlis points out how Coloureds did not have dual nationality or another passport to escape colonial marginalisation or enforced

²⁶ Jacob, Interview, 23 January 2013.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Julie Kate Seirlis, 'Undoing the United Front? Coloured Soldiers in Rhodesia, 1939–1980', *African Studies*, vol. 63 (2004), pp. 73-93.

²⁹ James Muzondidya cited in Julie Seirlis 'Undoing the United Front', pp.73-93

participation in the military service.³⁰ The consequence of these emigration restrictions according to Esther, a Coloured immigrant in 1974, was that a majority of Coloured immigrants in the 1970s consisted of women who were married to White British men.³¹ In most cases, their husbands would have faced persecution for crossing the racial divide by marrying a Coloured.³²

One of those who found herself in a position in which intermarriage was a determinant in her emigration was Pamela. She spoke of how in 1973 she and her husband were forced to emigrate.³³ The decision to emigrate was in response to her husband's sustained discrimination by the White community. Despite her British born husband being an engineer she explained how he was unable to find work and neither could they buy or rent a house in Whites' only residential areas.³⁴ The situation was untenable since her husband could also not live in Coloured residential areas because of rigid racial boundaries thus making emigration the only route to save the marriage.

Once settled in Britain, Esther explained how Coloureds forced to emigrate by their intermarriage status were gradually joined by family members they financially sponsored to migrate and Coloured political activists who were fighting racial discrimination (especially for Coloureds) back home. Despite the low levels of emigration, both Esther and Pamela acknowledged the presence of a small Zimbabwean Coloured community in Britain by the end of the 1970s.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Esther, Interview, 10 June 2013.

³² Ibid.

³³ Pamela, Interview, 13 October 2013.

³⁴ Ibid.

However, Esther admitted that because of the low levels of immigration the Coloured community was not as visible and vibrant as the African student community. Instead, they created their own support network led by Joseph Culverwell which rarely interacted or sought assistance from other Zimbabwean immigrant communities on immigration issues, employment or studying opportunities. Joseph Culverwell was the leader of a small group of political activists who had been made 'prohibited immigrant in Rhodesia' for fighting racial policies.³⁵ The role Culverwell played within the Coloured community was so significant that 'visiting him was a ritual expected to be carried out by every Coloured arriving in Britain.'³⁶

Creating an exclusive Coloured network was a natural response for a community whose history had been punctuated by policies aimed at creating a separate identity. Pamela acknowledged that a significant number of Coloureds in Britain during the colonial era were first generation Coloureds who had been placed in residential homes where a Coloured consciousness was stimulated.³⁷ With colonial racial categorisation of the population reinforcing their identities and prejudices toward other Zimbabwean communities, they had arrived in Britain with no motivation to interact with Zimbabweans outside their own community despite being aware of their presence.

The diversity of Zimbabwe's minority communities in the 1970s became more pronounced with the arrival of individuals from Asian and White communities. A significant number of Asians and Whites who emigrated in the 1970s were mainly young men in their mid-teens escaping conscription into the Rhodesian army.³⁸ Unlike Coloureds, a majority of them were

³⁵ Esther, Interview, 10 June 2013.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Pamela, Interview, 13^h October 2013.

³⁸ See Josiah Brownell, 'The Hole in Rhodesia's Bucket: White Emigration and the End of Settler Rule', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol.34 (2008), pp. 591-610; Seirlis, 'Undoing the United Front?', pp.73-93.

from affluent families who could sponsor the journey or they had family networks based in Britain.

Avoiding compulsory military service by young White men had become endemic in the 1970s. For example in 1973 half of 3000 young men eligible for military service evaded conscription.³⁹ In 1978 only 570 reported for duty out of a minimum requirement of 1 046.⁴⁰ However, it would be misleading as suggested by Josiah Brownell to conclude that White emigration was the exclusive consequence of the liberation war or refusal to participate in military service. He argues that there was also a political initiative to alter White migration patterns by British and American governments. The British government engendered White emigration as a means of hastening the collapse of Ian Smith's regime by denying it manpower, financial or moral support so as to force Ian Smith to negotiate for a political settlement.⁴¹

Since the expansion of the Rhodesian economy after World War Two had been inextricably linked with immigration from Europe, there was a concerted effort by the British to 'buy-out' young skilled White Rhodesians to leave Rhodesia.⁴² However, given the perception of immigration to the country's economic or political success, the Rhodesian government reduced White emigration by introducing a variety of restrictions. These include: dramatically reducing allowances emigrants would take out of the country, restricting foreign travel of young men and limiting foreign schooling.⁴³

³⁹ Josiah Brownell, 'The Hole in Rhodesia's Bucket', pp. 591-610.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

Regardless of the circumstances and challenges surrounding emigration, a majority of Whites who migrated had dual nationality or ancestral ties in Britain. With a pre-emigration history of having been placed at the top of the hierarchical ladder of the colonial classification, a majority of them had been desensitised from seeing the need of interacting with other Zimbabwean communities as equals. Therefore, upon arriving in Britain they assimilated into the White community resulting in no recognisable community of White Rhodesians.

While a majority of Whites migrating had dual nationality or ancestral ties with Britain, a majority of Asians were using historic family social networks to migrate on visitor's visas. Although Chirayil Thumbayil Kannan notes how the foundations of migration from South Asia to Britain were laid down before the Second World War with the arrival of seaman,⁴⁴ it was the post-war rapid growth of British Asian society that facilitated the establishment of migrant networks utilised by Zimbabwean Asians. Since a majority of Zimbabwean Asians were of Indian origin, Bhavesh, who migrated in 1973, revealed how migrant networks provided by extended family members played a fundamental role in young Zimbabwean Asian emigration.⁴⁵ With the majority of Zimbabwean Asians migrating to Britain in the 1970s categorised as young males in their late teens, family networking was invaluable in facilitating a smooth transition into life in Britain. The family members would offer accommodation whilst assisting the new arrivals to find colleges in which to enrol so as to regularise their immigration status.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Chirayil Thumbayil Kannan, *Cultural Adaptation of Asian Immigrants: First and Second Generation* (Greenford: The Author, 1978), p.34.

⁴⁵ Bhavesh, Interview, 9 September 2013.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

However, Bhavesh also pointed out that despite assistance from family members, migrating on a visitor's visa was risky as there was always the potential of being denied entry into Britain.⁴⁷ To minimise the threat of deportation a sizeable number of Asians had to migrate via a European country where they had the option of staying for several days or weeks before proceeding to Britain. They believed arriving from a European country would allow them to be perceived as tourists who were on a tour of Europe; thus diminishing the chances of being denied entry into the country. Once they obtained a visitor's visa it was easier to enrol at university or college so as to obtain a student visa. Attaining a student visa had been realised as the most viable option which guaranteed a longer stay in Britain whilst legally seeking employment.

Bhavesh, who was in his mid-teens when he migrated, was one of those who had to stay briefly in a third country before proceeding to Britain.⁴⁸ He made a stopover in Switzerland where he had relatives who could offer him temporary accommodation. Without the privilege of accessing British scholarships as Africans, he had to follow the example of other Asians by enrolling at a Higher Education Institution so as to obtain a student visa. He enrolled at Hatfield Polytechnic north of London where he was able to simultaneously study for a business qualification whilst being employed as a casual worker in shops or factories. He admitted that the lack of supervision by the Home Office enabled him to exceed the stipulated twenty hours he was permitted to work as a foreign student.⁴⁹

The steady increase of the Zimbabwean Asian and Coloured immigrant population in Britain did not translate to the construction of improved interactions with the Black student

⁴⁷ Bhavesh, Interview, 9 September 2013.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

community. This was apparent in political activism. This was because relations between the communities continued to be determined by the racial categorisation of the population back home. Despite the experiences of colonial Zimbabwe's discriminatory racial policies, there was universal agreement among the participants that there was no significant participation by either Asians or Coloureds in Black led Zimbabwe's diaspora politics of the 1970s. For Edison this was not something Black students worried about since the Coloured community were not active participants in the nationalist armed struggle back home. Edison's response confirmed Seirlis' argument that for many Blacks, Coloureds, by virtue of being second in the colonial hierarchical classification of the population, were perceived as beneficiaries and willing collaborators of the White regime and therefore could not be trusted in the liberation struggle.⁵⁰

The lack of motivation to join the Black diaspora community in protests against colonial rule could not solely be attributed to the racial perceptions embedded in the hierarchical categorisation of the population back home. The participants also revealed how it was also inextricably linked with different circumstances which led to emigration. Abdi, an Asian who migrated in the mid-1970s, spoke of how Coloureds and Asians felt discriminated against as they were not eligible to apply for scholarships or grants accessible to Blacks; neither were they beneficiaries of relaxed student visa rules which would have allowed them to work unlimited hours a week like Black students who had no scholarships.⁵¹ As a result, Abdi expressed the view that Asian and Coloured communities felt they had different aims and

⁵⁰ Seirlis, 'Undoing the United Front?', pp.73-03.

⁵¹ Abdi, Interview, 17 June 2013.

attitudes to those of Black African students; a position which made them not see the need of being co-participants in political activism with the Black students.⁵²

The consequences of the differences and perceived unfairness in the nature of migration between Blacks, Coloureds and Asians became apparent at Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 when a significant number of Blacks decided to migrate back to Zimbabwe. Zivanayi identified three main groups of Black students who relocated as soon as Zimbabwe attained independence. Firstly, there were those who had completed their degrees and therefore felt the need to go back home and develop the country. The second group consisted of individuals who had their British Council grants terminated or were required to return to Zimbabwe. Individuals who accepted relocation funds being offered by the British government constituted the third group. A majority of those in the third group would have completed their studies and would be eager to utilise their British qualifications in rebuilding a new Zimbabwe.

However, the Black participants established how it would be naïve to conclude that all Black Zimbabwean students relocated back to Zimbabwe when the country attained independence. There were those like Edison and Zivanayi who found themselves settling permanently in Britain despite having harboured ambitions of going back home after completion of their studies. Whilst the desire to complete their studies would have been the initial reason for postponing their relocation in 1980, both of them identified what they perceived as irreversible deterioration of the socio-economic and political situation in Zimbabwe during the first decade of independence as significant factors that made them settle permanently.

⁵² Ibid.

The civil conflict in Matabeleland in the 1980s was identified by Edison as a major factor which made a significant number of Black Zimbabwean students postpone plans to go back home.⁵³ He pointed out how British media reports of attacks by government forces on the Ndebele civilians made him and others in the diaspora begin to question if Mugabe's reconciliation initiative in 1980 was only aimed at Whites and not at other communities. With civil wars in regional neighbouring states of Mozambique and Angola, there was a natural development of perceptions that Zimbabwe might be heading towards the same direction of internal political upheaval if there was no peaceful resolution to end the Matabeleland insurgency. Edison further highlighted that the uncertainty in the political or security stability of the new state was not helped by threats posed by the South African Defence Forces (SADF).⁵⁴ Peter Stiff's volume *Cry Zimbabwe* unveils how the SADF was not only supporting the dissidents in Matabeleland, but was also involved in several bombings targeting South African National Congress activists based in Zimbabwe.⁵⁵

The signs of the gradual decline of the economy during the first decade of independence which resulted in slow employment creation further destroyed the confidence to relocate back home. As explained by James Muzondidya, a GDP growth rate of 1.3 per cent could not create enough jobs for the 3.3 per cent average growth in population; neither could it keep pace with approximately 100,000 school leavers by 1985. Economic decline became apparent in 1991 when average growth fell from 4 per cent to 0.4 percent.⁵⁶ It was therefore not surprising that for the Zimbabwean students the decision to live permanently

⁵³ Edison, Interview, 17 January 2013.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Peter Stiff, *Cry Zimbabwe: Independence Twenty Years On* (Johannesburg: Galago, 2000), pp.59-74.

⁵⁶ James Muzondidya, 'From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1980-1987', in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo (eds), *A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008: Becoming Zimbabwe* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009), p. 154.

in Britain emerged to be the only sensible option for a better quality of life which they believed could no longer be guaranteed in Zimbabwe.

However, the perceived deterioration of the political and economic climate back home, which had triggered decisions to stay permanently in Britain, failed to diminish the colonial nurtured strong association with Zimbabwe. Zivanayi remembered how, in the early 1980s, when the euphoria of independence was still high, the diaspora community would meet at the embassy in London to celebrate Zimbabwe's Independence.⁵⁷ As for Edison, despite his eligibility to attain British citizenship he resolved not to become a British citizen; a decision which he demonstrated by continuing to have a Zimbabwean passport with an 'indefinite-stay' immigration status.⁵⁸

Whilst a majority of Blacks were returning home to rebuild a new non-racial Zimbabwe, a significant number of Asians and Coloureds chose to adopt a cautious 'wait and see' attitude. Conscious of their privileged position over Blacks in colonial Zimbabwe, Abdi pointed out that at independence it was inevitable for both Coloureds and Asians to be cautious of Zimbabwe's independence as they were not sure what independence would mean for them.⁵⁹ Their anxiety over how they would be treated in a post-colonial Zimbabwe was further heightened when they were not represented at the Lancaster House negotiations which had led to Zimbabwe's independence. It was only after Mugabe's maiden reconciliation speech of March 1980 that Coloureds and Asians felt encouraged to relocate back to Zimbabwe.⁶⁰ However, Abdi admitted that the positive impact of the reconciliation speech was limited within the Asian immigrant community. This was because:

⁵⁷ Zivanayi, Interview, 17 January 2013.

⁵⁸ Edison, Interview, 17 January 2013.

⁵⁹ Abdi, Interview, 17 June 2013.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

there were a significant number within the Asian community who embraced the reconciliation speech with some scepticism. They continued to maintain a cautious attitude as they observed the political developments back home.

Justifying the cautious approach, Abdi spoke of how the 'Africanisation' policy in East Africa had led Zimbabwean Asians to develop perceptions of mistrust of African governments.⁶¹ The perceptions had been reinforced by the fact that Zimbabwe's Asian immigration of the 1970s had coincided with the arrival of expelled Asians from East Africa.⁶² It was only after 1981, when Asians encouraged by what they perceived as non-interference with Asian businesses by the government, started migrating back to Zimbabwe in greater numbers. Guarantees of safety of Asian businesses encouraged a significant number of those who relocated to continue with the entrepreneurial identity of Zimbabwean Asians by establishing businesses on arrival. For example, Bhavesh, who relocated in 1988 and settled in the Midlands city of Gweru did not use his British attained teaching qualification to find work in Zimbabwean schools but instead established an engineering company in the city.

On the contrary, the Coloureds who relocated back to Zimbabwe in 1980 like Esther migrated with a genuine belief that their mixed heritage would facilitate economic or political empowerment in a Black led government. They assumed they would not face obstacles in seeking employment in both the public and private sectors. It was therefore not surprising that on arrival in Zimbabwe, Esther took advantage of a shortage of teachers following the democratisation of education by seeking employment in a former White only Group 'A' school in Harare.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Valerie Marett, *Immigrants Settling in the City* (Leicester: Leicester University Press. 1989), p.13.

Although Zimbabwe's independence had ushered in a reversal of colonial migration trends, the newly independent country was about to experience new forms of migration affecting all racial communities. The transformation of Zimbabwe's socio-economic and political structures in building a new nation-state created new challenges for Zimbabwe's multicultural communities, triggering waves of post-colonial migration out of the country.

Post-colonial Immigrants

Since 1980, Zimbabwe has experienced three waves of post-colonial emigration; the 1980s, 1990s and post-2000.⁶³ The patterns and circumstances of migration varied between the racial communities. A majority of Whites and to a lesser extent Coloureds used the ancestral route whilst a majority of Blacks used student, work-permit and political refugee routes. As for Asians, a significant number utilised family networks that had already been established with other Asians of Indian descent settled in Britain. Despite the varied ways used to migrate, socio-economic and political events triggered the post-colonial exodus during the identified three phases of emigration.

Failure to adjust to changes in the political environment resulted in an estimated 50 000 to 60 000 Whites leaving the country between 1980 and 1984.⁶⁴ With both South Africa and Britain absorbing the bulk of the White migrants, Britain was usually the first choice destination for those with British passports or those who had access to ancestral visas. However, from the late 1980s, as pointed out by Daniel Tevera and Jonathan Crush, White emigration significantly declined partly because those who wanted to migrate for political

⁶³ See for example: Alice Bloch, 'Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives', *Social Policy and Administration*, Vol.40 (2006), pp.67-87; Daniel Tevera and Jonathan Crush, *The New Brain Drain from Zimbabwe* (Cape Town: Idasa, 2003); Josephine Lucy Fisher, *Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles: The Decolonisation of White identity in Zimbabwe* (Canberra: ANU E Press), 2010.

⁶⁴ Alice Bloch, 'Emigration from Zimbabwe pp.67-87.

reasons had gone, leaving behind individuals who had accepted the political changes.⁶⁵

Most of those who remained resided in urban areas as professional, business and trades people with a small but powerful and economically significant community of commercial farmers.⁶⁶

The 1990s emigration was a direct result of the economic hardships brought about by the implementation of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) supported Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). Implementation of ESAP was necessitated by the government's 1980s policies to establish a socialist and egalitarian state by 'promoting rural development....achieving a more equitable distribution of the land....improving and extending the basic socio-economic infrastructure in the communal areas.'⁶⁷ This massive expenditure on social services, not matched by an increase in tax revenues, resulted in the government incurring an ever increasing financial burden which gradually led to economic decline.

Faced with increasing national debt and a declining economy, the Zimbabwean government in 1990 launched economic reforms under the guidelines of the World Bank and the IMF. The government was instructed to liberalise the economy through: devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar, removal of subsidies on essential consumer products and cutting back government expenditure in social services.⁶⁸ These economic reforms caused untold suffering among the Zimbabwean middle and working classes as they faced rapid decline of real wages due to removal of price control and consumer subsidies. With the Zimbabwean economy shrinking by 30%, a significant number of middle class Zimbabweans adopted

⁶⁵ Tevera and Crush, *The New Brain Drain from Zimbabwe* pp.6-7.

⁶⁶ Fisher, *Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles*: p. 9.

⁶⁷ Diana Auret, *A Decade of Development 1980-1990* (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1990), p. 10.

⁶⁸ James Muzondidya, 'From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1880-1997', in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, *A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008*, p.189.

emigration as a strategy of escaping poverty. Britain's 2001 census statistics indicated that a significant number of those who migrated in the 1990s settled in Britain. Zimbabweans' migration to Britain resulted in the population of Zimbabwean born residents in England, which in the 1981 census was recorded at 15 000, rising by 136% to 47 000 in the decade 1991 to 2001 according to the 2001 census figures.⁶⁹

However, the pre-emigration background of the participants presented clear evidence that not all who migrated to Britain in the 1990s were economic middle class immigrants from the Black, Coloured or Asian communities. There was also emigration of young Zimbabwean Whites with ancestral links with Britain. This was a diverse group of younger generation Whites who wanted a break in their studies or to take a holiday. They would have completed either their 'O' and 'A' Levels, university studies or professional courses. Britain was the obvious destination for those with ancestral links with the country as they could be assured of family assistance in accommodation or advice on how to get temporary employment.

Martins, who migrated in 1990, was one of those young Zimbabweans with British ancestral links who decided to temporarily settle in Britain for one year as an adventure after completing his course in motor mechanics. He planned to work for a year raising funds to 'travel the world' before going back to Zimbabwe.⁷⁰ However, like most young White Zimbabweans, his stay became permanent after realising that Zimbabwe's economy was on the decline. Martins described how the decision to stay in Britain was supported by his Zimbabwean based parents who were witnessing what he described as 'the disappearing

⁶⁹ Office for National Statistics *Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011*, Available at <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census-analysis/immigration-patterns-and-characteristics-of-non-uk-born-population-groups-in-england-and-wales/story-on-immigration-patterns-of-non-uk-born-populations-in-england-and-wales-in-2011.html?format=print> (Accessed on 3rd March 2014).

⁷⁰ Martins, Interview, 17 January 2013.

job opportunities for young White Zimbabweans'.⁷¹ Taking advantage of his paternal Welsh heritage, he was able to renounce his Zimbabwean citizenship in 1992 to become a British citizen.

Post-millennium emigration was to a large extent a result of the demise of the economy following the seizure of white owned farms and the imposition of international economic sanctions by the USA and the European Union and their allies which included Canada and Australia.⁷² The imposition of economic sanctions was not only a response to the violent eviction of White farmers from their land, but was also induced by what the West perceived as government sanctioned persecution of political opponents. The farm evictions and persecution of political opponents started in 2000 when Zimbabweans rejected a new constitution proposed by the Government which would have given it powers to compulsorily seize land from Whites without compensation unless it came from the former colonial master, Britain.⁷³ Mugabe's referendum defeat acted as a wakeup call for the need to curb political opposition which he accused of being financially sponsored by White farmers and Western governments who were against land redistribution and Black economic empowerment.

Britain's political recognition of victims of farm invasions and political violence resulted in the country becoming the first choice destination of political asylum seekers who could financially afford to travel. Although claiming political asylum emerged to be an easy option for most Black Zimbabweans migrating to Britain, the reality was that a majority of them

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Heather Chingono, 'Zimbabwe Sanctions: An analysis of the "Lingo" Guiding the Perceptions of the Sanctioners and the Sanctionees', *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* Vol. 4 (2010), pp.66-74.

⁷³ Ibid.

were not victims of political persecution but were middle class economic immigrants fleeing the demise of the Zimbabwean economy.⁷⁴

David, who migrated in 2001, admitted that he was one of those who utilised political asylum as an escape route from the imminent economic meltdown.⁷⁵ This was after realising that his income's purchasing power of basic items like food had been eroded by the rapid increase of inflation. For him, migrating to Britain was the only way to escape poverty; a decision which he has never regretted especially after the virtual collapse of the economy in 2008 when annual inflation was over 230 million percent.⁷⁶

With Britain being perceived as a sanctuary for political asylum seekers and economic immigrants, there was an inevitable rise of a diverse Zimbabwean community in Britain. An influx of Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain was reflected in the decade 2001 to 2011 when Zimbabwean born residents increased by a further 151%.⁷⁷ Although post-2000 migration was undertaken by all racial communities, the scale of White emigration following the farm seizures was extraordinary. At the start of the land invasions in 2000 there were approximately 4 500 White commercial farmers utilising eleven million hectares of arable land.⁷⁸ By 2008, the number had been reduced to 500.⁷⁹

The experience of not being able to protect their businesses or properties did not only highlight their vulnerability to Zimbabwe's nationalist violent attempts to resolve colonial

⁷⁴ Alice Bloch, 'Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives', *Social Policy and Administration*, vol.40 (2006), p.67-87.

⁷⁵ David, Interview, 13 January 2013.

⁷⁶ Brian Raftopoulos, 'The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008', in Raftopoulos and Mlambo *A History From the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008*, p. 220.

⁷⁷ Office for National Statistics *Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011*, Available at <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census-analysis/immigration-patterns-and-characteristics-of-non-uk-born-population-groups-in-england-and-wales/story-on-immigration-patterns-of-non-uk-born-populations-in-england-and-wales-in-2011.html?format=print> (Accessed on 3rd March 2014)

⁷⁸ Raftopoulos, 'The Crisis in Zimbabwe', p. 216.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

injustices, but it also triggered a spiral of downward social mobility. Without the protection of the government, the rapid decline of their standard of living could not be halted since their claims to be citizens of Zimbabwe had been severely undermined. This was a community in which a majority of its members were either born in Rhodesia or in other African colonies and had no personal attachment to Britain except through memories of ancestral links.⁸⁰

As a community caught up in a web of downward social mobility following seizure of their farms, White Zimbabweans' choice of destination was primarily influenced by the need to settle in a country where they would be socially and economically integrated. In addition to Britain, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, and Nigeria were destinations of the evicted farmers.⁸¹ Martin Baumann's definition of the term 'exile' as being 'resonant with ideas of forced emigration' imposed upon individuals or groups⁸² could be used to describe the immigrant status of a majority of post-millennium White Zimbabwean immigrants. After the farm evictions 'automatic right of domicile and the inalienable right to a home on the basis of having been born in the country' could no longer be guaranteed.⁸³

Although there is no official data of the age at White Zimbabwean immigrants were forced to leave Zimbabwe from 2000, Robert, who migrated in 2002 aged 52, expressed that most of those who emigrated were over the age of 45.⁸⁴ He went on to describe how the violent circumstances surrounding their emigration had made a majority of them arrive in Britain

⁸⁰ Fisher, *Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles*, p.9.

⁸¹ Lloyd Sachikonye, *Zimbabwe's Lost Decade: Politics, Development and Society* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2012), pp.121.

⁸² Martin Baumann 'Exile' in Kim Knott and Sean McLoughlin, eds, *Diasporas Concepts in Intersections Identities* (London: Zed Books, 2010), p. 19.

⁸³ Fisher, *Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles*, p. 190.

⁸⁴ Robert, Interview, 13 November 2013.

with virtually 'nothing' except proud memories of a resilient and united White Rhodesian community that had sustained 'Rhodesia' during UDI despite economic sanctions and nationalist led armed struggle. These were memories which were to influence the construction of the community's identity in the diaspora.

Robert, who had remained in Zimbabwe until 2002, categorised a majority of Whites who remained in the country when he migrated as: ruling ZANU PF supporters who had become part of the political system; those who could not migrate because they could not trace their ancestral ties with Britain; and those who had convinced themselves that they had no relevant skills or finance to start a new life in a foreign land. He identified individuals who had no confidence that they would be able to cope abroad as members of the farming community who had lost everything during the farm invasions. With their skills limited to farming, Robert reckoned it would have been difficult for the older generation farmers to adapt to the employment demands of Britain.⁸⁵

These older generation White Zimbabwean immigrants (just like other Zimbabwean communities) started constructing interactions influenced by imported prejudices, identities or memories of unresolved conflicts constructed during pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial phases of Zimbabwe's history. The homeland influences were not to be restricted to race relations. Examining relations within the Black community also unveiled the extent to which historically constructed ethnic allegiances and identities were reincarnated in the diaspora.

Black Immigrant Community

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Construction of relations within the contemporary Black community in Britain cannot be fully understood in isolation from the legacies of ethnic identities constructed during the phases of Zimbabwe's history. The pre-colonial settlement of the Ndebele in Zimbabwe marked the start of the development of diverse historical memories based on ethnic particularism. The violent pre-colonial nature of Shona-Ndebele relations preceding the colonisation of Zimbabwe triggered that consciousness of ethnic particularism which evolved into being a determining factor in the construction of relations between the two African communities. Although, the colonisation of Zimbabwe and the ethnic tensions within the Nationalist Movement (discussed in Chapter Two) provided a conducive environment for the nurturing of pre-colonial tribal allegiances, it was the Matabeleland civil conflict (Gukurahundi) of the 1980s which emerged to be the most emotive and potent factor in constructing diaspora relations between the Shona and the Ndebele.

The Shona dominated government's indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force on the Ndebele community in response to the Matabeleland insurgency (Gukurahundi) allowed the construction of bitter memories which were to be reincarnated in the diaspora. Mabuza, a Ndebele immigrant who migrated in March 2003, revealed the extent of the traumatic experiences the Ndebele went through by pointing out that nearly 'every' Ndebele family in the diaspora either had a family member killed or tortured by the Zimbabwean security forces.⁸⁶ On a personal level, he emotionally recalled how his cousin was 'murdered' by the government soldiers in front of his young children after being suspected (without any evidence) that he was a dissident.⁸⁷ Migrating with such memories of personal tragedies naturally undermined the establishment of cordial relations with the Shona to the point that

⁸⁶ Mabuza, Interview, 9 June 2013.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

Mabuza admitted that a majority of Ndebele immigrants found themselves disassociating from the Shona community.

Mabuza's assertion that memories of Gukurahundi have been the most significant factors in influencing how the Ndebele construct their relations with the Shona became apparent during the interview process. Although the Ndebele interviewees did not explicitly condone the use of historic memories in disassociating themselves from the Shona, they were all unanimous in identifying Gukurahundi atrocities as a plausible reason which the Ndebele in the diaspora can use to pursue a separatist agenda. Memories of Gukurahundi trauma arising from marginality or discrimination had become a potent force which Delanty identifies as being crucial in 'communal identity'.⁸⁸

Participants' reference to Gukurahundi as a justifiable excuse to instigate separatism trivialised the fact that a majority of the interviewees could not have personally experienced the atrocities perceived to have been carried out by government security forces. This was because of the eleven Ndebele interviewees residing in Britain only three were over 45 years old in 2013 which means they would have been old enough to either remember or to have experienced the atrocities. The rest of the interviewees would have been too young to remember or have experienced the events of the conflict. The identification of Gukurahundi as a reason to justify a separatist agenda by individuals who did not experience it revealed the extent to which the events of the conflict have been passed from generation to generation.

This trend of ensuring that Gukurahundi will always be part of Ndebele history is being perpetuated by immigrant Ndebele parents like Zanele who emigrated in 2002. She

⁸⁸ Gerard Delanty, *Community* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 162.

admitted that she is part of a group of Ndebele parents in Britain who believe that it is their duty (just as it was for their parents) to tell their children of the persecution the Ndebele experienced under the hands of the Shona security forces.⁸⁹ Her resolve to ensure that Gukurahundi atrocities should always be entrenched in Ndebele history negates the fact that her only personal experience of the conflict took place when she was barely ten years old. This was when her family was forced to flee their home from the city of Gweru to Ndebele dominated Bulawayo city in the middle of the night 'without shoes.'⁹⁰ With most atrocities being committed in Matabeleland rural areas and fewer in urban areas, Zanele acknowledged that the bulk of the Gukurahundi information she knows was based on what she was told by family and community elders.⁹¹

Timothy, a Zimbabwean academic based in Britain also used the example of a former Ndebele work colleague to confirm the extent Gukurahundi is inextricably linked with the Ndebele diaspora community.⁹² He explained how a former work colleague now resident in Britain would not shy away from publicly declaring how he generally did not like interacting with the Shona. His dislike of the Shona according to Timothy was driven by the belief that forging close links with the Shona community would be betraying his father who was murdered by security forces during Gukurahundi. Therefore, as a way of dealing with the tragic loss of his father, he not only disassociated himself from the Shona diaspora community, but also felt obliged to constantly remind his son growing up in Britain that 'his grandfather whom he did not see was killed by the Shona.'⁹³

⁸⁹ Zanele, Interview, 2 March 2013.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Timothy, Interview, 10 May 2013.

⁹³ Ibid.

The attitude of Timothy's former work colleague represents those whose memories of Gukurahundi are based on convictions that it was an ethnic conflict in which the Shona through the government security forces committed acts of atrocities on the Ndebele. These memories were naturally constructed when at the height of the conflict the government security forces forced the Ndebele to speak Shona or risk being murdered or tortured.⁹⁴ Language had therefore emerged to be a weapon of war as it not only undermined Ndebele identity, but was also used as an emblem of loyalty to the Shona dominated Zimbabwean government.

It was this use of language as a weapon of war that emerged to be a significant catalyst in affirming perceptions that it was an ethnic conflict; perceptions which were to be imported into the diaspora. The older Ndebele participants' evaluation of the Gukurahundi served to confirm how individuals within the Ndebele immigrant community still harbour memories of government sponsored genocide of the Ndebele identity through the use of language. With such anti-Shona attitudes (based on language) it was therefore not surprising for Jonah, a Ndebele immigrant in his sixties, to describe how the ethnic attachment to Gukurahundi by Ndebele immigrants has evolved to be the same or even 'worse than racism' as it has given them justification not to interact with the diaspora Shona community.⁹⁵

The adult Ndebele participants were also aware that whilst the Ndebele were being forced to speak and teach Shona to their children there was no incentive for the Shona to learn Ndebele. This was partly because there was no deliberate effort by the government after independence to end the colonial education system of teaching languages. Ndebele continued to be exclusively taught in Matabeleland and parts of the Midland province

⁹⁴ See Chapter Two.

⁹⁵ Jonah, Interview, 28 February 2013.

where there was a strong Ndebele presence, whilst Shona was being taught in the Shona dominated provinces of Mashonaland, Masvingo, Manicaland and parts of Midlands.

The lack of Shona interest in learning Ndebele was apparent by the fact that, of the twenty-five Shona interviewed, only four spoke or had limited understanding of Ndebele beyond greetings. The Shona individuals who spoke Ndebele like Sharai had made an individual choice of learning the language when they were either students at tertiary colleges in Bulawayo or were employed in the city as teachers or nurses.⁹⁶ Sharai had done her nursing training in Bulawayo in the 1980s and on completion decided to live in the city until she emigrated in 2002.

Zanele as a Ndebele immigrant admitted that the failure to speak Ndebele by a majority of the Shona immigrants naturally restricts interaction.⁹⁷ This is because: the majority within the Ndebele immigrant community find it difficult to forge intimate interactions with a Shona diaspora community which historically had shown no interest in learning their language.⁹⁸ For the Ndebele, Gukurahundi had made language become what John Edwards describes as an emblem of groupness 'a symbol of psychosocial point' underpinning shared connotations.⁹⁹

Passing memories of Gukurahundi atrocities from generation to generation has been undermining the creation of a young Ndebele diaspora community whose relations with the Shona should not be determined by memories of the unresolved conflict tensions. There have been incidents in Britain where young generation Ndebele youths have been rebuked by their peers for forging intimate friendships with the Shona. Jabulani spoke of how his

⁹⁶ Sharai Interview 14 March 2013.

⁹⁷ Zanele Interview 2 March 2013.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ John Edwards, *Language and Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 55.

twenty year old daughter was 'demonised' by some of her Ndebele friends for having a Shona as her best friend.¹⁰⁰ The experience of Jabulani's daughter reinforces the slow process of building relations which would ultimately encourage intimate social interactions between the Shona and the Ndebele diaspora communities.

The testimony of Natalie, a twenty-one year old Zimbabwean student in Leicester, also exposed the generational impact of unresolved ethnic tensions on young Zimbabweans with dual Shona-Ndebele heritage.¹⁰¹ Having a Ndebele mother and a Shona father made her realise how attitudes of young Zimbabweans on both sides of the ethnic divide are still determined by historically constructed negative stereotypes. As someone with dual Shona and Ndebele heritage, Natalie experienced what she referred to as 'banter' with derogatory ethnic undertones based on historic events. Her Shona friends would often point out that Zimbabwe 'belongs to us', implying that her Ndebele side of the family are foreigners who migrated from South Africa.¹⁰² Her ability to speak both Shona and Ndebele also courted backlash from some of her Ndebele friends who would often rebuke her for speaking Shona; a language they described as sounding disgusting.¹⁰³

Exhibiting ethnic identities within the diaspora, younger generation Zimbabweans proved to Natalie the influential role older generation Zimbabweans are playing in sustaining the historic ethnic divide. She recalled how during family or community gatherings, discussions would usually turn to historic tribal conflicts, thus making it unavoidable for the younger generation present not to be aware of the historic ethnic tensions.¹⁰⁴ Without any willingness to let go of the ethnic identity indoctrination by both young and older

¹⁰⁰ Jabulani, Interview, 18 February 2013.

¹⁰¹ Natalie, Interview, 18 October 2014.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

generations, she is convinced that relations will not significantly improve within the foreseeable future.

Allowing memories of Gukurahundi to influence construction of relations within the different generations of the Ndebele community has inevitably had a negative impact on diaspora inter-ethnic marriages. Ralph, an unmarried Ndebele immigrant in his early thirties admitted that there are a significant number of Ndebele families who consciously discourage intermarriage with the Shona (especially when it involves a Ndebele lady).¹⁰⁵ He identified the reason as being driven by fears based on traditional Zimbabwean marriage practices in which a married woman is required to assimilate into her husband's family. He pointed out that since the Ndebele woman marrying into a Shona family will be expected to adopt her husband's surname and speak Shona, the Ndebele parents' fear is based on assumptions that she will inevitably lose most if not all of her Ndebele identity.¹⁰⁶ He described how the residue of a Ndebele identity will be restricted to speaking of Shona with a Ndebele accent or having a Ndebele first name; a situation which most diaspora Ndebele families find difficult to comprehend mainly because of Gukurahundi.¹⁰⁷

With very little intermarriage between the two ethnic communities, Zanele admitted that it will be a slow process healing the emotional wounds caused by historical conflicts, especially Gukurahundi.¹⁰⁸ Despite her acknowledgment of the importance of intermarriage in healing the wounds of Gukurahundi, she believed that intermarriage in the diaspora will continue to be stifled as long as Ndebele parents like hers continue to indoctrinate their

¹⁰⁵ Ralph, Interview, 13 May 2013.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Zanele Interview 2 March 2013.

children to construct relationships with the Shona through the lenses of Gukurahundi atrocities.¹⁰⁹

Regrettably, Jabulani, as a former Ndebele political activist in Leicester, admitted that organisations like Mthwakazi have been capitalising on Ndebele bitterness of Gukurahundi by also actively encouraging disengagement from the Shona. Jabulani described Mthwakazi as a 'divisive Ndebele separatist political organisation campaigning for the creation of an autonomous Ndebele state in Matabeleland'.¹¹⁰ According to Jabulani, the organisation in the 2000s had a 'very active Leicester branch' which once invited him to take an active role in organising the commemoration of 'Mzilikazi Day' in Leicester.¹¹¹ He declined the invitation on the pretext that celebration of the founder of the Ndebele community would not only consolidate ethnic particularism, but would also promote tribal animosity without healing the wounds of Gukurahundi.

However, it would be misleading to conclude that individuals within the Ndebele community are the only ones using memories of unresolved Gukurahundi conflicts to fan tribalism within Zimbabwe's diaspora Black community. There are also individuals within the Shona community who are not interested in pursuing a reconciliation agenda with the Ndebele. These are people whose perceptions and memories of Gukurahundi were constructed by Zimbabwe's state controlled media propaganda of the 1980s which blamed Ndebele politicians and some Ndebele civilians for instigating and sustaining political instability in Matabeleland. It is this recollection of 1980s state propaganda which has encouraged Shona speaking immigrants like David to trivialise the impact of Gukurahundi on

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Jabulani, Interview, 18 February 2013.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

the Ndebele. They are convinced that the Government's response to the disturbance was the only way to deal with a group of 'armed bandits who were using guerrilla tactics'.¹¹²

In defence of the government response to the conflict, David argued that the security forces' response was nothing to do with tribalism as claimed by some members of the diaspora Ndebele community.¹¹³ For him, it was a necessary and appropriate reaction to political instability which had been started by a group of Ndebele dominated 'dissidents' who were using guerrilla tactics to:

...murder the Shona and to disrupt the economy. As a result it would have been natural that the security forces would face difficulties in distinguishing Ndebele civilians who were mingling with the dissidents. The Ndebele should remember that the soldiers fighting the dissidents were former guerrilla fighters during the liberation and were acquainted with guerrilla tactics of depending on civilians for support. Therefore, there is no reason why the Shona or the government should feel obliged to apologise to the Ndebele civilians neither should the Ndebele keep on holding to memories of Gukurahundi to justify their separatist attitude. Gukurahundi is an unfortunate part of our history and should be left as that.'¹¹⁴

Such comments by individuals within the Shona community on how they perceive Gukurahundi has been a hindrance in establishing a cohesive Zimbabwean Black immigrant community. Most members of the Shona community are either oblivious to the atrocities of

¹¹² David Interview 13 January 2013.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ David, Interview, 13 January 2013.

Gukurahundi or they blame the Ndebele for bringing the atrocities upon themselves. Without a consensus on the interpretation of Gukurahundi, interactions between the Shona and Ndebele in the diaspora will always be engineered by unresolved conflicts of suspicion and mistrust with no internal or external motivation to end the historic hostilities.

The ethnic demography of Zimbabwe's Black immigrant community in Britain has been another contributory factor inhibiting the construction of cordial inter-tribal interactions by creating the right environment to trigger resuscitation of historic memories of ethnic conflicts, allegiances and prejudices. Although there is no specific ethnic data for different groups of Zimbabweans in the UK, a study of Zimbabwean immigrants by Alice Bloch found that most respondents were Shona. According to her findings, nearly three quarters spoke Shona fluently; a third spoke fluent Ndebele, while twelve per cent spoke both languages.¹¹⁵ Her findings justified the 'Office of National Statistics' (ONS) decision to print a Shona Census Form in the 2011 UK Census.¹¹⁶ By printing a Shona translated form, the ONS had inadvertently stimulated a consciousness that the Shona are the majority Zimbabwean immigrant community and therefore deserve official recognition. The Ndebele had been unwittingly made invisible within Zimbabwe's diaspora Black community.

The differences in ethnic demographics within Zimbabwe's Black immigrant community in Britain can be traced back to Ndebele migration trends linked to ancestral links between the Ndebele and South Africa. With the pioneers of the Ndebele kingdom having migrated from the Zulu nation of South Africa, South Africa had always been a natural and viable

¹¹⁵ Alice Bloch 'Zimbabweans in Britain: Transnational Activities and Capabilities', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 34 (2008), pp. 287-305.

¹¹⁶ Office of National Statistics, <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/census/2011/the-2011-census/collecting-the-information/the-national-campaign/written-translation-support-in-the-2011-census.pdf>. (Accessed 02/08/15).

destination for a majority of individuals from the Ndebele community.¹¹⁷ Ancestral heritage with South Africa as suggested by Jonathan Crush and Daniel Tevera meant the Ndebele could easily assimilate into the Zulu community because of the similarities in language, history and some aspects of traditions with the Zulus of South Africa.¹¹⁸ Although South Africa had always been the preferred destination for a majority of the Ndebele, it would be misleading to conclude that there was no Shona immigration into South Africa. The proximity of South Africa to Zimbabwe also encouraged individuals from the Shona community to migrate to South Africa. Labour recruitment in South African gold mines during colonial era initially triggered both Ndebele and Shona emigration.¹¹⁹

Whilst a combination of proximity and historical ties with South Africa had always ensured a higher Ndebele immigration rate into South Africa, participants' migration trends unveiled how Britain had always been an alternative and viable first choice destination for a significant number of middle class Shona professionals who could finance long-distance travel. Shona migration to Britain became more pronounced from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s when a significant number took advantage of organised recruitment of Zimbabwean professionals by UK based Employment Agencies who needed nurses, engineers, social workers and teachers.¹²⁰

JoAnn McGregor explains how the Agencies enticed the professionals (especially in the health sector) by holding periodic recruitment drives in Zimbabwe's public venues such as

¹¹⁷ Jonathan Crush and Daniel Tevera, *Zimbabwe's Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival* (Pretoria: The Institute for Democracy in South Africa, 2010), p. 69.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Pasura, *African Transnational Diasporas*, 2014, p.38.

¹²⁰ JoAnn McGregor, 'Professional Relocating: Zimbabwean Nurses and Family in Britain', *Geographical Paper* No. 178, University of Reading (2006), p. 6.

hotels between late 1992 and 2002 in Harare.¹²¹ Taking advantage of the recruitment drive was Sharai, a Zimbabwean trained nurse who migrated at the beginning of 2002 after being issued with a work permit. On arrival in Britain, Sharai undertook an adaptation course at a Leicestershire Nursing Home so as to be able to work as a qualified nurse. When asked to comment on the ethnic representation of those undertaking the adaption courses, Sharai admitted that she encountered very few Ndebele nurses.¹²² The fewer number of Ndebele nurses on adaptation courses proved the extent to which the Shona, unlike the Ndebele, had positively embraced opportunities of migrating to Britain.

The recruitment drive for Zimbabwean nurses to fill vacancies in the health sector was also complemented by a surge of Zimbabweans applying for nurse training at British Universities. The British government before 2002 had unwittingly encouraged foreign applications for nurse training by allowing international students access to non-refundable grants and bursaries.¹²³ It was therefore inevitable that Zimbabweans would seize the opportunity to study in Britain whilst having some financial stability. They could apply for nursing places whilst in Zimbabwe and then travel to Britain once they had been invited for interviews. Prior to 2002 this was the main migration route used by a majority of potential student nurses since Zimbabweans did not face immigration restrictions which required them to apply for a British visa before travelling. Memory's experience demonstrated how on arrival, they could obtain a holiday visa which would allow them to stay for six months.¹²⁴ During that time they could attend the interviews and, when successful, they would apply for

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Sharai, Interview, 14 March 2013.

¹²³ McGregor, 'Professional Relocating,, p. 9.

¹²⁴ Memory, Interview, 27 November 2013.

student visas. If unsuccessful, they would have enough time to apply to other Universities or enrol onto a different course.

There was consensus among the Black participants that the Shona were the first to utilise the student-nurse route to migrate to Britain unlike the Ndebele. The dominance of the Shona students training as nurses was reiterated by Memory, a Shona nursing student at De Montfort University (DMU) from January 2000 to 2003. She could only recall four Ndebele out of over forty Zimbabwean students in her year group.¹²⁵ The high number of individuals from the Shona community enrolled at DMU created the perfect environment for the establishment of migrant networks which triggered a rapid rise of the Shona population in Leicester. This was because married students like Memory arranged for their spouses and children to join them. In the case of Memory, her husband and children joined her in 2000 and 2002 respectively. Apart from organising migration of her immediate family, she also sent student nurse application forms to her two brothers and a cousin to come and join her in 2000 and 2001 respectively.¹²⁶ It was this form of chain migration prevalent within the settled Shona nursing student community that naturally helped the rapid increase of the Shona community in Leicester, especially in educational institutions.

The Shona interviewees presented clear evidence that visible presence of the Shona at Britain's universities in the early 2000s was used to resuscitate historically constructed prejudices that the Ndebele had never been as motivated as the Shona in the pursuit of higher professional or academic qualifications.¹²⁷ They would express the historic arrogance and prejudice toward the Ndebele during the interview process with comments like

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ See Chapter Two.

*mandex*¹²⁸ *haadidi kudzidza* (Ndebele do not want to learn) to explain the low representation of the Ndebele immigrants in higher education (especially in nursing) at the turn of the millennium.

However, these comments trivialised the fact that once the Ndebele immigrants regularised their immigration status, they also pursued education as the most useful tool in attaining social mobility. This was clearly evident when, out of the eleven UK based Ndebele interviewed, eight had acquired a UK professional or academic qualification after they had regularised their immigration status. Of the three who had not attained a British qualification, two had Zimbabwean professional qualifications and the remaining one was still waiting for the decision on his political asylum application. With this high percentage of Ndebele enrolling for further education the derogatory comments by the Shona served to confirm their historic arrogance engrained in their numerical superiority over the Ndebele.

Changes in Zimbabwe's landscape following the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) political party in 1999 under the leadership of Trade Unionist Morgan Tsvangirai marked the beginning of changes in the ethnic demography of Zimbabwe's immigrant population in Britain. The results of the parliamentary elections results in 2000 did not only herald the start of a significant challenge to Mugabe's government by the MDC, but also triggered Ndebele community migration. This was because the 2000 parliamentary elections served to confirm that just as it was in the 1980s, Matabeleland provinces were still anti-Mugabe's government. This was apparent when, of the twenty-three parliamentary

¹²⁸ Derogatory name used by the Shona referring to the Ndebele.

seats in Ndebele dominated Bulawayo and Matabeleland provinces, MDC won all of them except two.¹²⁹

With memories of Gukurahundi still embedded in the lives of the Ndebele, the political gains by the MDC encouraged them to migrate to Britain as political asylum seekers since the British government recognised that the political violence in Zimbabwe was being sanctioned by the Zimbabwean government.¹³⁰ Although claiming political asylum in Britain was an easy option for both the Shona (who were supporters of MDC) and the Ndebele, Zanele admitted that Ndebele asylum seekers had greater confidence in using the asylum route as a means of escaping the collapse of the economy in Zimbabwe.¹³¹ As the minority within the Black Zimbabwean community they were encouraged by assumptions that the British government would be more sympathetic to their political asylum applications.¹³² Unlike potential political Shona migrants, the Ndebele immigrants could use their support of the MDC to claim that they would always be vulnerable to Mugabe's government persecution just as in the 1980s civil conflict.¹³³

The diverse immigration circumstances between the two communities were apparent within the research's participants. Of the eight Shona who had political refugee immigration status, only two had used seeking political asylum as a first option when they arrived. The other six only adopted the asylum political route when there were changes in their immigration status following the expiry of their six month visitor or student visas. This was

¹²⁹ Africa Watch, 'Recent Data, Statistics and Indicators Zimbabwe 2000 Parliamentary Election Results', *African Security Review*, Vol. 14 (2005), pp.59-63.

¹³⁰ Alice Bloch, 'Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives', *Social Policy and Administration*, vol.40 (2006), pp.67-87.

¹³¹ Zanele, Interview, 2 March 2013 .

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

contrary to Ndebele interviewees as all but one used political asylum as their first option or they would have joined their spouses or families who used the political asylum route.

The increase in the number of Ndebele asylum seekers coincided with the implementation of the Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999. The Act introduced the dispersal policy which empowered the UK Border Agency to relocate asylum seekers from London and the South East of England to cities and towns in northern England where there was affordable accommodation.¹³⁴ With a criterion of dispersing political asylum seekers to urban areas with cheap housing, Leicester, with relatively cheap accommodation in St Mathew and Highfields, was designated a dispersal area for Zimbabwean asylum seekers¹³⁵. Although there might not be statistical verification of Zimbabwean political asylum seekers dispersed to Leicester on arrival, data gathered at the end of May 2004 by the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) identified Zimbabwean asylum seekers as second only to Somalis on the list of asylum seekers needing assistance.¹³⁶

The inevitable consequence of the dispersal policy was the rapid ethnic transformation of the Black Zimbabwean immigrant community in dispersal cities like Leicester which were once dominated by the Shona. The ethnic transformation of the diaspora community inadvertently created the right environment for the reincarnation of historical memories of unresolved conflicts between the Shona and the Ndebele. The source of the reincarnation of these historical memories was the realisation by a significant number of the Ndebele new arrivals that the Shona were: already settled in employment; engaged in higher education,

¹³⁴ Patricia Hynes and Rosemary Sales, 'New Communities: Asylum Seekers and Dispersal', in Alice Bloch and John Solomos, eds, *Race and Ethnicity in the 21st Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), p. 39.

¹³⁵ Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees (ICAR), 'Current Situation' Available at <http://www.icar.org.uk/9971/leicester/current-situation.html> (Accessed on 4 March 2012). ICAR is Runnymede Trust based academic research and information organisation.

¹³⁶ Ibid

with nursing and social work being the most popular courses; or holding leadership positions in social organisations such as churches or community support networks.¹³⁷

As a Ndebele asylum seeker in 2002, Zanele admitted that the apparent realisation by the Ndebele of a Shona immigrant community perceived to be settled in Britain's socio-economic structures led to the construction of jealousy driven perceptions that they would always play 'catch up' with Shona immigrants; just as in Zimbabwe. A combination of British government dispersal policy and the diverse immigration trends between the Shona and the Ndebele had therefore inadvertently triggered a resuscitation of ethnic prejudices.

The new Ndebele settlers were arriving with memories of how their minority status had always prejudiced them in assuming leadership roles as reflected in the Unity Agreement of December 1987.¹³⁸ The Unity agreement had instead subtly created perceptions that the Ndebele should not expect to assume elected leadership positions in organisations where the Shona dominate. It was therefore inevitable that on arrival in Britain, there were individuals within the Ndebele community who were determined to assert their influence on the Zimbabwean Black community. They were confident of success in cities where they believed their population was increasing to the level that it will be possible to challenge Shona dominance.

Leicester, as one of the cities which started to experience the rapid transformation in its ethnic demographics following an influx of Ndebele asylum seekers from 2001, could not be spared the resuscitation of a Black Zimbabwean community that would be demarcated by ethnicity. Sharai who witnessed the rapid changes in the ethnic demographics of Zimbabwe's Leicester community explained how the increasing presence of a large Ndebele

¹³⁷ Zanele, Interview, 2 March 2013

¹³⁸ See Chapter Two.

community in the city naturally attracted other Ndebele individuals from all over Britain.¹³⁹

As the Ndebele population increased in the city, it did not take long for some members of the Shona community to develop perceptions that the Ndebele were determined to assert their influence by pursuing a separatist agenda without fear of Shona reprisals.

Jabulani, a political activist within Leicester's Ndebele community admitted that an increase in the Ndebele population gave them the confidence to initiate a separatist agenda since it activated shared historical or traditional commonalities namely, Gukurahundi and language.¹⁴⁰ These commonalities emerged to be unifying focal points which enabled the Ndebele to establish social networks to challenge the Shona. For example, Jabulani gave an example of how he and a few other members of the Ndebele community in Leicester established a Burial Society to financially assist or give support to bereaved members of the community. Although he claimed that the Burial Society was open to all Zimbabweans, he admitted that as a Ndebele run support network, it was inevitably dominated by the Ndebele.¹⁴¹

Happison, a Derby based Shona community worker who lived in Leicester from 2000 to 2006, also reaffirmed the negative impact on community relations following the rapid increase of the Ndebele population in Leicester.¹⁴² As someone who used to be involved in Leicester's community activities, he recalled moments when consensus on certain issues would be difficult to obtain. Disagreements would arise on trivial issues such as assembling football teams for sporting activities resulting in the establishment of teams with an ethnic

¹³⁹ Sharai, Interview, 21 March 2013.

¹⁴⁰ Jabulani, interview, 18 January 2013.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Happison, Interview, 23 January 2013

identity.¹⁴³ The experiences by Jabulani and Happison therefore served to unravel the extent to which the rapid ethnic transformation of Leicester's Black community had evolved into a hindrance in establishing cordial diaspora interactions between the Shona and the Ndebele as it invoked historic memories of prejudices, tensions and ethnic allegiances.

The development of Shona perceptions that a significant number of the Ndebele in Leicester are anti-Shona were not only triggered by an increase in the number of exclusive Ndebele organised social events or support networks, but also by the Ndebele's use of ethnicity to influence leadership positions in organisations previously dominated by the Shona. Mathew, a former secretary of a Leicester based Zimbabwe support network organisation explained how the election process to choose leaders had to adapt to changes in the ethnic demographics of the organisation's membership.¹⁴⁴ As the membership became more diverse, his position and that of the Shona chairman became untenable; a situation which forced both of them to resign. He pointed out that changes in the leadership structure were instigated by some Ndebele members in the organisation who were demanding a tribal balance in the leadership structure to reflect what they perceived as the superior numerical position of the Ndebele in Leicester.¹⁴⁵

The influence of ethnicity in leadership issues as was the case in Zimbabweans' Leicester organisations were also experienced in Derby. Despite the Shona being the majority within Zimbabwe's Derby community, Jacob who had been living in the city since 2002, admitted a gradual rise of ethnic conflicts within some Shona run community organisations. He explained how the situation arose when the Ndebele realised that their population in the

¹⁴³ Ibid

¹⁴⁴ Mathew, Interview, 3 February 2013

¹⁴⁵ Ibid

city was increasing. As the population increased, Jacob claimed that the Ndebele were reluctant to participate in Shona led community organisations even when the Shona agreed to incorporate them in the leadership structures.¹⁴⁶ As a result, the Ndebele, according to Jacob, have not been visible in community activities led by the Shona. Ndebele lack of interest in Shona organised activities was described by Jacob as an attitude which does not only trivialise the fact that the Shona led organisations were being 'competently run', but it also undermined 'democratically run institutions'.¹⁴⁷

The reincarnation of ethnic tensions within Zimbabwe's Black immigrant communities experiencing ethnic transformation has also been compounded by ethnically constructed political allegiances. The source of the contemporary political allegiances can be traced back to the split of the main opposition political party, the MDC into two factions in 2005. One faction was led by Shona speaking Morgan Tsvangirai and the other by Ndebele speaking Welshman Ncube. Panganayi, as a former MDC committee member of the UK branch in Reading, revealed how the majority of MDC supporters in Britain responded to the split by using their ethnicity to choose which group to align with.¹⁴⁸ This became apparent when a majority of Shona speaking supporters (including him) aligned with Tsvangirai with Ndebele supporters aligning with Ncube. For the Ndebele, the MDC split provided a remote chance that they would destabilise the political dominance of the Shona; a wish which Paurosi, a former Shona war veteran described as 'wishful thinking which would never happen'.¹⁴⁹ The use of ethnicity in defining the allegiances within the MDC had indirectly mirrored the ethnic split of the nationalist movement during the colonial era.

¹⁴⁶ Jacob, Interview, 23 January 2013.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Panganayi, Interview, 24 March 2013.

¹⁴⁹ Paurosi, Interview, 2 July 2013.

Community tensions attributed to political allegiances have not been restricted to ethnic factionalism within the opposition MDC party, but have also extended to intense and acrimonious rivalry between Mugabe's ZANU PF and MDC diaspora supporters. Memories of the post-2000 clamp down of political activism by the Zimbabwean government has led to a vocal and visible diaspora group of opposition supporters who are not only anti-Mugabe, but also pursue an agenda of ostracising ZANU PF sympathisers.

In cities like Leicester, where there is a high population of Zimbabweans, MDC sympathisers or anti-Mugabe supporters are in control of the majority of community support Associations since most of them would have used the political asylum route to settle in Britain. Nyasha, a political refugee and a member of one these community Associations since settling in Leicester in 2010, accused the association's leadership of reincarnating the memories of animosity between the two major political parties in Zimbabwe.¹⁵⁰ She described how the leaders have made it an exclusive Association for MDC supporters by denouncing Mugabe and his supporters 'a situation which has made ZANU PF supporters in Leicester feel intimidated to be associated with the Association.'¹⁵¹

After attending five fortnightly public meetings as an observer, the extent to which the Association had evolved into an anti-Mugabe movement became apparent. The structure of the meeting rarely changed. The proceedings would always start with Christian song(s) and a prayer, followed by an interactive address with the audience by the Chairman or a member of the leadership team. It was during the address that Zimbabwe's political issues were brought up which ranged from reports of unsubstantiated political violence, collapse of the economy, growing poverty and the need to change the government in Zimbabwe.

¹⁵⁰ Nyasha, Interview, 8 April 2013.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

Political references negated the fact that the Association was to be perceived as apolitical with the aim of not only helping asylum seekers, but any Zimbabwean who might require assistance. The meeting would end with socialisation of the members and guests whilst eating Zimbabwe's staple food of sadza (thickened porridge made from maize meal), meat-stew and green vegetables.

The impact of homeland developed ethnic prejudices in determining community relations in cities like Leicester has not been reciprocated in urban areas where there was no significant ethnic transformation to challenge the dominance of the Shona. Using the example of Stevenage, Mathew explained that, during the time he lived in the town between 2004 and 2009, the Shona dominated community had managed to construct a cohesive and united Zimbabwean Black community. He explained how organised community social activities such as sporting events and the establishment of networks to support community members in bereavement were invaluable in uniting the Stevenage Zimbabwean community.

Mathew identified the unity of Zimbabwean Black immigrants as one of the major reasons why Stevenage Town Council allowed the community to have access to facilities at a community centre.¹⁵² He acknowledged that during the time he lived in the town, the availability of the community centre enhanced community cohesiveness by making it easier to hold community meetings and organise social events such as church services, parties or weddings. If it was not for the cohesiveness of the Zimbabwean community, Mathew was convinced that Stevenage Town Council would not have continued to be twinned with Zimbabwe's Kadoma City; a partnership which started in 1989.¹⁵³

¹⁵² Mathew, Interview, 3 February 2013.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

Mathew was also convinced that the ethnic demographics of the Zimbabwean community in Stevenage in which the Shona were the dominant group was the most plausible reason for the construction of a cohesive Zimbabwean community. He justified his conviction by highlighting that the Zimbabwean community in Stevenage was fortunate in that there was one predominant ethnic group; the Shona.¹⁵⁴ As a result there were no detrimental tribal conflicts. The minority Ndebele who could also speak fluent Shona were willing participants in Shona organised events as there was no opportunity or need to promote ethnic differences.¹⁵⁵

Mathew's assertion served to confirm that Shona dominance in urban areas like Stevenage would have created pseudo community relations which offered a false sense of cordial ethnic relations. The Ndebele would have reluctantly accepted the fact that if they wanted to exclude themselves from the Shona, they would find it difficult to access community support networks dominated by the Shona. The creation of such pseudo community relations justified why some individuals within the Ndebele community would have migrated to cities like Leicester where there was a significant Ndebele population.

Migrating to areas with a large Ndebele was necessitated by the fact that there were some within the Ndebele community who needed to gain confidence in constructing communities to challenge the Shona dominance. For a majority of individuals within the Ndebele community, constructing a united and visible community would be the most effective way in dealing with historic memories that the Shona will always use their dominance (as it was in Zimbabwe) to impose their will on them. To emphasise this point, Panganayi, a Shona who resides in Reading, gave an example of an incident which occurred at one of the

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

Zimbabwean Days of Fellowship organised by his Church for the predominantly Black members.¹⁵⁶ The 'Days of Fellowship' held at least four times a year aimed to socialise and fundraise for Zimbabwean projects whilst holding church services the way it is done back home; especially by singing songs in vernacular languages.¹⁵⁷

It was the need to recreate a Zimbabwean feel to the services which triggered tensions between the Shona and the Ndebele at one of those meetings in 2005. Panganayi described how the Ndebele took advantage of their increasing numbers to verbally express their displeasure when Shona songs were dominating song services. To avoid future disruption of the Day's proceedings, Panganayi pointed out that the organisers of subsequent 'Days of Fellowship' had to ensure that both communities were equally or proportionally represented in all Church services, with English being used as the medium of communication when addressing the congregation. Despite the positive response to Ndebele protests, Panganayi was convinced that such protests and subsequent changes would not have occurred in the early 2000s when the Ndebele were significantly in the minority.¹⁵⁸

The incident in Panganayi's church revealed that the Black Zimbabwean Christian community in Britain was not immune to ethnic identities or tensions which had the potential of hindering interactions between the Shona and the Ndebele. Ethnic identities in the churches frequented by Zimbabweans became apparent when the increasing number of Zimbabwean immigrants started to undergo rapid ethnic transformation at the turn of the new millennium. As the Zimbabwean immigrant population increased, there was a

¹⁵⁶ Panganayi, , Interview, 24 March 2013.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

Chapter 3

spontaneous growth of diaspora congregations whose ethnic demographics were an extension of the churches in Zimbabwe.¹⁵⁹ Just like in Zimbabwe, the diaspora Zimbabwean Home Grown Pentecostal Churches founded by Shona clergy continued to be dominated by members from the Shona community.¹⁶⁰ Examples of these Shona dominated Home Grown Churches include Family of God, Forward in Faith Mission International, African Apostolic Faith, Johanne Masowe Gospel of God Church, and Apostolic Faith Mission.

The Traditional Churches' congregations have also not been spared Zimbabwe's ethnic demographics. While Home Grown Church congregants' ethnic identities are reflective of the ethnicity of the founding leaders, the diaspora demographics in the Traditional Churches such as the Salvation Army, Seventh Day Adventist, Church of England, Roman Catholic or Methodist can be traced back to spread of Christianity during the early years of colonial rule. Although Chengetai Zvobgo points out that missionary operations commenced in full force after the defeat of the Shona and Ndebele following the uprising of 1896-97, it is important to note that the impact of Ndebele's initial resistance to Christianity and the colonial process of colonising Mashonaland first cannot be ignored when seeking to understand the diverse (diaspora) ethnic representation in a majority of Traditional Churches.¹⁶¹

For example, due to Ndebele resistance to Christianity in the nineteenth century and the Ndebele uprising of 1893, Zvobgo identifies the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) Church as one of the few churches involved in pioneer missionary activities in Matabeleland. The Church

¹⁵⁹ Dominic Pasura 'Religious Transnationalism: The Case of Zimbabwean Catholics in Britain', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, vol. 42 (2012), pp. 26-53.

¹⁶⁰ See Chapter Two.

¹⁶¹ Chengetai J M Zvobgo, *A History of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe 1890-1939* (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1996), p. 67.

consolidated its presence in the region by opening Solusi Mission School in 1894.¹⁶² Although the Ndebele rebellion of 1894 and a severe famine disrupted the evangelistic work, the SDA missionaries were able to organise a church in 1902; evidence of the Church's progress in its evangelistic work. By 1933 an SDA school had been established at Solusi Mission which over the years expanded into one of the largest church run private educational institutions in Zimbabwe's Matabeleland region. It is this early presence of the SDA Church in Matabeleland which explains why a significant number of the Ndebele both in Zimbabwe and Britain are members of the Church.

Similarly, the trend in the construction of ethnic identities in Churches like SDA which had an early presence in Matabeleland was replicated in the majority of Traditional Churches involved in establishing mission stations in Shona dominated regions of Mashonaland and Manicaland during the early stages of colonial rule. Examples of Churches actively involved in the Shona regions during the first decade of colonial rule included Roman Catholic, Wesleyan Methodists, American Methodist Episcopal, Anglicans, Dutch Reformed and Salvation Amy.¹⁶³ As a result of their early presence in the regions, these churches have always had a strong Shona presence; a presence which has extended to diaspora congregations.

For example, the Roman Catholic Church in Britain has exhibited the historical dominance of the Shona community in its congregations by holding diaspora 'Mass Services' in Shona and rarely in Ndebele.¹⁶⁴ The services are held across the country in urban centres where there is a strong Zimbabwean immigrant population like London, Leicester, Birmingham and

¹⁶² Ibid, p. 11.

¹⁶³ Ibid, pp. 1-81.

¹⁶⁴ John, Interview, 24 March 2013.

Slough. Zivanayi and John, who are both members of the Roman Catholic Church, admitted that having Shona 'Mass Services' which cater for the dominant Shona congregants has naturally excluded or stifled Ndebele participation. By having services in Shona, the use of language has reincarnated memories of the influence of linguistic differences in enforcing Shona-Ndebele demarcations. This is because: Ndebele participation in the Shona services according to John (who attends services in Slough) have been restricted to members of the Ndebele community who are fluent in Shona whilst the rest would feel comfortable attending English services.¹⁶⁵

The Black participants also reveal an insecure diaspora community which is riddled with historically constructed mistrust and jealousy that is not influenced by ethnicity. This became apparent when a majority of them admitted reluctance to share sensitive personal issues such as immigration status to other Black Zimbabweans before regularisation of immigration status. Mathew identified this lack of trust as the main reason why a majority of Black Zimbabweans who had not legalised their stay in Britain would refrain from socialising with other Zimbabweans.¹⁶⁶ This was largely because of known incidences in which individuals were reported to immigration officials for working illegally by people they thought they trusted. The emergence of diaspora mistrust between the first generation arrivals could not be understood outside the context of political events in both the colonial and post-colonial eras.

As demonstrated in chapter two, the nationalist movement's brutal methods of soliciting support from the masses and repressive and authoritarian governance of the Rhodesian government had created a mind-set of fear and mistrust between Black Zimbabweans. The

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Mathew, Interview, 3 February 2013.

advent of independence also failed to desensitise Black Zimbabweans from a culture of being tolerant of each other as the government continued to employ coercive tactics to 'elicit civilian compliance' by ruthlessly suppressing political opposition, striking workers and students, or civil society.¹⁶⁷ Migrating with memories of violence against each other would have naturally constructed a Black Zimbabwean diaspora community which found it difficult to escape the influences of the undesirable environment of insecurity when among other Black Zimbabweans.

Parallel to mistrust and suspicions within the community were feelings of jealousy driven by historical influences of linking education with social mobility. The cultural import into the diaspora of the significance of education in the lives of Black Zimbabweans inadvertently started the process of dismantling historic social class identities. This was because: Britain's education sector had provided all Zimbabweans, regardless of social class background, with opportunities to achieve social parity with those who were above them in Zimbabwe's social structure. Kudzi, a 35 year old radiography student in Bradford who arrived in Britain with no professional qualification identified 'Access into Nursing' and 'Foundation Degree' as the most popular routes used by those who had been perceived to be less academically gifted to attain academic oriented qualifications or university degrees.¹⁶⁸ With educational opportunities provided by the foundation courses, upward social mobility in the diaspora was no longer the privilege of deskilled professional Zimbabweans or those who migrated on student visas.

¹⁶⁷ James Muzondidya, 'From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1980-1987' in Raftopoulos and Mlambo A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008, p.154.

¹⁶⁸ Kudzi, Interview, 1 April 2013.

However, for the Black Zimbabwean immigrant community with a pre-emigration history of idolising social upward mobility through education, Britain's educational opportunities attracted jealousy driven ridicule from Zimbabweans who had migrated as professionals. Identification of former class or school mates who were perceived to be academically weak or incompetent to attain a university degree or professional qualification made some within the Zimbabwean community question whether entry qualifications at some British universities are rigorous enough. Questioning the integrity of the enrolment requirements at some British universities facilitated the emergence of theories to explain how they would have succeeded in their studies.

There are those like Brenda, a Zimbabwean trained nurse living in Luton, who was convinced that some of her compatriots only succeeded by asking or paying trusted friends and relatives to write their assignments.¹⁶⁹ Her conviction was a result of having worked with British trained Zimbabwean nurses who she knew had failed their 'O' Levels back home. The other theory had been embraced by individuals like Hains who accused some Black Zimbabweans of fraudulently obtaining academic certificates so as to meet the minimum entry requirements for certain university courses.¹⁷⁰ The conviction of a Coventry University trained Zimbabwean nurse, Sibusiso Nyoni in October 2014 for faking her Zimbabwean 'O' Level certificate, strengthened the argument of fraudulent activities by desperate Zimbabweans wanting to use education to attain social mobility.¹⁷¹

It is undeniable that examination of the emerging contemporary Black Zimbabwean immigrant population has unveiled a community riddled with historically driven ethnic

¹⁶⁹ Brenda, Interview, 23 October 2014.

¹⁷⁰ Hains Interview 10 March 2013.

¹⁷¹ NEWZIMBABWE.COM NEWS, 'Nurse banned in UK over fake Zim O'Levels', 9 October 2014.

particularism, political allegiances, mistrust and jealousy. However, with each racial Zimbabwean community migrating with different historical experiences, the examination of White, Coloured and Asian communities will establish the extent of the influence of imported memories on the respective Zimbabwe's minority communities.

The White Immigrant Community

Migrating either as holders of dual nationality or on ancestral visas resulted in White immigrants being unevenly dispersed across Britain. This was because on arrival in Britain a majority of them chose to settle in areas where they had family or ancestral ties. As a result, virtual social networking emerged as an invaluable tool in forging a sense of a collective identity for the dispersed community. *The Rhodesian in the UK*, a Facebook account was created in 2010 to stimulate consciousness of a community identity based on past experiences. With a membership of 3 210 (as of 21th June 2015), the social network site has firmly established itself as an invaluable point of contact for the White community.

Since its inception, the virtual community has evolved into a support network providing moral and welfare support, and advice on immigration and employment for a majority of White Zimbabwean immigrants who would have gone through the trauma of downward social mobility after being forced to emigrate by changes in Zimbabwe's political system or loss of farms. The Facebook support network has firmly established itself as a potential ally to individuals described by John Rex to have arrived within migrant minority communities without strong or extended families.¹⁷² A posting by a member of the Facebook virtual community summed up the ethos of mutual assistance:

¹⁷² John Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State: Working Papers in the Theory of Multi-Culturalism and Political Integration* (London: Macmillan Press, 1996) p. 151.

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...well I'm on a mission again for my oldies - not only Byo peeps but the ones who have found themselves in the UK and need support. This is a huge upheaval for them and yes have a 'haven' but in a strange place away from family and friends and to be honest it's scary! I need people to contact me who will 'adopt' these people - it's not about money but guidance and support until they find their feet.¹⁷³

By appealing for assistance for those in 'Byo' (Bulawayo, Zimbabwe's second largest city), the writer brought out a perspective that the virtual community is not only about assisting those in Britain, but is also concerned about the welfare of White pensioners in Zimbabwe.

Commenting on the support mechanism of Zimbabwean based White pensioners, Alison, an active member of the virtual community, identified the pensioners as those who could not emigrate because of financial constraints or failure to obtain ancestral visas.¹⁷⁴ To ensure sustainable and transparent management and coordination of supporting those in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Pensioners Support Fund (ZPSF) was set up by members of the virtual community (*Rhodesian in the UK, Facebook*). The racial bias of the pensioner support network was highlighted in the ZPSF beneficiaries' partial list published on the *Rhodesian in the UK, Facebook* account in June 2013. An analysis of the surnames on the partial list showed that of the 447 beneficiaries, only seven were Blacks.¹⁷⁵ The Black recipients of assistance were identified by Alison as most likely to be former domestic workers of the

¹⁷³ Quote on 'Rhodesian in the UK' *Facebook* site available at, <https://www.facebook.com/groups/48794364540/> (Accessed 21st February 2014).

¹⁷⁴ Alison, Interview, 15 November 2013.

¹⁷⁵ *Rhodesian in the UK Facebook* site available at <https://www.facebook.com/groups/48794364540/10151508568784541/> (Accessed 21st February 2014).

White immigrants who were left with no means of supporting themselves following the farm evictions or when their White employers voluntarily migrated.¹⁷⁶

Three groups of White Zimbabwean immigrants were identified by the participants as being in need of assistance from White Zimbabweans already settled in Britain. The support they received from the *Facebook* virtual community would range from financial assistance, providing temporary accommodation, being signposted to employment opportunities, and advice on immigration issues. The first group consisted of individuals or families who would have arrived with depleted financial resources after being evicted from their farms or would have been victimised to the point of abandoning their businesses.

The other diaspora group needing assistance was composed of those who migrated when they were in their late fifties and were approaching retirement age. They would have lived a comfortable life before being forced to migrate. As a result, a majority of them needed assistance because of a variety of interrelated reasons. These included: not being psychologically motivated to find employment because of the violent circumstances surrounding their emigration or experiencing health problems which could not permit them to work in physically demanding menial jobs.

The third group consisted of those who had no transferrable professional qualifications or skills to find suitable employment. Since a majority of older generation White Zimbabweans who were economically active prior to migration were over forty, they would have considered themselves too old for the British labour market.

Having a support ethos has allowed the virtual community to establish a network described by Vilna Francine Bashi as being made up of kinship, friendship and shared community

¹⁷⁶ Alison, Interview, 15 November 2013

origin.¹⁷⁷ To affirm Bashi's assertion, Alison explained how the appeals by the *Facebook* community often encouraged members to assist strangers who were only linked to the community by circumstances that had forced them to migrate. She gave an example of how the virtual community once rallied to purchase an air ticket for a White Zimbabwean living in South Africa who had been left stranded after being robbed of his money and travelling documents when on a visit in Britain. On a personal level she also recalled how appeals posted on *Facebook* encouraged her to give 'free temporary accommodation' to a White Zimbabwean immigrant for two weeks whilst he sought ways of establishing himself. By volunteering to assist a stranger, Alison claimed it was testimony that the *Facebook* virtual community had become a sanctuary of White Zimbabweans who were experiencing the trauma of forced migration from a country they once called 'home'.¹⁷⁸

With a majority of Whites having been forced to migrate by political or economic circumstances, the *Facebook* virtual community had also been used as a platform to express anger and bitterness toward the Zimbabwean and British governments. Historic memories of the events leading to Zimbabwe's independence and the violent seizure of their farms had been the source of the bitterness. A comment below by one of the members responding to an announcement by the Zimbabwean parliament in 2013 that the 'country is broke' sums up this bitterness. The member's response was:

...sad but true they have screwed the country into the ground as we
said they would when the British handed it to them on a plate to

¹⁷⁷ Vilna Francine Bashi, *Survival of the Knitted Immigrant Social Networks in a Stratified World*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 18.

¹⁷⁸ Alison, Interview, 15 November 2013.

destroy. The British had to because there was NO WAY in a hell they would EVER come close to winning it in a war situation.

The comment also seemed to endorse the assertion that there are some individuals within the White immigrant community who still entertain thoughts that the independence of Zimbabwe could not have been possible without the compromise and participation of the White leadership (following Britain's persuasion) at the Lancaster House negotiations. It is this consciousness of the role Whites perceive they played in Zimbabwe's independence which Alison identified as the source of their anger towards the British government. There is a strong conviction within the community that Britain should have militarily intervened to protect White farmers from farm seizures. By not militarily intervening, a majority of Whites feel they were 'sold out, dumped and betrayed' by the British.¹⁷⁹

The perceived inactivity by the British has only served to reinforce perceptions that the Lancaster House agreement was based on under the table shenanigans which were not about the long term interests of the White community in Zimbabwe. Alison claimed that since Zimbabwe's independence, the White community had been subjected to an anti-colonial nationalist ideology of 'terrorising Whites whilst disregarding the fact that Blacks in Zimbabwe during the colonial era were enjoying a better standard of life than those in neighbouring states ruled by Black governments.'¹⁸⁰ The anti-White rhetoric was evident when the Black Nationalist movement, especially the ruling ZANU (PF) party, continued with slogans which ostracised Whites as Zimbabwean citizens. Examples of the slogans included: 'down with Whites' (*pasi nevarungu*) or describing Whites with the slogan 'plunderers of

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

black wealth' (*vapembivepfumi*).¹⁸¹ Therefore, for most Whites, the farm invasions at the turn of the millennium were the conclusion of a process which started after the signing of the Lancaster House Constitution; a process of undermining Whites' claims to be citizens of post-colonial Zimbabwe.

Despite the perceived inactivity by the British government to stop the farm invasions, Alison explained that there are some within the White community who have not lost hope of pressurising the British government to facilitate their return to their 'homes'. She identified the most prominent White Zimbabwean protesters as those who have been active participants in a multiracial 'Zimbabwe Vigil' which takes place every Saturday from 14:00 to 18:00 outside the Zimbabwean Embassy in London. The multicultural vigil which started in 2002 is part of a protest against Mugabe's government whose policies of perceived 'gross violations of human rights' have been deemed to be the source of post-millennium mass exodus of Zimbabweans cutting across all racial groups and social classes.¹⁸²

Outside the *Facebook* virtual community, events have also been organised to promote physical interaction within Zimbabwe's White immigrant community. The 'July-Braai' is an annual event held in Derby, usually during the last weekend of July. Alison explained that the choice of Derby to annually host the event has been influenced by the uneven dispersal of the White population across Britain. Its central location provides a fairer and easy commute for the dispersed population. On the Rhodesian Pioneer Club (RPC) website, the 2014 event was advertised (see below) as a family event which caters for both children and adults whilst fundraising for the Zimbabwe Pensioners Support Fund.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Dominic Pasura, 'Zimbabwean Transnational Diaspora Politics in Britain', in JoAnn McGregor and Ranka Primorac (Eds), *Zimbabwe's New Diaspora: Displacement and the Cultural Politics of Survival* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), pp. 108-111.

Figure Five: July Braai Advert



RHODESIAN PIONEER CLUB JULY BRAAI
25TH TO 28TH JULY 2014
 @ <http://www.beechwoodparkleisure.co.uk/>
 For info and booking forms
<http://www.rhodesianspioneerclub.co.uk>
 email: bobby6408@hotmail.com
 Phone: 01454601966

SUPPORTING THE OLD FOLK IN ZIMBABWE
www.zpsf.co.za

FEATURING
 John Edmond
 Stu Walker
 The Buzz Band
 Those Guys

All Forces Museum Display
 Shooting Gallery

Adults and Kids Fancy Dress
 Tug Of War
 Boerewors Competition

STALLS
 Spaza UK (SA Goodies)
 Rhodie Rags (Clothing & apparel)
 Vetkoek & melktart
 Biltong & Dry Wors
 Braai & Wors Packs
 Personalized Glassware

Source: <http://www.rhodesianspioneerclub.co.uk/default.shtml>

To create a Zimbabwean feel to the occasion, the stalls are stocked with South African food (which resembles food consumed in Zimbabwe) and products with a Rhodesian theme. With approximately 1 000 individuals attending the event on a Saturday, Alison who had been attending the event for ten years, explained how the July Braai has established itself as the largest gathering of White Zimbabweans from all over Britain. The occasion provides the opportunity for adults with similar historic backgrounds to establish new friendship networks as they reminisce about the past.¹⁸³ As the largest gathering of White Zimbabweans in Britain, the RPC has also utilised the occasion to fundraise for 'Rhodesians

¹⁸³ Ibid.

pensioners' who have no access to any form of pensions because of political events or the demise of the economy in Zimbabwe. Some of these, according to Alison, would not have stayed long enough in the UK to apply for permanent residency immigration status to have access to British government benefits.¹⁸⁴

One major characteristic of both the *Facebook* community and the RPC organised 'July Braai' event has been the reincarnation of a colonial identity. On the *Facebook* community, this is reflected by: the uses of the colonial name, 'Rhodesia' and its flag; postings of the colonial national anthem; and postings of photographs of the Rhodesian army with attachments celebrating victories over the nationalist liberation fighters. The adoption of the name Rhodesia by the organisers of the 'July-Braai' and the use of the Rhodesian Coat of Arms (shown below) on its website also reinforces that colonial identity.

Figure Six: Rhodesian Coat of Arms

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.



Source: <http://www.rhodesianspioneerclub.co.uk/default.shtml> (First visited 7th March 2014)

To ensure the growth and survival of a Zimbabwean White immigrant community, the organisers of social events like the July Braai actively encourage attendees to invite any new arrivals. Robert, who migrated in 2002 when the Zimbabwean economy was in a steep decline, spoke of how he was surprised when he received a letter from an 'ex-White Rhodesian inviting him to the July Braai.'¹⁸⁵ What surprised him was that he had not given his contact details to anyone except a few friends he knew from back home. His conclusion was that the Zimbabwean White community already settled in Britain was actively seeking new arrivals with the aim of creating a database which would naturally evolve into the basis of co-operation and cohesion of the Zimbabwean White community; essential ingredients in the sustenance of an active community.¹⁸⁶

Reincarnation of the colonial identity by active White Zimbabwean immigrants has had a major impact on the racial demographics of both the 'July-Braai' event and the *Facebook* virtual community. The colonial identity reactivates colonial memories of racial boundaries

¹⁸⁵ Robert, Interview, 13 November 2013.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

which were ushered in by the colonial racial categorisation of the population. Promotional videos of the 2014 'July-Braai' on the RPC website portray it as an exclusive gathering of Whites. Similarly, of the 1,902 members on the *Rhodesian in UK Facebook* virtual community (as of March 2014), eleven could be identified as being non-White. Elizabeth, a White Zimbabwean who migrated in 2004, identified the failure to dismantle colonial racial boundaries as the major reason why she was discouraged from inviting her Zimbabwean Coloured friend to the 'July-Braai.' She was advised that her Coloured friend would 'feel out of place' as she would have no shared historical experiences with the majority of the event attendees.¹⁸⁷

The colonial identity also constructed an imaginary boundary which restricts interaction with those from the Black community. This was reflected in a lack of awareness among the Black interviewees of an active and strong support and social network of White Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain. John, a Black Zimbabwean immigrant residing in Slough since 2002 summed up the nature of interaction between Black and White Zimbabwean immigrants by explaining how interaction with White Zimbabweans usually occurred in public places like supermarkets where he would have been overheard speaking in Shona.¹⁸⁸

The interaction would only be restricted to a brief conversation without any exchange of personal details such as name or contact details.¹⁸⁹

Although Alison admitted that the July-Braai event conveyed a message of being exclusively for Whites, she refuted the accusations that the decision to use the name Rhodesia and its emblems was a deliberate resuscitation of colonial identities aimed at provoking non-White

¹⁸⁷ Elizabeth, Interview, 6 November 2013.

¹⁸⁸ John, Interview, 24 March 2013.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

Zimbabweans.¹⁹⁰ In justifying her claim, she argued that it would have been naïve to ignore the fact that Zimbabwe used to be called Rhodesia. For her, the use of the name Rhodesia was and is still an essential component in stimulating a shared historical identity of a multi-racial community which was once known as Rhodesian. She stressed her point by highlighting the fact that ‘once upon a time there were people of all races who lived in Rhodesia and therefore there are Rhodesians...therefore that Rhodesian identity is not a racial White identity but it is recognition of those who lived in Rhodesia...Black or White.’¹⁹¹

Outside the confines of Zimbabwean White social events, Mary, a Black Zimbabwean who migrated in 2002 and settled in Cambridge, spoke of how on two separate occasions she encountered Zimbabwean Whites clinging to Rhodesian identities and memories.¹⁹² Her first incident involved a visit to a widowed White ex-Rhodesian soldier in his late seventies who was being looked after by her Church. She revealed how surprised she was to witness the extent to which he had gone to maintain a colonial identity in his house by ‘displaying Rhodesian flags and plaques on the wall, with nothing to show that he had embraced Zimbabwe’s independence despite having lived in post-colonial Zimbabwe’.¹⁹³

Her second experience was in 2010 with a White Zimbabwean lady in her forties who had failed to accept the reality of the permanent demise of Whites’ colonial privileges over Blacks. Although the White lady would have been a young girl during the colonial area, Mary was ‘shocked’ with her ‘colonial mentality that Black women should work for Whites for virtually nothing.’¹⁹⁴ Mary’s realisation of this colonial attitude happened when she and her Black Zimbabwean friend were offered ‘valueless Zimbabwean dollars’ to babysit and iron

¹⁹⁰ Alison, Interview, 15 November 2013.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Mary, Interview, 13 October 2013.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

her clothes.¹⁹⁵ For Mary, her experiences served to highlight the extent to which the colonial mentality is still embedded in the lives of some Whites who are naturally finding it difficult to let go of colonial memories. These are memories that make them believe that they are still superior to Blacks.

However, it would be misleading to conclude that all ex-White Zimbabwean immigrants endorse a colonial identity. Events like the 'July-Braai' have been the source of exposing divisions on the extent to which historical memories have influenced the construction of a Zimbabwean White immigrant community. After attending two 'July Braai' events, Elizabeth made a decision never to attend again. This was after realising that she had nothing in common with the majority of the attendees. She could not condone explicit and subtle racist rhetoric based on past experiences. These imported racist memories were usually expressed during role plays as the participants attempted to recreate life in colonial Zimbabwe.¹⁹⁶ Describing the racist themed role plays, Terry, who also migrated in 2004, said participants would pretend they were African domestic maids by blackening their faces and dressing like a maid 'imitating a Shona accent and go on to entertain themselves by saying racist jokes about Black maids...creating much amusement among the onlookers.'¹⁹⁷

The basis of the racist rhetoric according to Elizabeth's assessment was embedded in the fact that a majority of the attendees had either not envisaged life under a Black government or had harboured bitterness of losing their property during the farm invasions. As a result, Elizabeth claimed they are still clinging to memories of their historical privileges and racial prejudices as a coping mechanism in dealing with the shock of downward social mobility.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Elizabeth, Interview, 6 November 2013.

¹⁹⁷ Terry, Interview, 14 November 2013.

¹⁹⁸ Elizabeth, Interview, 6 November 2013.

Elizabeth's comment served to highlight that the influence of past memories on the White community's construction of identities and relations with other Zimbabweans has been a complex process of interrelated factors which include the diverse circumstances which led to migration.

The behaviour of the diaspora White community was testimony of continual avoidance by many Whites after independence of what David McDermott Hughes describes as 'a full reckoning with society and their minority status' despite the gradual decline of all White neighbourhoods.¹⁹⁹ Whilst a few liberals would have crossed the racial boundaries by inviting Blacks into their social circles such as restaurants or sport clubs, the majority had continued to maintain their identity especially on farms or any out of city location.²⁰⁰ It was therefore inevitable that within the White older generation diaspora community there were individuals who would have migrated without taking any initiative to cross the racial divide by either attending social events where Blacks dominated such as a football match in Black residential areas or learning indigenous languages.

Without any historic interactions outside the remit of employer and employee, constructing relations with members of the Black community was not going to be initiated by a majority of older generation Zimbabwean Whites in the diaspora. It was therefore not surprising, according to Martins, that a majority of White immigrants in Britain found it difficult, if not impossible, to let go of their colonial identities.²⁰¹ In this self-imposed diaspora isolation, Whites' fixation on a Zimbabwean identity was on environmental terms mainly climate, wildlife or farm life.

¹⁹⁹ David McDermott Hughes, *Whiteness in Zimbabwe: Race, Landscape, and the Problem of Belonging* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 6.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

Young Zimbabwean Whites who were born towards the end of the liberation struggle or in independent Zimbabwe add another dimension to the complex process of historical influences on the construction of a Zimbabwean diaspora White community. These are individuals with no recollection of colonial lifestyle or propaganda to persuade them to adopt a colonial identity or to relate to what goes on at Rhodesian themed events such as 'July Braai'. Neither do they bother to join the virtual community on *Facebook*. Twenty-four year old Terry and twenty-six year old Jessica both born in independent Zimbabwe recalled how after attending the July Braai with their parents they vowed not to return because of the racist rhetoric.²⁰² Kenneth, who migrated in 2001 when he was eighteen, also admitted that the Rhodesian themed events never appealed to him despite his parents being regular attendees.²⁰³

The views of these young White Zimbabweans are a product of growing up in post-colonial Zimbabwe attending multi-racial schools. Their memories of Zimbabwe will therefore be based on a multiracial society with no official racial boundaries to determine a person's position in society. With friends across the racial divide, there is awareness that associating with groups or events with visible links to colonial Rhodesia might jeopardise the friendships established prior to migration. With regard to the farm invasion, although they sympathise with those who lost farms, their association with Blacks and learning colonial history have provided some rationale as to why the invasions occurred. For those like Terry, there is general acceptance that the farm invasions would have been avoided if Whites had embraced the land reform programme of the 1980s.²⁰⁴

²⁰² Terry 1 November 2013; Kenneth, Interview, 9 January 2014.

²⁰³ Kenneth, Interview.

²⁰⁴ Terry, Interview, 14 November 2013.

Kenneth also explained how rejection of a colonial identity by young White Zimbabweans has made them feel comfortable with participating in the multi-racial Zimbabwe Music Festival (ZIMFEST) held in London.²⁰⁵ ZIMFEST has emerged to be one of the largest single annual summer events bringing Zimbabweans across the cultural or racial spectrum in celebrating Zimbabwe's music, sports, food or arts.²⁰⁶ The use of Zimbabwean flags and the participation of musicians across racial or tribal lines have provided a platform where post-colonial Zimbabwe's memories and experiences are celebrated by Zimbabweans from different racial or ethnic backgrounds.

Despite the attempts of social events like ZIMFEST in bringing young Zimbabweans together, the experience of Jessica shows how naïve it is to conclude that there are generally cordial relations between young Zimbabweans of different racial backgrounds.²⁰⁷ Twenty-six year old Jessica revealed how she has been finding it difficult to establish friendships with Black Zimbabweans of her generation, blaming the nature of relations back home.²⁰⁸ Despite having had Black friends at school she described the friendship as 'superficial' since she could not recall inviting her supposedly Black friends to her house. Neither could she remember being invited to the homes of her so-called Black friends. It seemed the type of friendship they developed seemed to be a continuation of colonial racial boundaries. Without any imported memories or experiences of relations outside Zimbabwe's school environment, Jessica believed there would be no basis or incentive to establish intimate interracial relations in the diaspora.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁵ Kenneth, Interview, 9 January 2014.

²⁰⁶ JoAnn McGregor, 'Associational Links with Home among Zimbabweans in the UK: Reflections on Long Distance Nationalisms', *Global Network*, vol. 9 (2009), pp. 185-208.

²⁰⁷ Jessica, Interview, 26 November 2013.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

The presence of 'twice migrants' within Zimbabwe's White immigrant community has further complicated the influence of historical memories on the construction of community interactions. Experiences of Gareth and Elizabeth as twice immigrants unveiled how circumstances surrounding their migration determined the extent to which they would embrace a Rhodesian identity.

Gareth, who was born in South Africa in the 1940s, but raised in Zimbabwe, is an ex-Rhodesian policeman who was not comfortable with Ian Smith's racial policies. He left Zimbabwe in 1978 to take up employment in Swaziland's police as a consultant. However, when Zimbabwe became independent he abandoned plans of relocating back to Zimbabwe as he was not certain what would happen to Whites when the Lancaster House Constitution agreement expired in 1990. Although he admitted he always felt safe and welcome whenever he visited his parents, he identified the post-colonial nationalist rhetoric as the main reason why he developed perceptions that Zimbabwe might be unsafe for the White population.²¹⁰ Driven by perceptions of fear of the unknown he decided not to re-join his parents who still lived in Zimbabwe but instead migrated and settled in Cyprus where he stayed until 2010 before deciding to use his Irish heritage to relocate to Britain. The main reason why he migrated to Britain was for his daughter's education who was at secondary school.

Upon settling in Britain, Gareth realised that the circumstances which had forced him to leave Zimbabwe in 1978 inhibited him from establishing close relations with other White Zimbabwean immigrants of his generation.²¹¹ He was aware that a majority of White Zimbabwean immigrants who had reactivated a colonial identity were doing so as a

²¹⁰ Gareth, Interview, 28 November 2014.

²¹¹ Ibid.

compensatory behaviour in dealing with the bitterness following the loss of their socio-economic privileged status at independence in 1980 or loss of their farms. Although Gareth sympathises with those who had lost their farms, he admitted that his experiences have made it difficult for him to comprehend the bitterness being exhibited by his White compatriots to the extent of reactivating a colonial identity. Unlike a majority of them, he had voluntarily left Zimbabwe to live in Swaziland in 1978 because he did not approve of Ian Smith's policies and neither was he personally affected by post-colonial policies which culminated in the eviction of Whites from their farms. Relocating to Europe was a voluntary choice based on 'unfounded fears at that time.'²¹² Therefore for him, adoption of a colonial identity moulded along racial lines would go against the principles of a creating a non-racial Zimbabwe which had forced him to emigrate to Swaziland in 1978.

As a result of the differences in historical experiences with a significant number of White Zimbabweans, Gareth did not see the need to actively identify himself with Rhodesian groups on internet social networks since he had little in common with them. He also acknowledged that he would not bother to attend any social events organised by the diaspora White Zimbabweans if he became aware of their colonial identity.²¹³ It was therefore not surprising that without the influence of White Zimbabweans, Gareth's memories of Zimbabwe were not influenced by colonial privileges but by how much he 'misses the land, wildlife, weather and people.'²¹⁴ Without having reincarnated a colonial identity, Gareth instead bemoaned the racial fragmentation of the Zimbabwean immigrant

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

community as he wished Zimbabweans should be more united to the extent of 'meeting as a community of friends in pubs.'²¹⁵

Gareth's attitude as a 'twice migrant' in regards to establishing interactions with other White Zimbabweans in Britain contrasts with that of Alison who migrated in 1999. Alison had initially left Zimbabwe for South Africa in 1981 as part of a contingent of Whites who did not feel safe in a black led country. As a newly married wife in 1981, Alison believed her fears were justified since her new husband and her father had been in the Rhodesian army and therefore were vulnerable to Black hostility. Her fears became a reality when her husband failed to secure employment; a situation she believed was exacerbated by her husband's involvement in the Rhodesian army. She blamed this on the 'independence euphoria' which had made people with certain historical backgrounds like her husband feel neither safe nor have the confidence of starting a comfortable life in a new Zimbabwe.²¹⁶ It was therefore inevitable that emigration for the newly married couple was the only way to escape what they perceived as selective persecution of Whites. Although the initial plan was to use her ancestral ties to settle in Britain, they found living in apartheid South Africa the best option because of the presence of a large White Zimbabwean community which had been disillusioned by Zimbabwe's independence. Assisted by apartheid policies and a community of former White Zimbabweans, Alison and her husband were able to settle comfortably in South Africa until 1999 when she decided to migrate to Britain following the collapse of her marriage.

Prior to migrating to Britain, the White Community of Zimbabweans who shared the same historical experiences had been an integral part of her life both in Zimbabwe and South

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Alison, Interview, 15 November 2013.

Africa. With memories of the importance of community support networks in her life, it was therefore inevitable that upon settling in Britain she made an effort to seek out other White Zimbabweans. Her efforts were made easier during the early 2000s by the influx of White farmers who had been evicted from their land. She described how her endeavours of identifying with other White Zimbabweans initially started by word of mouth, gradually evolving into social internet networking. She identified the initial success of networking White Zimbabweans as the reasons why there is 'a structured Zimbabwean community of Whites unlike in South Africa where White Zimbabweans were assimilating themselves and becoming South Africans'²¹⁷ She acknowledged that the 'mind-set' of ex-White Zimbabweans of wanting to maintain their identity invigorated her to ensure that the networking should evolve into networks to support (mainly) White Zimbabweans in both Britain and Zimbabwe.

Coloured Immigrant Community

By the late 1980s, a majority of Coloureds had concluded that they had been over optimistic in envisaging more recognition under a Black government. Fisher alludes to the fact that a majority of Coloureds would have hoped that their kindred relationship with Blacks would facilitate better treatment which would allow upward social mobility.²¹⁸ However, as the first decade of independence progressed, it started to dawn on the community that prospects of upward social mobility would not be realised. The realisation happened after missing out on economic empowerment initiatives such as land distribution.²¹⁹

²¹⁷ Ibid

²¹⁸ Fisher, *Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles*, p. 138.

²¹⁹ James Muzondidya, 'Invisible Subject Minorities and the Quest for Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe', in Brian Raftopoulos and Tyrone Savage, *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation* (Cape Town: Institute for Justice, 2004), p. 224.

With the Zimbabwean economy starting to deteriorate from the 1990s, Coloured individuals who could prove their claim to British ancestral ties embraced emigration as an escape route from what they perceived as deliberate economic marginalisation by the government. Without a strong or widespread network of Coloured businesses or individuals in managerial positions in the private or public sectors, the government's discriminatory economic indigenisation to empower Blacks condemned a large number of Coloureds to stagnant or downward social mobility when the economy started to deteriorate in the 1990s. By the mid-1990s, emigration had therefore become the viable route out of that cycle of condemned poverty.

The urgency to flee Zimbabwe by those who could claim their ancestral heritage was further heightened by rumours of anti-Coloured rhetoric attributed to Mugabe. Pamela recalled how Mugabe was accused of threatening Coloured claims to Zimbabwean citizenship by saying 'you Coloured people go to England to your fathers.'²²⁰ Although the rumours were unproven, Pamela expressed that most Coloureds had no reason not to believe that Mugabe had uttered the statement. For most of them, the economic marginalisation of Coloureds was enough evidence to prove that Mugabe's government was using their mixed heritage to place the Coloured community at the periphery of society. It was this social and economic disenfranchisement of Coloureds which according to Pamela forced a significant number of them to rethink their connection with Zimbabwe.

By the turn of the millennium there was a small settled coloured community in Britain assisting emigration of family members and friends from Zimbabwe. The result of assisted migration was the development of a Coloured community in urban areas where there was a

²²⁰ Pamela interview, 13 October 2013.

high concentration of pioneer immigrants who migrated in the 1970s. Milton Keynes emerged to be one of those urban areas outside London which experienced a rapid increase of Zimbabwean Coloureds after 2000. A majority of the new arrivals in Milton Keynes had been drawn by the presence of pioneer immigrants as they would have been guaranteed invaluable assistance in settling in an unfamiliar environment. Although Pamela agreed that the presence of pioneer Coloureds in Milton Keynes in the 1990s triggered an influx of new arrivals, she also regrettably admitted that the influx had created an 'enclave of mixed race with limited interaction with other Zimbabweans'.²²¹

Although Milton Keynes was identified as having the largest concentration of Coloureds, the participants (as shown in bibliography) presented clear evidence that there were some members of the community spread across Britain. To ensure there was effective interaction that allowed the maintenance of imported Coloured consciousness, different communication ways had to be explored. With Panikos Panayi pointing out how communication networks have allowed migrants' ethnicity to be perpetuated in modern societies as they would facilitate the sharing of experiences,²²² it was inevitable that the internet emerged to be influential in establishing a cohesive diaspora Coloured community.

The role of the internet in the formation of diasporic Zimbabwean Coloured interactions was recognised by Clayton Peel. Through websites such as 'goffal.com', Peel explains how Coloureds during the early years of the 2000s were able to mobilise themselves as a community.²²³ The website became an important forum for coping with homesickness, sharing job hunting and social concerns, or commenting on the deterioration of the political

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Panikos Panayi, *An Immigration History of Britain: Multicultural Racism Since 1800* (Harlow: Pearson, 2010), p. 140.

²²³ Clayton Peel, 'Exile and the Internet: Ndebele and Mixed-Race Online Diaspora "Homes"', in McGregor and Primorac, *Zimbabwe's New Diaspora*, p. 237.

and socio-economic situation back home in Zimbabwe.²²⁴ In addition to fostering community interactions, the websites also promoted a racial discourse by promoting the notion of charity initiatives that targeted Coloureds still resident in Zimbabwe.²²⁵ Pamela confirmed diaspora sponsored charity work targeting Coloureds in Zimbabwe when she highlighted how the community financially assisted a lady to start home-schooling for academically gifted Coloured children who could not afford hiring tutors for extra tuition.²²⁶

The creation of a cohesive and close knit Coloured community cannot be solely attributed to the guarantees of support from pioneer immigrants (as the case in Milton Keynes) or through internet interactions. The process of preserving Coloured consciousness in the diaspora can also be traced back to the colonial era when exclusive Coloured foster homes were established as vehicles of transmitting commonality bonds essential in constructing a coloured identity. The progressive development of the commonality bonds during the different phases of Zimbabwe's history naturally enforced familiar community boundaries and emotional commitments which were to be reincarnated in Britain. As one of the minority communities within Zimbabwe's demographics, interactions could not be established outside the remits of the historic consciousness of the need to protect their identity. Limiting interactions with other Zimbabweans would therefore be regarded as essential in protecting collective identities and values which had always separated them from other Zimbabweans.

Despite the influence of past experiences in protecting a diaspora Coloured identity, there were inter-generational variations on the extent these experiences determined interactions

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid, p. 238.

²²⁶ Pamela, Interview, 13 October 2013.

with other Zimbabweans. Acknowledging the impact of inter-generational dynamics on community identity was Hughes, a Zimbabwean Coloured who migrated in 2002. He described how the older generation's failure to 'let go of the past' had been the main reason why there has been very limited interaction between the Coloured community and other Zimbabwean immigrants.²²⁷ The promotion of a separatist attitude based on historical memories by the older generation had been described by Esther as being 'narrow minded'. She explained how she had been ostracised by some members in her community for 'playing White', just because she had refused to prescribe to their separatist philosophy that is entrenched in historical experiences.²²⁸

Spurred by racial prejudices nurtured during the colonial segregation of the population, it was an inevitable outcome that David Mason's use of the generic term 'Black' to identify 'people who are not White' would be rejected by some older generation Zimbabwean coloured individuals.²²⁹ Pamela, who spoke of being rebuked by other Coloureds for describing herself as Black, admitted that for most Coloureds adopting the term 'Black' challenged the conditioning process some of them went through when they were being indoctrinated to believe that they were superior to Black Africans.²³⁰ Unfortunately for her, identifying herself with the Black community was unavoidable since all of her siblings are Black. She described herself as one of the few Zimbabwean Coloureds who had to make a conscious decision of adopting a dual identity by maintaining relations with the only family members they knew since birth; their maternal Black family.²³¹

²²⁷ Hughes, Interview, 4 November 2013.

²²⁸ Esther, Interview, 10 June 2013.

²²⁹ David Mason, *Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 16-17.

²³⁰ Pamela, Interview, 13 October 2013.

²³¹ Ibid.

Leo Lucassen's assertion that intermarriage can dismantle racial boundaries did not resonate with older generation Coloured immigrants' attitude towards Blacks.²³² This became apparent when historically constructed Coloureds' separatist attitude discouraged intermarriage, especially when it involved Blacks. It was therefore not surprising, according to Pamela, that strong resistance to marrying Blacks in Britain was closely linked to the development of racial superiority attitudes (over Blacks) during the colonial era's hierarchical compartmentalisation of the population.²³³ She acknowledged that the colonial classification of the population in which Coloureds were being conditioned to align with Whites had instead led to acceptance or tolerance of relationships between Coloureds and Whites.²³⁴

However, despite the conditioned alignment to Whites, Pamela recognised that historical racial prejudices have resulted in small numbers of intermarriages between Coloureds and White Zimbabweans. In affirming Pamela's observation, Esther admitted that her two sons are not only part of a small group of 'fairer skinned' young generation Coloureds who have chosen to marry outside the community, but they have also chosen to marry Whites who are not Zimbabweans.²³⁵

Despite the encouragement to maintain exclusive Coloured boundaries by the majority of older generation Coloureds, Simon, a Coloured immigrant in his late twenties stated that the younger generation occasionally broke down the barriers of interactions when they hosted social events such as parties.²³⁶ Those invited to these parties could be individuals

²³² Leo Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850*, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2005), p. 137.

²³³ Pamela, Interview, 13 October 2013.

²³⁴ See Chapter Two.

²³⁵ Esther, Interview, 10 June 2013.

²³⁶ Simon, Interview, 17 September 2013.

who would have interacted with the Coloured community prior to migration. These normally consisted of former schoolmates who tend to empathise with the Coloured way of life. However, outside these social gatherings, Simon admitted there was very little meaningful inter-personal interaction with other Zimbabweans.²³⁷

However, it is important to acknowledge that not all members of the Coloured older generation when they migrated had a separatist philosophy. Hughes, a practising Christian, admitted that being a member of a religious organisation facilitates more interaction with Zimbabweans outside the Coloured community. Like most Coloured Christians, his church and not his Coloured community had become the source of welfare and moral support.²³⁸ This was because, in the absence of proximate families, diaspora congregations would not only be sources of spiritual solace, but also invaluable in providing material and welfare support.²³⁹ The development of a diaspora Christian fellowship between Coloureds and other Zimbabweans was usually evident in the Traditional Churches and not in Zimbabwean Home Grown Churches. This was because traditional Churches have multiracial congregations unlike Home Grown Churches which are dominated by Black Zimbabweans.²⁴⁰

The absence of Coloureds in the Home Grown Churches reinforces Gerard Delanty's point that in many transnational communities there is always a dominant ethnic group.²⁴¹ Coloureds' interaction with other Zimbabweans in the diaspora would therefore be influenced by what Nims refers to as historic consciousness of their minority status within

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Hughes, Interview, 4 November 2013.

²³⁹ Dominic Pasura, 'Religious Transnationalism: The case of Zimbabwean Catholics in Britain', *Journal Religion in Africa*, Vol. 42 (2012), pp.26-53.

²⁴⁰ Christopher Roy Zembe, 'A Comparative Study on the Integration of Culturally Diverse Zimbabwean and Somali Communities in Leicester' (unpublished De Montfort University MA Dissertation, 2012), pp. 76-79.

²⁴¹ Gerard Delanty, *Community* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 159.

Zimbabwe's population structures.²⁴² For most Coloureds in the diaspora, limiting interactions with other Zimbabweans (even in a religious environment) was essential in maintaining historic boundaries which had always separated them from Black, Asian and White Zimbabweans.

Hughes also described how the nature of migration to Britain had played a significant role in consolidating Coloureds' historic minority status within the Zimbabwean diaspora community. Unlike a significant number of Black immigrants who used the asylum and working or student visa routes, Coloureds, like most Whites used the ancestral visa option.²⁴³ However, in comparison to Whites, Hughes explained how Coloureds faced prohibitive challenges when the British government tightened the use of ancestral rights. Prospective Coloured immigrants were required to produce proof of their ancestral rights such as death or marriage certificate.²⁴⁴ Obtaining these documents proved to be difficult because most of the Coloured children were a result of illicit relations between White men and Black women.²⁴⁵ As a result, most Coloureds born during colonial rule like Anita found it impossible to emigrate because they did not have any documents which proved that their fathers were British.²⁴⁶

With regard to relations with the Zimbabwean Asian immigrant community, Pamela admitted that the level of interaction between the two communities remained very minimal as it mirrors the level of interactions in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe. Lack of interaction with Asians suggests that Coloureds still harbour memories of Asians' negativity

²⁴² Nims, 'The Goffal Speaks', p.53.

²⁴³ Hughes, 4 November 2013.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ John Pape, 'Black and White: The "Perils of Sex" in Colonial Zimbabwe', *Journal of Southern African Studies* vol. 16, (1990), pp. 699-720.

²⁴⁶ Anita, Interview, 26 July 2013.

triggered by what Floyd Dotson and Lillian Dotson describe as perceptions that Coloureds are a representation of a cultural abyss which can be seen as too Europeanised.²⁴⁷ As a result, older generation Coloureds' had no historical point of reference which would have encouraged associating with Asians in the diaspora.

Asian Immigrant Community

Kasim, an ex- Zimbabwean Asian businessman living in Britain since 2002 explained how the Asian experience of East Africa's 'Africanisation' policy created uncertainty for Zimbabwean Asians living in Zimbabwe when the country became independent in 1980.²⁴⁸ With a colonial history of being perceived as exploiting Africans in their businesses, they were not sure how the Black Zimbabwean government would react to their identity engrained in their businesses. It was therefore inevitable that at independence, according to Kasim, a significant number of Asian business owners like him had packed their bags ready to flee Zimbabwe.²⁴⁹

It was only after the reconciliation speech by Mugabe in 1980 that Asians were given a sense of security that their businesses were safe from any nationalisation under Black economic empowerment initiatives. Asians embraced the political message of reconciliation which ensured the safety of their businesses by remaining in the country, running their businesses just as they did during the colonial era. With very little Asian emigration in the 1980s, the affluent Asian community started developing Asian enclaves in most cities. The most prominent Asian enclaves have been the Belvedere and Ridgeview suburbs in Harare, which affluent Asians transformed into an upmarket residential area.

²⁴⁷ Floyd Dotson and Lillian Dotson, *The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 286.

²⁴⁸ Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

The resolve by Asians to create post-colonial Asian enclaves was illustrated by Gutu, a retired senior official in Zimbabwe's civil service. He explained how in 1989 the need to create Asian enclaves forced a work colleague to relocate from Belvedere to a more multi-racial affluent suburb of Mt. Pleasant in Harare. This was after sustained persuasive and at times aggressive pressure from his affluent Asian neighbours to relocate. This was evident when, in addition to being paid a substantial amount of money above the market price for his house, he was also given a retail shop in Harare and a smaller house in Gweru (one of Zimbabwe's cities).²⁵⁰ The aggressive methods used by some Asians in pursuit of an isolationist agenda formed the basis on which they would interact with other Zimbabweans in the diaspora when they started emigrating.

The slowdown of Zimbabwe's economy in the 1990s triggered the first significant wave of post-colonial Asian emigration. Kasim, who owned a marketing consultancy firm, identified Asian professionals as forming the majority of those from the Asian community who emigrated in the 1990s. Britain, Australia, Canada and United States of America were the preferred destination of the professionals living the country.²⁵¹ Whilst professional Asians were migrating, those who owned businesses like Kasim decided to stay, adopting a 'wait and see attitude', with some of them describing themselves as 'permanent tourists'.²⁵²

It was not until post-2000 that Asians from all social classes started to migrate in greater numbers following threats by liberation war veterans on Asian businesses. Tim Butcher writing in *The Telegraph* revealed how 'The Liberation War Veterans Association' which had been actively involved in seizing White owned farms warned Zimbabwean Asian business

²⁵⁰ Gutu, Interview, 3 August 2013.

²⁵¹ Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013.

²⁵² Ibid.

people that nothing will stop them from reclaiming commercial national interests from them if 'they do not stop looting the economy'.²⁵³ The threats and the expulsion naturally heightened the anxiety of the Zimbabwean Asian business community since they mirrored the rhetoric which preceded the expulsion of Asians in Uganda in the 1970s.

Facing an uncertain future, Zimbabwean Asians were left with two options. They either had to scale back their businesses or emigrate. While most chose to stay by adopting a 'wait and see attitude', Kasim explained how Britain emerged as one of the preferred destinations for those who decided to emigrate. With significant South Asian communities of Indian descent already established in Britain, historic family ties were utilised to facilitate migration. For those without traceable family links in Britain like Kasim, they were able to migrate using marriage or accompanying spouse visas if their wives were British citizens or had family in Britain. The other group of post-millennium emigrants consisted of those who migrated during the colonial era and had managed to stay long enough to attain British citizenship. Bhavesh who lived in Britain from 1975 to 1988 was part of that small group who were able to use their British citizenship acquired during colonial rule to relocate back to Britain.²⁵⁴

Reliance on family support resulted in Zimbabwean Asians being dispersed across Britain, settling in cities where their families were already established with a high concentration of Asians. The major urban areas to host the post-millennium Zimbabwean Asian immigrants outside London included Leicester, Luton and Slough. However, failure to live in close proximity to each other has resulted in Zimbabwean Asians failing to establish a recognisable community identity like that of Ugandan Asians settling in Leicester from the

²⁵³ *The Telegraph*, 25 April 2002.

²⁵⁴ Bhavesh, Interview, 1 September 2013.

1970s.²⁵⁵ Constructing identities to trigger interactions with other communities would therefore be based on what John Edwards describes as personal classification 'markers' regarded as essential to respective individuals.²⁵⁶ Bhavesh, a Zimbabwean Asian teacher and former business owner, identified historical experiences, religion and language as the key classification markers Zimbabwean Asians used to construct identities essential in forging interactions.²⁵⁷

However, allowing these identifiable commonalities to evolve into social aggregates facilitating interaction naturally excluded a large proportion of non-Asian Zimbabweans who are mainly Christians, and do not speak Gujarati or subscribe to the caste system. This was because the reactivation of generic Asian identities facilitated interactions which were leading to assimilation into Asian communities they share commonalities with; a process described by Abdi, a Zimbabwean Asian immigrant in the 1970s as a major catalyst in excluding themselves from other Zimbabweans. He identified the shared commonalities as the main reason why former Asian Zimbabweans residing in Leicester who are at least 40% of his golf club's membership are still perpetuating racial segregation by actively marginalising themselves from the rest of the Zimbabwean community.²⁵⁸

Whilst Zimbabwean Hindu and Sikh communities used family ties, language or caste to forge interactions, Muslims on the other hand used their religion as a major determinant in facilitating the assimilation process. With a majority of Zimbabwean Asian Muslims belonging to the Sunni sect, Kasim as a practising Sunni Muslim admitted that there had been widespread assimilation into the Sunni Muslim community in cities like Leicester

²⁵⁵ Joanna Herbert, *Negotiating Boundaries in the City* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 15-21.

²⁵⁶ Edwards, *Language and Identity*, p. 16.

²⁵⁷ Bhavesh, Interview, 1 September 2013.

²⁵⁸ Abdi, Interview, 17 June 2013.

where there is a large concentration of Sunni Muslims.²⁵⁹ The influence of religion in constructing diaspora identities affirmed Stopes-Roe and Cochrane's assertion in which they highlight how religious affiliation is an important component in the identity of minority groups.²⁶⁰

However, it would be an oversimplification to conclude that the interaction processes leading to assimilation solely depended on similarities of caste, religion or language. Historical experiences in countries of origin were also influential in assisting Zimbabwean Asians to identify Asian groupings that they can establish intimate interactions with. Bhavesh emphasised the importance of these past experiences by highlighting how a significant number of post-millennium Zimbabwean Asians found it difficult to establish close relations with Asians from East Africa.²⁶¹

Unlike Zimbabwean Asians whose migration to Zimbabwe became noticeable at the turn of the twentieth century, documentation of the migration history of South Asians to East Africa reveals a rapid increase of the population from the mid-nineteenth century. For example, in the period 1880 to 1920 the population increased from 6 000 to 54 000.²⁶² As a result, the East African Indian population was not only larger than that of Zimbabwe, but its members had also constructed a collective identity rooted in the history of East Africa. It is this collective identity which had been cited by Bhavesh as the main hindrance in forging intimate relations with those from East Africa. Instead, contemporary Zimbabwean Asian immigrants have found it easier to interact with Asians from the Southern African countries

²⁵⁹ Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013.

²⁶⁰ Mary Stopes-Roe and Raymond Cochrane, *Citizens of the Country: The Asian-British* (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1990), p.2.

²⁶¹ Bhavesh, Interview, 1 September 2013.

²⁶² Gijsbert Oonk, 'South Asians in East Africa, 1800–2000: An Entrepreneurial Minority Caught in a "Catch-22"', *The Low Countries Journal of Social and Economic History*, Vol. 10 (2013), pp. 59–81.

of Mozambique, Zambia and South Africa because of shared historical experiences and memories.²⁶³

These regional historic memories can be traced back to interpersonal ties of kinship and friendship established by first generation immigrants in Southern Africa. The creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Ian Smith in 1965 indirectly consolidated historic ties. With business opportunities being stifled by the Rhodesian government, a significant number of Asians migrated to Zambia and Malawi when the two countries became independent in 1964. As a result, Zambia and Malawi had always had a larger Asian population in comparison to Zimbabwe, a situation exacerbated by Zimbabwe's early prevention of Indian immigration.²⁶⁴ However, despite the regional disparity in population distribution, historic kinship ties continued to be reinforced by inter-marriage and business activities between the regional communities; interactions which did not cease in post-colonial Zimbabwe. It was therefore inevitable that the historic kinship and friendship would be resuscitated in Britain.

Summary and Conclusion

By examining the construction of relations within the multicultural Zimbabwean immigrant community in both the colonial and post-colonial eras, the chapter has established how the quest for a cohesive Zimbabwean immigrant community in Britain has been hindered by memories of unresolved conflicts of historic experiences. The historic, political and economic processes which permeated the different phases of Zimbabwe's history

²⁶³ Bhavesh, Interview, 1 September 2013.

²⁶⁴ Dotson and Dotson, *The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi*, p. 53.

formulated ideas of belonging whose outcome has been the construction of ethnic and racial attachments (and allegiances) based on memories of shared historical experiences.

Although Black Students in the 1970s forged a united identity not determined by historic ethnic identities, other races formed their own communities with minimum inter-racial interactions. A lack of inter-racial interactions was not only reflective of the interpersonal relations constructed under the racial classification of Zimbabwe's population, but also of diverse circumstances which led to emigration.

Whilst it is undeniable that the colonial hierarchical categorisation of the population created perfect conditions for the construction of racial prejudices, the contribution of post-colonial events cannot be omitted when examining interactions within Zimbabwe's diaspora communities in Britain. It was post-colonial emigration which unravelled a Zimbabwean immigrant community fragmented along ethnic and racial lines as memories of unresolved historic conflicts were resurrected in the construction of diaspora relations. Within the Black community Gukurahundi emerged to be the dominant factor in restricting interactions between Shona and Ndebele immigrants.

Although the periods of immigration might have been different, a majority of post-colonial Zimbabwean White immigrants are united by bitterness caused by circumstances which forced them to migrate. Cherished memories of colonial privileges and the nature of migration have been instrumental in developing a united White diaspora community with a colonial identity. Reincarnation of a colonial identity which is evident in the use of the colonial name Rhodesia and its emblems on the *Facebook* virtual community and at social events had created interaction barriers with non-White communities.

The impact of imported historical memories has also been a significant determinant on how the contemporary Coloured immigrant community construct their interactions. Memories of the stimulation of Coloured consciousness during the colonial era and of perceptions of marginalisation in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe increased the resolve to construct a united diaspora Coloured community with its own support network. It is the harbouring of memories of past experiences of marginalisation and prejudices especially within the older generation which had placed limits on the extent to which the diaspora Coloured community should interact with other Zimbabweans.

Whilst Coloureds' construction of interactions was been influenced by imported memories of experiences as mixed-race Zimbabweans, for Asians it has been influenced by commonalities with non-Zimbabwean Asians. Being a diverse community separated by religion, caste, language and historic family ties, reincarnation of historically constructed social commonalities instigated assimilation into Asian communities with whom they share the same identity markers. The assimilation process did not only undermine interactions with other Zimbabweans but, more significantly, it made the Zimbabwean Asian community invisible. As a result, just as it was in Zimbabwe, interaction with other Zimbabweans was usually within the confines of a work or business environment.

Despite the influence of historical experiences in the construction of identities and interactions, a majority of Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain are still comfortable to introduce themselves to new acquaintances as Zimbabweans. Their identity with Zimbabwe is mainly based on cherished memories of their homeland. These memories include physical features (climate and tourist attractions) and social features (food, drinks and family connections). However, memories of the tragedies of colonial and post-colonial socio-

economic and political structures devoid of nation building have erected racial barriers restricting interactions based on shared cultural heritage.

The chapter has developed an argument showing how imported historical prejudices and identities constructed during the phases of Zimbabwe's history erected imagined ethnic and racial boundaries which placed limits on interracial or ethnic interactions. The ultimate consequence has been the creation of separate insular Zimbabwean immigrant communities of Blacks, Whites, Coloureds and Asians which rarely organise or participate in interracial events. As the fragmented Zimbabwean communities used their historically constructed identities and prejudices to construct relations with other Zimbabweans in Britain, a comparative analysis between Zimbabwe's ethnic groups (to be examined in the next chapter) will unveil diverse and complex socio-economic integration patterns whose influences can be traced back to pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial experiences.

Homeland Influences on the Dynamics of Zimbabwean Communities' Economic and Social Integration in Britain.

The significance of migrants' interaction with the host society's social and economic structures has been recognised by academics such as Leo Lucassen in his comparative study of Britain, France and Germany. In his volume *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850*, he uses the Irish, Poles, Turks and West Indians as case studies to demonstrate the evolving nature of integration process across time and geographical space. In the British case, he examines the integration processes of the Irish in the nineteenth century and West Indians after World War Two.¹

Lucassen's examination of West Indians unveils a post-war gradual shift of anti-immigrant discourse away from earlier immigrant groups of European descent to non-European immigrants (of which the West Indians were part). The rapid increase of non-European immigrants from the New Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean, South Asia and Africa at the end of World War Two facilitated the construction of an environment in which colour or racism emerged to be a significant barrier to successful integration of the new arrivals. Lucassen captures the new phase in Britain's immigration and integration dynamics by pointing out how the post-war influx of Black Caribbeans triggered violent and racist reactions in some British cities.²

Whilst colour would have emerged to be a determinant of post-war socio-economic integration of non-Europeans, this chapter's focus on Zimbabwean immigrants' integration tackles the question of whether historical socialisation or pre-emigration imperial and post-

¹ Leo Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850*, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2005).

² Ibid p.125.

colonial influences have also emerged as contributory factors to the evolving integration patterns of post-war immigrants. As former subjects of the British (just like West Indians), Zimbabwean immigrants are suited for use in the case study to determine how pre-emigration influences hinder or promote successful integration. After having been socialised in British economic, social and cultural norms, analysis of historic socialisation provides scope in attempting to understand Zimbabweans' integration processes. Lucassen's assertion that the nature of immigrants' integration is influenced by socialisation in countries of origin has therefore made it imperative that the discussion of Zimbabwean communities' integration patterns in Britain cannot be done outside the context of pre-emigration homeland experiences.³

For the chapter's arguments to complement current academic debates on the evolutionary nature of integration since World War Two it is essential to start by defining the concept of integration. By defining integration the chapter will be unveiling key indicators which measure whether immigrants are being successfully integrated into the host society's economic and social structures. In the case of Zimbabwean immigrants, identification of integration's key indicators facilitates the development of arguments which show an inextricable link between homeland influences and socio-economic integration of multi-ethnic Zimbabwean communities.

Defining Integration

³Leo Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat*, pp. 18-19.

Despite the significance of integration on immigrant communities' social or economic development, there is no consensus on its definition among migration historians, social scientists or politicians. Patrick Ireland identifies the 'multifaceted and dynamic' nature of the integration phenomenon as posing complex challenges when attempting to identify characteristics of an integrated immigrant community.⁴ In recognition of the complex debates in defining integration, Lucassen provides a broad definition of the term by identifying key players involved in migrants' interaction with host society's economic and social structures. He describes the term as a multifaceted process in which 'all people, migrants as well as non-migrants find their place in society.'⁵

Defining integration as a multifaceted process involving both immigrants and the indigenous community affirms Jenny Phillimore's assertion that successful integration is not solely dependent on the migrants but also on the extent the host society is 'open and inclusive' towards immigrants' socio-economic improvements and movement towards parity with the indigenous population.⁶ The receptiveness of the host community in facilitating the successful integration of migrants can only be gauged by what Ireland describes as integration 'quantitative indicators'.⁷ He identifies employment, educational attainment (linked to social mobility) and cultural adaption as significant examples of quantitative indicators needed to assess migrant communities' socio-economic integration.⁸

⁴ Patrick Ireland, 'New Ways of Understanding Migrant Integration in Europe', in Assaad E Azzi et al, *Identity and Participation in Culturally Diverse Societies: A Multidisciplinary Perspective* (Chichester: Blackwell, 2011), p.132.

⁵ Lucassen, *Immigrant Threat*, p.18.

⁶ Jenny Phillimore, 'Restrictionism Versus Liberalism: The Rapture Between Rapture and Integration in the European Union' in Carlton Howson and Momodou Sallah, eds, *Europe's Established and Emerging Immigrant Communities: Assimilationism, Multiculturalism or Integration* (Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham Books Ltd, 2009), p.51 Check title of article.

⁷ Ireland, 'New Ways of Understanding Migrant Integration in Europe', p. 117.

⁸ Ibid.

These indicators became integral components in assessing the integration processes of the post-war influx of immigrants from former British colonies in the West Indies, India, Pakistan and Africa. What had started as an active recruitment drive of foreign labour from the Caribbean and South Asia during the post-war economic boom was to mutate into a phenomenon challenging Britain's ability to manage a population that was increasingly becoming racially diverse. This was because the new arrivals, as pointed out by Lucassen, were seen as problematic because of their different 'skin colour and the social and cultural characteristics' alien to Europeans.⁹ It was therefore an expected outcome, as argued by Zig Layton-Henry, that the non-European immigrants were considered to be inferior to European immigrant communities which had dominated Britain's pre-1945 immigration landscape.¹⁰

With the host society confronted with racial prejudices, discrimination or negative stereotypes, it became imperative for the integration policy discussions to come up with solutions on how to present the post-war non-European immigrants with opportunities that would allow them to either attain upward social mobility or blend into the host society. The outcome sought by the integration discussions was in recognition of growing resentment towards what was perceived as a 'massive and ongoing invasion of Blacks.'¹¹ The resentment as described by Lucassen had evolved into racial conflicts and discrimination on the labour, housing and marriage market.¹²

⁹ Lucassen, *Immigrant Threat*, p.3.

¹⁰ Zig Layton-Henry *The Politics of Immigration: Immigration, 'Race' and 'Race' Relations in Post-War Britain* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 28.

¹¹ Lucassen, *Immigrant Threat*, p. 125.

¹² Ibid.

The 1958 riots in Nottingham and Notting-Hill did not only testify to the rise in racial tensions in Britain, but also the influence of Right Wing anti-immigrant movements such as the National Front.¹³ With changing demography, the integration debates would therefore be driven by fear that if the new arrivals were not fully incorporated they would exist as 'unassimilable segments' characterised by criminality or poverty; an environment which would inspire the creation of Right Wing anti-immigrant movements by native communities.¹⁴

With migration scholars such as David J Griffiths, Sarah Hackett and Alice Bloch recognising the continuous permanent settlement of non-Europeans in Britain throughout the post-war decades of the twentieth century right into the new-millennium,¹⁵ migration and integration debates had to evolve to accommodate the new arrivals. Unlike their non-European predecessors who had arrived in the first two decades after World War Two, the more recent arrivals (of which Zimbabweans are part) settled at a time when British society had been significantly transformed to become multicultural.

As ethnically diverse non-European immigrant communities continued to increase in Britain during the course of the twentieth century, the indigenous population would have become accustomed to the permanent presence of people of 'colour' or those with different outward physical appearances than Europeans. Being accustomed to the permanent presence of non-Europeans facilitated the transformation of the integration debates to

¹³ Ibid, p. 1.

¹⁴ Ibid .

¹⁵ See for example: Alice Bloch, 'Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives', *Social Policy and Administration*, Vol. 40 (2006), pp. 67-87; David J Griffiths, 'Fragmentation and Consolidation: The Contrasting Cases of Somali and Kurdish Refugees in London', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol.13 (2000), pp.281-302; Sarah Hackett, *Foreigners, Minorities and Integration: The Muslim Immigrant Experience in Britain and Germany* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013).

include (in addition to racism) issues related to immigrants' imported educational or professional qualifications and proficiency in the English language; and religious or cultural differences with the indigenous population. The rapid increase of the Zimbabweans in Britain from the 1990s illustrated in the introductory chapter meant that contemporary Zimbabwean immigrants were therefore arriving at a time when integration debates had evolved to accommodate cultural or social diversity of the immigrants.

Aims of the Chapter

Using the participants' diaspora experiences and chapter two's analysis of the transformation of the Zimbabwean society during the colonial and post-colonial phases of Zimbabwe's history, the chapter's overarching aim is to uncover and explore homeland influences which had an impact on contemporary Zimbabwean immigrants' integration patterns. With Zimbabweans arriving in Britain with diverging ethnic, social and economic profiles which were developed and nurtured throughout the phases of Zimbabwe's history, it was inevitable that the imported prejudices, identities and experiences would aid the construction of different economic and social integration pathways. By focusing on employment, educational attainment and cultural adaption as integration indicators, the chapter will identify and engage historic social and economic systems which first generation Zimbabweans found themselves replicating in the diaspora as they mapped out their integration processes.

Migrating as communities with diverse socio-economic profiles historically constructed along ethnic lines necessitated a comparative analysis of integration patterns between Blacks, Whites, Coloureds and Asians. A comparative study facilitated the evaluation of the

impact of the historic experiences on each ethnic community. Three components provided the framework for the evaluation.

The first component was the identification of ethnic communities that became disenfranchised when they failed to effectively engage with Britain's economic or social structures which would have facilitated noticeable rapid social mobility. The second component involved the identification of communities in which a majority of their members were able to pursue integration processes that allowed them to be positively engaged with the host society's social and economic structures. The third component was related to identification of specific historic influences that had an impact on Zimbabweans' social integration.

Although the chapter will recognise how homeland influences played a major role in determining the socio-economic integration of Black, White and Coloured Zimbabweans, examination of the economic integration of Zimbabwean Asians will unveil the extent to which post-war South Asian immigration to Britain impacted negatively on the entrepreneurship of Asians from Zimbabwe. This was because as a small community of late arrivals compared to other South East Asians, first generation Zimbabwean Asians were not keen to establish businesses that would be perceived to be competing with established non-Zimbabwean Asian businesses.

In order to comprehend the historical influences on the processes of Zimbabweans' integration in Britain, the chapter will in two sections separately explore economic and social integration. The economic integration section will concentrate on employment (formal and self-employment) and educational attainment as key indicators to measure the

extent to which Zimbabweans used pre-emigration experiences to facilitate positive interactions with Britain's economic structures. The section will also establish how deskilling that had dismantled imported social class identities motivated Black Zimbabweans to reactivate homeland experiences or memories in selecting integration processes which had the potential of triggering upward social mobility. The aim was to gain qualifications that would facilitate movement up the social ladder so as to reclaim lost middle class status.

By including self-employment in the employment discussion, the economic section will further affirm the complexity of historical influences on Zimbabwean immigrants' economic integration processes not recognised by most emerging academic work. The literature of Zimbabweans' self-employment in Britain provides a general overview towards the issue by restricting the debate to two perspectives.¹⁶ One side of the debate explores the reasons why some Zimbabweans decided to be entrepreneurial whilst the other side focuses on different types and the nature of entrepreneurial activities. However, the debates fail to reveal how homeland influences developed in both the colonial and post-colonial eras have had an impact on the nature and success of the diaspora businesses. The chapter's examination of historical influences will therefore provide alternative arguments which do not seek to romanticise diaspora Zimbabweans' self-employment. Instead, unveiling the nature of the business and ethnic diversity of those in self-employment or business will demonstrate the extent to which homeland influences negatively impacted upon entrepreneurialism in Britain.

¹⁶ See for example: Beacon Mbiba, 'Beyond Abject Spaces: Enterprising Zimbabwean Diaspora in Britain', *African Diaspora*, Vol. 4 (2011), pp. 50-75; Dominic Pasura, *African Transnational Diasporas: Fractured Communities and Plural Identities of Zimbabweans in Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp.91-93.

Since the process of constructing social interactions with the natives of the host country cannot be done in isolation to historic socialisation of the immigrants, the social integration section will engage language, religion and intermarriage as indicators of Zimbabweans' social integration. Examination of these social integration indicators will not only unravel the impact of historical socialisation on preserving community or individual identity markers in the diaspora , but it also assesses the receptiveness of Britain to the influx of twenty-first century immigrants with different cultural backgrounds.

Whilst pre-emigration exposure to western civilisation made a majority of first generation Zimbabwean immigrants not deal with problems of disentangling issues related to language or religion in their integration processes, the section will establish why historically constructed community identities and prejudices placed barriers on two major aspects of social integration: intermarriage and construction of effective interactions with the indigenous population.

With a majority of contemporary first generation Zimbabwean immigrants arriving after they had experienced the neo-colonial monumental and tragic collapse of Zimbabwe's society they had not envisaged at independence, integration patterns for a majority of them were to reflect the pessimism they had in their country. For most of them, pre-emigration experiences had made Britain a safe haven from Zimbabwe's socio-economic and political problems. Circumstances surrounding emigration had therefore made it critical for Zimbabwean communities to find ways of facilitating what Gerard Delanty describes as a

'high degree of integration'¹⁷ which would allow them to interact positively with Britain's economic and social structures.

Economic Integration

Mark-Anthony Falzon's assertion that any research into migration and integration should include a look at processes of economic integration,¹⁸ affirms the importance of social mobility as a key outcome which evaluates immigrants' participation in host society's economic structures. With a majority of first generation Zimbabweans having had to adopt emigration as an escape route out of condemned poverty following the deterioration of the Zimbabwean economy from the 1990s,¹⁹ it became imperative to adopt integration processes that would trigger upward social mobility.

Examination of employment and education to gauge Zimbabweans' economic integration facilitated the engagement of historic socio-economic systems which have been replicated in the diaspora. The discussion on how historical influences on education and employment have been significant components in Zimbabweans' economic integration processes will be based on migrants who arrived after they had completed their secondary education. At the time of migration they would either have been in employment or old enough to enrol at a tertiary college or university. These are individuals whose pre-emigration socio-economic experiences would have influenced them to embrace education as a plausible route to successful economic integration. On the contrary, the nine who migrated when they were in primary or secondary school admitted they were too young when they left Zimbabwe to

¹⁷ Gerard Delanty, *Community* (London: Routledge, 2003), p.161.

¹⁸ Mark-Anthony Falzon 'Passage from India: Trajectories of Economic Integration in London and Mediterranean Europe', in Leo Lucassen, David Feldman and Jochen Oltmer (Eds), *Paths of Integration: Migrants in Western Europe (1880-2004)* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), p.158.

¹⁹ See Chapter Three.

have memories that would influence their economic integration. Instead a combination of job prospects, peer influence and, parents' expectations (based on pre-emigration socialisation), were the most significant determinant factors in choosing ways to be economically integrated.

Education

The level of education has been singled out by both migration historians and social scientists as crucial to the overall migrants' economic integration as it allows access to better employment or life opportunities.²⁰ However, despite the importance of education to economic integration it will be naïve to generalise its role on immigrants' integration processes during the initial stages of settling in their adopted country. This is because: the level of education obtained in their home country as alluded by Borja Martinovic, Frank van Tubergen and Ineke Maas puts immigrants in a position which determines the extent to which they will successfully interact with host society's economic and social structures.²¹ This was the case for Zimbabwean immigrants. Drawing from the economic integration experiences of the participants, the pre-emigration levels of educational or professional qualifications determined whether the new migrants would either be deskilled or successfully integrate in Britain's labour market after verification of their Zimbabwean attained qualifications.

A skills audit of forty-one of the interviewees presented clear evidence of diverse levels of educational or professional qualifications. The participants' statistics excluded four


²⁰ See for example: Hackett, 'Foreigners, minorities and integration', p. 155; Phillimore, 'Restrictionism Versus Liberalism', pp.53-54.

²¹ Borja Martinovic, Frank van Tubergen, Ineke Maas, 'Changes in Immigrants' Social Integration during the Stay in the Host Country: The case of Non-Western Immigrants in the Netherlands' *Social Science Research*, Vol. 38 (2009), pp. 870-882.

individuals who had permanently settled in Britain before Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 (two Blacks, one Asian and One Coloured); nine of the younger generation who arrived in Britain when they were still in either primary or secondary school (six Blacks, two Whites and one Asian); and five resident in Zimbabwe (three Blacks, one Coloureds and one Asian).

Statistical evidence of the forty-one older generation interviewees shown in Figure Seven below illustrates Blacks as a Zimbabwean community which arrived with the highest proportion of individuals possessing higher educational qualifications of either a University Degree or Tertiary Diploma qualification. However, despite possessing qualifications that would have entitled them middle class status when they first settled in Britain, a majority of the respondents found themselves struggling to be competitive on the labour market because of deskilling.

Figure Seven: Profile of those who arrived with a Higher Educational or Professional Qualifications



Of the twenty-three out of twenty-eight adult Black interviewees who had arrived in Britain with a professional qualification or a university degree level, only three were able to find work which corresponded with their qualification. Two of the three who found work in their profession were Zimbabwean trained nurses who had to undertake the adaptation courses so as to be allowed to work as qualified nurses in Britain. The remaining one was a Human Resources Manager back in Zimbabwe who was able to find work as an employee manager of a multinational company based in Britain. It was this deskilling which reactivated homeland influences needed to facilitate successful economic integration by making choices related to the attainment of British academic or professional qualifications.

The participants' deskilling was a common trend among other Zimbabwean immigrants settled across Britain; an issue Alice Bloch affirms. She points out how most professionally trained Zimbabweans (just like the participants), some educated up to degree level, found themselves in menial jobs as care assistants in NHS or residential homes, or as factory or warehouse operatives when they first settled in Britain.²² By working in these low status jobs, the deskilled Zimbabweans were forced to work side by side with fellow Zimbabweans who would have been below them in Zimbabwe's social hierarchy. Erasing these imported social class differences became an essential component in determining how Black Zimbabweans would reincarnate homeland memories or experiences to approach their economic integration.

With the way of life in Zimbabwe still engrained in the memories of first generation Zimbabweans, it was an expected response from David to describe the deskilling experience

²² Alice Bloch, 'Emigration from Zimbabwe: Migrant Perspectives', *Social Policy and Administration*, vol.40 (2006), p. 78.

during initial stages of economic integration as ‘traumatic and humiliating’.²³ He had migrated as a holder of Higher National Diploma in accountancy. Prior to migration, he had firmly established himself within Zimbabwe’s middle class after rising through his company’s structure into a managerial position.²⁴ His comments served to highlight the extent to which historic idolisation of middle class status was entrenched within the Black immigrant community. As already established in chapter two, social class stratification of Africans had emerged in the colonial era (following the creation of an African middle class community) and continued to be a key component of identity among Blacks in post-colonial Zimbabwe.²⁵

A majority of Black Zimbabweans had therefore migrated with a mind-set of wanting to continue being conspicuously different from other Zimbabweans they perceived to be below them in the pre-emigration social hierarchy. It was this pre-emigration developed mind-set that would be significant in influencing Black Zimbabweans’ economic integration patterns. Their aim was to be positively engaged with Britain’s economic structures so as to trigger upward social mobility that facilitates attainment of middle class status.

Whilst deskilling would have facilitated the dismantling of imported social class distinctiveness, both the deskilled members of the middle class community and those who migrated as occupiers of the lower echelons of Zimbabwe’s hierarchical society viewed education attainment as means of climbing up the social and economic ladder to attain that middle class status. The universal acceptance by Black immigrants of linking education with meritocracy was not a spontaneous illogical reaction to disadvantages and discrimination to Britain’s economic or social sectors embedded in their deskilling. Instead it was rooted in

²³ David, Interview, 13 January 2013.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ See Chapter Two.

homeland influences that had been developed and nurtured in both the colonial and post-colonial eras. The colonial era's socio-economic systems (which were not fully eradicated during the first thirty years of independence)²⁶ had irrevocably set in motion the construction of identities and prejudices which cannot be ignored when exploring the role education played in economic integration patterns of contemporary first generation Black Zimbabwean immigrants that differentiates them from other Zimbabweans.

Chapter two's discussion unravelled how the advent of western education to complement the colonial capitalist system had started the process of conditioning Black Africans to believe that educational attainment was not only a symbol of status, but also a viable route out of poverty. The post-colonial government's policy of 'education for all' which was deliberately targeting Blacks further consolidated the community's perceptions of associating educational attainment with upward mobility.²⁷ It was this historically nurtured inclination to pursue education success which would inevitably play a pivotal role in the economic integration of the contemporary first generation Black Zimbabwean diaspora community in Britain with different social class background.

The participants presented clear evidence on how the impact of imported homeland influences on the adoption of education as a plausible route to successful economic integration was not uniform across the multi-racial Zimbabwean immigrant community. Comparisons between the forty-one adults who had been the focus of this particular study unveiled clear evidence of the extent Black Zimbabwean immigrants outpaced other

²⁶ See Chapter Two.

²⁷ Gibbs Kanyongo, 'Zimbabwe's Public Education System Reforms: Successes and Challenges', *International Education Journal*, Vol. 6 (2005), pp.65-74.

communities in embracing education as an essential process that leads to successful economic integration.

The significance of education in the lives of the diaspora Blacks illustrated in Table Seven, showed 75% of the Black first generation interviewees attaining a new or higher British academic qualifications within ten years of settling in the country compared to 33% Whites, 25% Coloureds and none within the Asian community. Of the twenty-one Blacks who attained British qualifications, nineteen had arrived with either a university degree or professional qualification. The high rate of upgrading qualifications or retraining by Blacks was therefore clear testimony of imported historic influences on seeing education as an escape route out of the lower echelons of British society; integration processes not shared by the majority of individuals from other ethnic communities.

Table 7: Distribution of Interviewees who attained British qualification within ten years of arrival by race

	British Qualifications					% Attained British Qualifications
Race of Interviewees	Postgraduate Degree	First Degree	*University Diploma	Enrolled on Foundation Course	**No British Qualification	
Blacks	10	8	2	1	7	75
Whites	0	2	0	0	4	33
Coloureds	0	1	0	0	4	25
Asians	0	0	0	0	3	0

*Nursing Diploma in Higher Education **Statistics include those who would have migrated with professional qualification

The age profile of the interviewees who attained a British qualification within ten years of arriving in Britain illustrated in Table Eight further demonstrated the diverse impact of homeland influences on the adoption of education as a catalyst to successful economic integration between the ethnic communities. Blacks in comparison to other ethnic communities had the largest proportion of mature students who had embarked on academic or professional progression. These were individuals who had grown up in colonial or early years of post- colonial rule when education was still being perceived as Blacks' only plausible route out of poverty. Their motivation to pursue higher educational or professional qualifications in the diaspora was therefore embedded in their pre-emigration memories and experiences of linking education and social mobility. This explains why, unlike other races, first generation Black Zimbabweans' trend in embracing education as a means of facilitating successful economic integration was not restricted to the younger generation but it was an experience embraced by all age groups, young and old.

Table 8: Age of Interviewees who Attained British University Qualification within Ten Years of Arrival

	Age Range (Years)			
	20-29	30-39	40-49	+50
Race of Interviewees				
Blacks	1	11	8	2
Whites	1	0	1	0
Coloureds	1	0	0	0
Asians	0	0	0	0

*Number excludes the nine participants who migrated when they were still in primary and secondary school.

With fifty-year old Elizabeth being the only White participant over forty years enrolling in further education, the statistical evidence in Table Eight reveals how older generation White Zimbabweans had placed educational attainment at the periphery of their diaspora economic integration patterns. Elizabeth regards herself as one of the few ‘over forties’ White Zimbabweans who decided to enrol for a university degree despite facing opposition from other White Zimbabweans of her generation who could not understand why she was going back to school when she was approaching fifty years.²⁸

Elizabeth admitted that the apparent trivialising of education by older generation White Zimbabweans in the diaspora should not be understood outside the context of their pre-emigration privileged lifestyle that characterised the colonial era.²⁹ This was when a majority of them (unlike Blacks) would not have experienced social or economic marginalisation which would have encouraged them to attain higher educational or professional qualifications. By virtue of occupying the pinnacle of Rhodesia’s socio-economic structures, they would have been accustomed to an environment in which they would move up the country’s economic structures without having to put much emphasis on higher academic or professional qualification attainment.³⁰ Even after independence, the failure to be honest participants in the redistribution of resources meant that a majority of Whites continued to enjoy a colonial lifestyle embedded within the historical socio-economic privileges.³¹

With a background of pre-emigration socio-economic privileges, a significant number of older generation White Zimbabweans in Britain migrated without being nurtured by a

²⁸ Elizabeth, Interview, 6 November 2013.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ See Chapter Two.

cultural attribute that elevated educational attainment. It was therefore an expected outcome according to Elizabeth that once settled in Britain, most members of her generation failed to develop a new mind-set that would have motivated them to enrol in Further Education so as attain qualifications which would have made them competitive on the British labour market.³²

There was universal agreement among the older White participants that the inevitable consequence of not harbouring an incentive to pursue educational attainment was stagnant or little upward social mobility for most White Zimbabwean immigrants of the older generation. It was the slow upward social mobility which Timothy, a Black Zimbabwean academic, singled out as the source of jealousy and resentment by Whites towards the Black community who had attained better educational or professional qualifications. He recalled how his former White colleagues in the teaching profession avoided or stopped communicating with him after he had told them he was an academic teaching at one of the country's leading universities.³³

It would be misleading though to conclude that the inherited colonial lifestyle of socio-economic privileges was the sole reason why older White Zimbabweans immigrants were not motivated to pursue education as an alternate route to successful economic integration. The White participants also gave an insight into how the post-colonial violent seizure of their properties at the turn of the new millennium (that triggered their exodus from Zimbabwe) was a significant homeland event that discouraged the older generation from adopting educational attainment as an essential component of economic integration

³² Elizabeth, Interview, 6 November 2013.

³³ Timothy, Interview, 10 May 2013.

processes. Alison describes how the economic integration patterns of a majority of older White Zimbabweans, especially ex-Zimbabwean farmers, were instead driven by a consciousness of the loss of their businesses or properties which had robbed their children of their inheritance.³⁴ The losses experienced by the White farmers are made clear in the Table Nine below.

Table 9: Financial losses of a sample of evicted White farmers

Loss	Total in \$US Million)	Average per Respondent in \$US (Thousand)
Moveable Property	190	445
Crops	74	177
Property Burnt	43	102
Earnings	677	1 621
Livestock	68	164
Medical Expenses	3.3	808
Legal Expenses	2.6	6 408
Total	1 066	2 530

Source: Lloyd Sachikonye, *Zimbabwe's Lost Decade: Politics, Development and Society* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2012), p. 122

Alison explained how the violent circumstances surrounding their emigration made it inevitable for many White farmers to arrive with no savings or enough financial security to retain the quality of life they had been used to prior to migration.³⁵ As an economically disadvantaged immigrant community in financial distress, their immediate need according to her was not to attain British academic or professional qualifications but to seek

³⁴ Alison, Interview, 15 November 2013.

³⁵ Ibid.

appropriate accommodation and basic needs for their families.³⁶ She described how it was perceived as 'selfish' and 'foolish' pursuing personal gains of academic attainment at the expense of providing the best quality of life for their children. Instead, she explained how a significant number of White parents felt more comfortable in seeking employment as skilled or unskilled personnel so as to ensure that they provided the best possible upbringing for their children to enable them to interact positively with Britain's social and economic structures.³⁷

Also affirming the unselfish placement of their children's economic integration over their own was Gareth, a parent in his late sixties with a daughter at university in Leicestershire. He identified financially sponsoring their children's university tuition fees or living expenses as the best gift White Zimbabweans evicted from their properties would give to their children.³⁸ Britain's immigration laws also made the financial assistance for further education justifiable since most of them would not have been eligible to pay home tuition fees; a status which they would only attain after being granted 'Leave to Remain' in the country after the expiry of five years in Britain.³⁹

A survey of the Coloured participants also presented clear evidence (shown in Table Eight) on how educational and professional progression was not embraced by older generation members of the community resident in the diaspora. The failure to pursue educational attainment in the diaspora was engrained in the identities constructed during the colonial and post-colonial eras. Prior to emigration, a majority of the Coloured community's diaspora

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Gareth, Interview, 28 November 2013.

³⁹ Gov.Uk, *Settlement: Refugee or Humanitarian Protection* Available at <https://www.gov.uk/settlement-refugee-or-humanitarian-protection/eligibility> (Accessed on 24th October 2014).

members, as already established in chapter two, had successfully constructed an identity within the socio-economic realms of Zimbabwe which lacked 'tangible and traditional markers of elite status.'⁴⁰ Placing education at the periphery of their lives was identified by Kelly Nims as one of the reasons why prior to migration a majority of Coloureds found themselves in the lower echelons of Zimbabwean society.⁴¹

Experiences of marginalisation that started in the colonial era created and consolidated the desire to preserve Coloured consciousness and to have control over their own destiny by making choices which trivialised self-development through education.⁴² In post-colonial Zimbabwe, the government's inability to correct racial inequalities in education by providing more schools and training opportunities to the Coloured community, was a missed opportunity to implement policies to eradicate attitudes of trivialising education within most Coloureds.⁴³

With this colonial and post-colonial marginalisation in education, a significant number of Coloureds migrated with no history of having been motivated to excel academically. It was therefore an expected outcome for the older generation Coloured immigrants not to adopt economic integration processes that would involve pursuit of better educational or professional qualifications. Without the desire to enrol for Further Education, Hughes, a Zimbabwean Coloured living in Essex, admitted that a significant number of older generation Coloureds have experienced social stagnation; just as they did in Zimbabwe.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Kelly M Nims, 'The Goffal Speaks: Coloured Ideology and the Perpetuation of a Category in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe' (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 2013), p.182.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Josephine Lucy Fisher, *Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles: The Decolonisation of White Identity in Zimbabwe* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010), p. 139.

⁴⁴ Hughes, Interview, 4 November 2013.

Although the pre-emigration history of Coloureds would have been characterised by trivialising education, it would be wrong to conclude that there were no highly skilled or professional Coloured immigrants who were also deskilled when they arrived. However, it has to be noted that the only difference with the Black Zimbabweans was that the deskilled Coloureds did not seek to attain UK professional qualifications as to be competitive on the labour market. Esther, who migrated as a teacher and was one of the few Coloureds to enrol at the University of Zimbabwe in the 1970s, recalled her frustrating days as a supply teacher as she struggled to find a permanent teaching post when she migrated in 2000.⁴⁵ Similarly, Patrick, despite having been a director of his own company and living in Borrowdale Brookes, one of Harare's affluent residential suburbs, spoke of how he had to survive in what he described as Britain's 'cash driven economy' by starting at the bottom of the social ladder. To be able to survive he explained how he had to work in warehouses before finding employment in 'sales'.⁴⁶

Table Eight also identifies older generation Zimbabwean Asian immigrants as a community which did not embrace education as an option for economic integration. Bhavesh, a qualified maths teacher, acknowledged how the invisibility of contemporary older Zimbabwean Asians in Britain's institutions of higher learning was engrained in the circumstances surrounding the migration of a community that had a pre-emigration socio-economic identity of being self-employed.⁴⁷

Although it was undeniable that at independence there was a sizeable number of educated Asians in professional occupations or working in self-employment as medical doctors,

⁴⁵ Esther, Interview, 10 June 2013.

⁴⁶ Patrick, Interview, 20 January 2015.

⁴⁷ Bhavesh, Interview, 1 September 2013.

accountants and lawyers, the slowdown of Zimbabwe's economy in the 1990s triggered an exodus of Asian professionals from Zimbabwe. Without official statistical evidence, the Asian participants identified Australia, Canada and the United States of America as the preferred destinations for the Asian professionals leaving the country in the 1990s. Britain was therefore not a favoured destination by a majority of professional Zimbabwean Asians who would have been inclined to adopt education as an economic integration route.

As Asian professionals left Zimbabwe in the 1990s, Kasim, who owned a marketing company prior to his emigration in 2002 pointed out how the Asian community visibility in the country continued to be preserved by the business community.⁴⁸ It was not until the turn of the new millennium when the Zimbabwean Asian business owners adopted emigration as a route to escape the decline in the country's rapid economic decline.⁴⁹ By migrating with a historic cultural identity of self-employment, Kasim admitted that unlike Blacks the older generation of the post-millennium Zimbabwean Asians were not inclined to pursue higher education as a means of attaining economic integration. Instead, they were more interested in exploring ways of either becoming self-employed or joining Britain's labour market as employees with the hope of raising capital to reinvest in their Zimbabwean businesses.⁵⁰

With formal employment emerging to be one of the key components of economic integration, ex-Zimbabwean Asian business owners who successfully integrated were individuals like Bhavesh who migrated with pre-emigration professional or educational qualifications which were transferable onto the British labour market. Bhavesh, a qualified maths teacher who, prior to migration, had quit teaching to start an engineering company,

⁴⁸ Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013.

⁴⁹ See Chapter Three.

⁵⁰ Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013.

decided to work as a supply teacher in Leicestershire. This was after realising that he would not be able to establish a business in Britain which would generate profits to match his wages as a teacher.

Finding work was not a problem since he had done his teacher training during the time he had temporarily relocated to Britain in the 1970s. By using his British professional qualifications he admitted that he had done relatively well in comparison to other Zimbabwean Asians who would have migrated with no skills or professional qualifications. His positive economic integration was demonstrated when he bought a house in Leicestershire's predominantly middle class area of Oadby; a purchase funded partly by proceeds raised from the sale of his properties in Zimbabwe.⁵¹

Employment

John Rex and Sally Tomlinson's argument that it is not how far immigrants enter employment but the nature of jobs they do affirms employment (alongside education) as an essential indicator of immigrants' integration.⁵² With the nature of employment being singled out as one of the significant indicators of minority communities' economic integration, it was an expected outcome for homeland influences to play an integral role in Black Zimbabweans' choice of university or college courses. Driven by historic (homeland) influences the Black participants demonstrated that there was natural inclination to select courses in Further Education which had the potential of guaranteeing employment that could facilitate upward social mobility.

⁵¹ Bhavesh, Interview, 1 September 2013.

⁵² John Rex and Sally Tomlinson, *Colonial Immigrants in a British City: A Class Analysis* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 16.

Migrating with a historically nurtured attitude of idolising middle class status as professionals meant that few were interested in studying subjects that did not lead to a professional 'Bachelor's Degree'. It was therefore not surprising that the choice of courses by most Black participants shown in Table Ten below were those which would lead to professional qualifications. With business qualifications consisting of different disciplines, the participants provided clear evidence that nursing was the most popular professional qualification pursued by Black Zimbabwean immigrants. The popularity of nursing as a profession of choice by many Zimbabweans who envisaged upward social mobility was affirmed by McGregor. She identified favourable access to bursaries and grants during training and guaranteed employment upon completion as the major reasons which encouraged Zimbabweans to train as nurses.⁵³

Table 10: Adult Black Participants of Choice of Courses

⁵³ JoAnn McGregor, 'Professional Relocating; Zimbabwean Nurses and Family in Britain', *Geographical Paper* No. 178 (2006), University of Reading, p. 6.

Course	Number
Nursing	5
Business (Accounting, Information and Technology, Economics, Banking)	5
Post Graduate Certificate in Education	1
Social Work	1
Law	2
Engineering	1
Journalism	1
Radiography	1
Sociology	1
Psychology	1
Agriculture	1
Early Childhood	1

Although McGregor singled out financial assistance and job opportunities as major reasons that persuaded a majority of Zimbabweans to enrol as student nurses, the popularity of nursing can also not be divorced from the historically nurtured perceptions of the profession. The colonial era's demonization of Africans' way of life that included consultation of traditional healers and the use of herbal medicine naturally started the process of enhancing the privileged position of western biased medical professions within the Black community.⁵⁴ After independence the nursing profession continued to be considered as a 'preventive, promotive, curative and rehabilitative' indispensable discipline

⁵⁴ Rudo Gaidzanwa, *Voting with Their Feet: Migrant Zimbabwean Nurses and Doctors in the Era of Structural Adjustment* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1999), p.16.

with regards to people's health.⁵⁵ It was this pre-emigration invested prestige of the nursing profession which made a significant number of Zimbabweans from all social classes feel comfortable to train as nurses as it did not carry a stigma that had been historically attached to those in the lower echelons of the Zimbabwean society.

However, the popularity of nursing failed to escape the dynamics of pre-emigration prejudices and identities of a multi-ethnic Zimbabwean diaspora community. McGregor's assertion that Britain's care industry (of which nursing was part of) absorbed a majority of Zimbabwean immigrants failed to be replicated within first generation White, Coloured and Asian Zimbabwean communities. The reasons why older members of Zimbabwe's minority communities were not motivated to seek employment in the care industry were to a large extent engrained in pre-emigration post-colonial experiences.

Prior to Zimbabwe's independence, chapter two explored how health delivery had been characterised by separate health facilities for Whites, Coloureds, Asians and Blacks, and a two tier-training system for health personnel. When at independence the health sector was democratised to facilitate the discontinuation of the racially segregated health system the nursing profession gradually ceased to be a desirable alternative profession for White nurses.⁵⁶ They could not comprehend providing health care to those that had been conditioned to believe they were below them in the social stratification of Zimbabwe's society.

Not seeking employment in Britain's health sector was therefore an expected outcome for White Zimbabwean immigrants who would have undergone post-colonial conditioning of

⁵⁵ Kudakwashe G. Mapanga, 'A Perspective of Nursing In Zimbabwe', *Online Journal of Issues in Nursing*. Vol. 5 (2000).

⁵⁶ See Chapter Two.

associating the nursing profession with Blacks. Derogatory remarks like 'British Bottom Cleaners' and 'Bum Technicians' to describe the work of those employed in care homes would have further demotivated Whites to join a sector dominated by Black Zimbabweans.⁵⁷ It would have been a remarkable climb-down to work as equals in low status employment as care assistants with a community they had historically perceived to be below them.

The failure to work in the British care industry by older generation Coloureds when they arrived in Britain can also be understood in the context pre-emigration influences. Although there was no consensus between the Coloured participants in explaining why Britain's care industry was shunned by most first generation Coloureds, two reasons were identified as the most plausible ones. The first one was related to Zimbabwe's post-colonial indigenisation policies and the second was related to historical desire of preserving Coloured consciousness.

Not finding Coloureds in the British health sector whether as carers or nurses according to Esther, a retired Coloured teacher living in Leicester, was an inevitable consequence of a process that had started in Zimbabwe. She identified the government's indigenisation policies of empowering Blacks (discussed in chapter two) as a major pre-emigration political event which cannot be ignored when explaining why there are few Coloureds in British care work or nursing sectors. By embarking on an indigenous policy that failed to provide more nurse training opportunities for Coloureds, nursing gradually ceased to be a profession in

⁵⁷ JoAnn McGregor, 'Joining the BBC (British Bottom Cleaners): Zimbabwean Migrants and the UK Care Industry', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 33 (2007), pp.801-824.

which Coloureds would be found.⁵⁸ It was therefore inevitable that not seeking employment in Britain's care work sector was a continuation of a trend that had started in Zimbabwe.

Migrating with a consciousness of preserving the community identity was another alternative argument presented by ex-businessman Patrick when explaining why Coloureds have not been involved in Britain's care industry. He pointed out that for a community that had always been determined to preserve their Coloured identity, working conditions in the British health sector were perceived as carrying the potential of creating dysfunctional families.⁵⁹ A history of being marginalised and being isolated by their Black or White extended families created an environment in which Coloured families would play an integral role in the development and preservation of Coloured consciousness. The failure to establish family networks outside the Coloured community throughout the course of Zimbabwe's history made it imperative that economic integration patterns in Britain should not infringe on the support network which had been historically provided by families.

The long and unsociable working hours highlighted by Macgregor that characterised Britain's care industry⁶⁰ had therefore failed to appeal to the Coloured community which Patrick claimed had always been family oriented with women playing an integral part in keeping the families together.⁶¹ With nursing having been historically perceived to be a women's profession, Patrick explained why most women in Britain did not work as carers or

⁵⁸ Esther, Interview, 10 June 2013.

⁵⁹ Patrick, Interview, 20 January 2015.

⁶⁰ McGregor, 'Joining the BBC'.

⁶¹ Patrick, Interview, 20 January 2015.

train as nurses.⁶² They would rather work part-time in other sectors of the British economy whilst allowing men to work away from home or for long hours.

As for Asians' absence in the British care sector, there was a consensus among the participants that nursing had never been a professional choice for a majority of the community's members. This was to a large extent a consequence of a pre-emigration self-employment identity which had made formal employment an undesirable economic activity by most Zimbabwean Asians. Asians who worked in Zimbabwe's health sector prior to migration were usually doctors who in most instances had private surgeries and would employ Black nurses whilst family members did the administration work.⁶³

Whilst it is undeniable that education can be a crucial component to immigrants' overall economic integration as it allows access to better formal employment or life opportunities that trigger upward social mobility, Stephen Castles also identifies self-employment as another socio-economic status indicating immigrants' position in the host society's labour market.⁶⁴ This is because: business ownership by immigrants had always been perceived as evidence that the receiving society is 'open and inclusive' towards what Phillimore describes as immigrants' socio-economic improvements and movement towards parity with the indigenous population.⁶⁵

It was therefore an expected outcome that one of the most novel developments in Britain's post-war labour market as alluded by Giles A. Barrett, Trevor P. Jones and David McEvoy has

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013.

⁶⁴ Stephen Castles, *Here for Good: Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities* (London: Pluto Press, 1984), p. 132.

⁶⁵ Phillimore, 'Restrictionism Versus Liberalism?', p. 51.

been an increasing prominence of 'ethnic minority self-employment.'⁶⁶ With self-employment or business ownership being identified as important caveats in economic integration processes it was inevitable for some members within the Zimbabwean immigrant community to seek and capitalise on opportunities that would allow them to exercise their entrepreneurial abilities by being self-employed.

The reasons behind the emergence of a self-employed community in Britain cannot be divorced from homeland economic activities. Beacon Mbiba points out how retrenchment of public and private sector workers including those in managerial roles following Zimbabwe's Economic Structural Economic Programme of the 1990s and the post-2000 collapse of the Zimbabwean economy had forced a majority of retrenched workers to establish small businesses in the informal sector.⁶⁷ Even those in employment who faced increasing job insecurity and decline in living standards were forced to set up informal businesses.⁶⁸ A majority of these informal traders as pointed out by Peter Gibbon were involved in cross border trade or selling second-hand clothes.⁶⁹

Mbiba identifies these entrepreneurs as the 'first and most able to emigrate to Britain' as economic migrants following the political crisis and deterioration of the economy.⁷⁰ A significant number of them had developed a mind-set to explore self-employment as an alternative route to economic integration. It was therefore an expected outcome that experiences of rejection in the UK labour market, even when education and language

⁶⁶ Giles A. Barrett, Trevor P. Jones and David McEvoy 'Ethnic Minority Business: Theoretical Discourse in Britain and North America' *Urban Studies*, Vol. 33, (1996), pp.783-809.

⁶⁷ Beacon Mbiba, 'Beyond Abject Spaces: Enterprising Zimbabwean Diaspora in Britain', *African Diaspora*, Vol. 4 (2011), pp. 50-75.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Peter Gibbon, *Structural Adjustment and the Working Poor in Zimbabwe: Studies on Labour, Women Informal Sector Workers and Health* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1995), p.137.

⁷⁰ Mbiba, 'Beyond Abject Spaces' pp.50-75.

competence skills were not a barrier, encouraged these Black first generational Zimbabweans to enter into Britain's entrepreneurial space.⁷¹

Examples of the majority businesses set up by Black Zimbabwean immigrants have been small enterprises. These include: grocery stores mainly selling imported Zimbabwean products; pubs which have become a meeting place for Zimbabweans; courier services delivering parcels and packages to Zimbabwe; one man van drivers; solicitors; and hair salons with a predominantly Zimbabwean clientele.⁷² These were businesses which can be described as not representing a route into significant upward social mobility but instead economic integration that would ensure a survival mechanism for the majority. Notable exceptions of bigger enterprises have been Mwanaka's maize farming; and Mufaro family foods which Mbiba describes as a successful business manufacturing yoghurts and probiotic milk.⁷³

Whilst it is undeniable that first generation Black Zimbabweans in Britain embraced entrepreneurship or self-employment as a means of economic integration, it has to be recognised that there has been an apparent failure to establish a vibrant and recognisable diaspora Black Zimbabwean entrepreneurial class identity. A comparative analysis with other non-European immigrants such as Somalis, South Asians or Chinese exposes Zimbabweans as a community that has struggled to establish its entrepreneurial credentials.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² See for example: Mbiba, 'Beyond Abject Spaces' pp.50-75 and Thomas T. Domboka 'The Entrepreneurial Experiences of 1st Generation Migrant Black African Female Entrepreneurs in Britain' *Journal of Business Diversity* Vol. 13 (2013) pp.40-51.

⁷³ Mbiba, 'Beyond Abject Spaces' pp.50-75.

⁷⁴ See for example: Hilary Metcalf, Tariq Modood and Satnam Virdee (Eds) *Asian Self-Employment: The Interaction of Culture and Economics in England* (London: Policy Studies Institute.1996); Monder Ram, Nicholas

Black Zimbabweans' failure to establish a visible and vibrant business community had been apparent in cities with a high Zimbabwean immigrant population such as Leicester. With a population of 3 377, the 2011 census statistics showed Leicester as having the largest concentration of Zimbabweans in the East Midlands.⁷⁵ The failure to establish a recognisable business community does not compare favourably with the Somalis who, like Zimbabweans, started arriving in the city in high numbers after 2000.⁷⁶ Despite both groups being regarded as recent arrivals in the city, Somalis managed to build a strong business community in the St. Mathew and Highfields areas. In contrast, the only recognisable Black Zimbabwean business known by a majority of the Zimbabweans in the city had been the Pamuzinda grocery shop in the Highfields area.⁷⁷

There is an inextricable link between limited visibility of Black Zimbabweans' diaspora businesses (or self-employment engagements) and imported attitudes to education. As already established, colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe education policies created a sense of meritocracy which indoctrinated most Black Africans to embrace educational attainment as the most plausible and realistic route to upward social mobility.⁷⁸ It was therefore a natural outcome that resuscitation of historic elevation of educational attainment by the majority of Black Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain (discussed earlier on in the chapter) would naturally trivialise self-employment or the motivation to be self-employed.

Nicholas Theodorakopoulos, Monder Ram and Trevor Jones, 'Forms of Capital, Mixed Embeddedness and Somali Enterprise', *Work, Employment and Society*, Volume 22 (2008), pp.427-446; Robin Ward and Richard Jenkins (Eds) *Ethnic Communities in Business: Strategies for Economic Survival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984).

⁷⁵ *Leicester Mercury*, 5 July 2013.

⁷⁶ Christopher Roy Zembe, 'A Comparative Study on the Integration of Culturally Diverse Zimbabwean and Somali Communities in Leicester' (unpublished De Montfort University MA Dissertation, 2012), p. 26.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p. 127.

⁷⁸ See Chapter Two.

Besides the historic elevation of educational attainment, two other major events in Zimbabwe's history should also not be discarded when explaining why self-employed Black Zimbabweans have been less successful in Britain. The first one is related to racist policies of the colonial era and the second one to post-colonial mismanagement of the economy by Blacks.

The colonial socio-economic racist policies explored in chapter two started the construction of an environment which significantly curtailed entrepreneurial Africans' participation in the major sectors of the economy namely mining, finance or manufacturing. With Gerald Mars and Robin Ward pointing out that migrants' commercial success depends on the historically constructed imported business experience and skills,⁷⁹ the imperial racist discourse deliberately stifled the entrepreneurship of Blacks by denying those opportunities to gain experience or skills needed to set-up or manage large corporate businesses to challenge White economic dominance. The long term consequence was it subtly facilitated the construction of a mind-set that Whites and not Africans are custodians of Zimbabwe economic success; thus undermining confidence in Black owned or managed businesses by other Black Zimbabweans. The colonial prejudices against Black owned business were not to be restricted within Zimbabwe's borders, but were to extend into the diaspora.

With independence failing to radically reform the economic structures of the colonial state to facilitate greater Black participation in the economy, the major sectors of the economy continued to be under White or foreign ownership; thus allowing Blacks to continue reinforcing the colonial constructed mind-set of seeing themselves as employees and not

⁷⁹ Gerald Mars and Robin Ward 'Ethnic Business Development in Britain: Opportunities and Resources' in Ward and Jenkins *Ethnic Communities in Business*, p.10.

employers. With this backdrop of economic restrictions or frustrations, a majority of older generation Black Zimbabwean immigrants migrated with no motivation or entrepreneurial experience to either establish or run large corporate companies so as to construct a recognisable diaspora entrepreneurial identity.

Although it is undeniable that imperial racial discriminatory policies denied Africans the opportunity to acquire the relevant entrepreneurial experience or skills needed to establish reputable businesses that would have earned the trust of other Black Zimbabweans, failure to establish a vibrant and visible diaspora Black Zimbabwean business community should also be understood as a consequence of post-colonial governance. The Black participants provided an insight on the extent to which imported memories of corruption and poorly run state enterprises after independence have also assisted in stifling the entrepreneurial potential of Black Zimbabweans in Britain. The older generation interviewees who were old enough to make comparisons between the colonial and post-colonial economies expressed how migrating with memories of post-colonial mismanaged economy and the country's resources destroyed their trust of Black owned diaspora businesses.

Although Black participants' acknowledged the socio-economic and political disadvantages associated with racial segregation, they were unanimous in agreeing that the colonial White administration had managed the economy better than the Black led government of Mugabe. They appreciated that Ian Smith's led government had managed to keep the country's economy running without cases of hyper-inflation collapse, collapse of transport networks, education or health delivery that have characterised independent Zimbabwe. For the participants this was a commendable economic achievement since the Rhodesian

government was not only under economic sanctions, but was also involved in military operations against the nationalist movement.

Panganayi's comment summarised the shared appreciation of the White managed colonial economy when he pointed out that:

...our parents could still afford to buy meat, clothes...with proper Christmas celebration. These are experiences which have been taken away from the young generation by politicians and business people with close links with the political establishment. Just look at how they have run down the Parastatals.⁸⁰ Who would have imagined in 1980 that NRZ (National Railways of Zimbabwe) will be in this state...how about Air Zimbabwe? All collapsed under Black management. Who would have imagined that within thirty years of independence there would be mass exodus out of Zimbabwe?'⁸¹

Panganayi's comments highlighted the discourse of disillusionment within the Black diaspora community that had started to emerge in the 1990s after the euphoria of independence had died down. This was a community which had experienced the impact of the fast rising inflation and corruption which Zimbabweans had not experienced before independence. Even those who had been too young to remember life in colonial Zimbabwe would have been made aware of the mismanagement of the economy by privately owned print media. Andrew Morrison and Alison Love singled out *Parade* and the *Moto* magazines, and the weekly newspaper the *Financial Gazette* as important media sites for those who

⁸⁰ A term used in some African companies to describe companies that are wholly or partly owned by the government.

⁸¹ Panganayi, Interview, 24 March 2013.

became critical of the way the government was mismanaging the economy by making comparisons of what life was like before independence.⁸² The publications provided the avenue for the readers to air their views through letter writing.

It is this comparative analysis of the colonial and post-colonial era's economies that aggravated shared sentiments against the diaspora Black Zimbabwean owned businesses by other Black Zimbabweans. Just like in Zimbabwe, the Black owned businesses became synonymous with corruption, poor management and extortion by overcharging; hence no reason to support them. The consequence of the imported distrust of Black Zimbabwean businesses was articulated by all older generation Black participants when they pointed out that they would rather do business with a White Zimbabwean than a fellow Black Zimbabwean even when the two are competitors.

Expressions of having confidence in White owned businesses by the participants were reflective of an African mind-set that had been subtly constructed during the colonial era and failed to be erased in independent Zimbabwe because of mismanagement of the economy and corruption. With the status quo remaining after independence of perceiving Whites as having been better managers of the Zimbabwean economy it was expected that a majority of Blacks migrated with a negative attitude towards Black owned business which was being replicated in the diaspora.

Without guaranteed support from their kith and kin, Black Zimbabweans' entrepreneurial potential in Britain would naturally be suppressed along two strands. First, it undermined the confidence of those in self-employment to expand their businesses: hence the failure or

⁸² Andrew Morrison and Alison Love, 'A Discourse of Disillusionment: Letters to the Editor in two Zimbabwean Magazines 10 years after Independence', *Discourse & Society*, vol. 7 (1996), pp. 39-75.

reluctance to transform their businesses into vibrant and visible enterprises. Secondly, those contemplating entering self-employment had no extrinsic motivation to do so knowing that their community will not be a guaranteed market they will depend on. The result has been an inevitable slow increase of Black owned Zimbabwean businesses in Britain.

A letter published in the online Zimbabwean based newspaper, 'newzimbabwe.com' by a Leicestershire based businessman exposed the extent to which the distrust had become a hindrance to the success of entrepreneurial Black Zimbabweans. The letter was intended to stir the consciousness of diaspora Black Zimbabweans into believing that it was not right for Zimbabwean businesses to plead for support from their own Black community. In the article he wondered why 'people are still wasting valuable time travelling the earth, spending small fortunes on fuel to get exactly the same goods and services that are available locally from a Zimbabwean-owned supplier.'⁸³

His frustration emanated from the fact that with over ten Zimbabwean butcheries scattered across the UK, Zimbabweans were prepared to 'travel for hours to go and patronise a Briton who runs a butchery in Milton Keynes; ignoring excellent suppliers in their own home towns, many of whom are Zimbabweans, selling exactly the same products.'⁸⁴ He made comparisons with the Leicester Asian community which he perceived to be supportive of each other. However, with historical memories of poorly run Black owned businesses constructed in both the colonial and post-colonial era it will take more than writing a letter to persuade Zimbabweans to support the businesses of their compatriots.

⁸³ NEWZIMBABWE.COM NEWS *Are Zimbabweans naive or what?*, 29, August 2010.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

Entrepreneurialism or self-employment as an indicator of Black Zimbabweans' economic integration also unveiled the significance of diverse historical experiences on the Shona and Ndebele diaspora integration processes. This was apparent when a survey of Zimbabwean businesses in Leicester, Slough, Birmingham, Coventry, Wolverhampton and Leeds unravelled an inextricable link between ethnicity and entrepreneurial activities. There was an undeniable dominance of Shona owned businesses in cities like Leicester where there was a strong Ndebele community. Without recognisable Ndebele owned businesses in the city, the Shona owned businesses identified by both Shona and Ndebele participants included the Pamuzinda grocery shop, Leicester Commercial College, Nursing Relief Agency and Coedma Freight.

It was this diaspora dominance of Shona businesses in the city which prompted Mabuza, a Ndebele immigrant, to comment that 'the Ndebele can benefit from the Shona or those from Mashonaland in terms of businesses.'⁸⁵ However, Mabuza's comment served to undermine historical evidence by scholars on pre-colonial Zimbabwean history such as David Beach and Gerald Chikozho Mazarire who unveiled pre-colonial Ndebele as an entrepreneurial community involved in ivory hunting, trade and pastoral farming.⁸⁶ As if to affirm Beach's arguments, the Ndebele respondents like Themba shared the pride of the pre-colonial existence of a powerful Ndebele kingdom with functioning socio-economic structures administered by a centralised political system.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Mabuza Interview 9th June 2013.

⁸⁶ David Beach, *Zimbabwe before 1900* (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1994), pp.61-62; Gerald Chikozho Mazarire, 'Reflections on Pre-Colonial Zimbabwe 850-1880s' in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo (Eds), *A History From The Pre-Colonial Period to 2008: Becoming Zimbabwe* (Harare, Weaver Press, 2009), pp.38-38.

⁸⁷ Themba, Interview, 17 November 2013.

With Zimbabwe's pre-colonial historians Beach and Mazarire acknowledging pre-colonial Ndebele entrepreneurialism, attempts to understand the contemporary ethnic representation within the enterprising Black Zimbabwean diaspora community should therefore be developed as an impact of colonial and post-colonial experiences. The historical influences developed in these two phases of Zimbabwe's history that curtailed the entrepreneurship within the contemporary Ndebele community were based on three factors: Christian Missionary Activities of the nineteenth and early twentieth century; the failure by the Ndebele to relinquish the dream of re-establishing the Ndebele kingdom; and the post-colonial Gukurahundi episode in Matabeleland.

It is undeniable that the advent of Whites as Christian missionaries started the process of constructing an environment in which the Ndebele would be forced to play catch-up to the majority Shona in producing individuals who would become part of the African business elite. As discussed in Chapter Two, disparity in accessing western education provided by Christian missionaries from the mid-nineteenth century into the first two decades of colonial rule allowed the majority Shona community to attain numeracy and literacy skills earlier than the Ndebele. This facilitated more positive integration into the social and economic structures of the colonial state by the Shona. They demonstrated this through the establishment of African churches and a diverse range of businesses which included grocery shops, market gardening, transport businesses using wagons and donkeys, bricklaying, carpentry and tailoring businesses.⁸⁸ Entrepreneurial activities by the Shona early on during the colonial era inevitably created perceptions that the Ndebele were less entrepreneurial than the Shona; perceptions that were to be re-incarnated by the Shona in the diaspora.

⁸⁸ See Chapter Two.

Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni's assertion that the militaristic Ndebele failed to relinquish the idea of re-establishing themselves as an independent kingdom should also not be trivialised in seeking to understand why the Ndebele had been historically perceived to be less entrepreneurial than the Shona.⁸⁹ By failing to relinquish the dream, the White missionaries working together with the colonial administration had no option but to economically alienate the Ndebele through education. Chengatai Zvobgo affirmed the point when he pointed out how missionary operations which included the establishment of schools had to be halted in the early 1890s thus denying the Ndebele the skills to be economically integrated in an economy that was being modelled along western capitalist structures.⁹⁰ With V Wild highlighting the slow progress in Ndebele entrepreneurial activities in Matabeleland in a survey between 1949 and 1950,⁹¹ it would be correct to conclude that the Ndebele response to colonial marginalisation was not through the entrepreneurial route but migration to South Africa where they had ancestral links.

Although the Ndebele participants did not refute the colonial experiences of having played a role in undermining their entrepreneurship, they were unanimous in identifying post-colonial economic marginalisation during the Gukurahundi civil war as the most significant event which failed to provide them with incentives to challenge Shona dominance in business. The conviction by the Zimbabwean government that the Ndebele were supporting the armed insurgency in Matabeleland justified the use of socio-economic marginalisation as a weapon needed to destroy Ndebele particularism.

⁸⁹ Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'Nation-Building in Zimbabwe and the Challenges of Ndebele Particularism,' *African Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 8 (2008), pp. 27-56.

⁹⁰ Chengetai J M Zvobgo, *A History of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe 1890-1939* (Gweru: Mambo Press), 1996), p. 6.

⁹¹ V. Wild, 'An Outline of African Business History in Colonial Zimbabwe', *Zambezia*, Vol. 19 (1992), pp. 19-46.

The economic marginalisation summarised by literature on Gukurahundi included: translocation of economic resources from Matabeleland to Mashonaland; closing Ndebele owned businesses in rural areas; key jobs in Matabeleland reserved for Shona; and Ndebele people deprived of equal opportunities with the Shona at Matabeleland institutions.⁹² The government's deliberate policy of economic marginalisation had made the Ndebele resign to the reality that the majority Shona would continue with their dominance in businesses. For Ndebele participants, economic marginalisation mirrored the colonial racist discourse in which Blacks were being denied opportunities to compete with Whites. The only difference this time was it was Black against Black. With this background of colonial and post-colonial marginalisation a majority of the Ndebele community had therefore arrived in Britain with no history of having been motivated to establish businesses to challenge Shona businesses.

The consequence of Ndebele lack of historic entrepreneurial identity was the adoption of economic integration patterns that would not be measured by how successful they establish diaspora businesses; neither were they interested in competing with the diaspora Shona entrepreneurial community. Instead, education and not self-employment or entrepreneurship emerged to be the preferred integration process for the majority of the community's members. The Ndebele participants demonstrated this when eight out of the eleven interviewees had attained or when in the process of attaining a British qualification at the time of the interview.

Mars and Ward's assertion that 'circumstances of migration' in the country of origin are directly relevant to immigrants running businesses also resonated with the Zimbabwean

⁹² Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Do Zimbabweans Exist? Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Post-colonial State* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2009), p.183.

White immigrant community.⁹³ For a community consisting of members who had been sheltered by their social class status in both the colonial era and the first three decades of the post-colonial period, it would have been an expected outcome to have recognisable White Zimbabwean owned businesses in Britain. Pre-emigration family history of socio-economic privileges would have given White Zimbabweans familiarity with skills that would have encouraged them to enter self-employment once they had regularised their immigration status. However, a comparative survey of the White participants' pre-emigration status and participation in Britain's labour market illustrated in Table Eleven provided an insight of a diaspora community that failed to replicate their pre-emigration entrepreneurial identity.

Table 11: Employment status of White Zimbabwean Immigrants.

Name	Pre-emigration employment or socio-economic status	Employment in Britain
Ray	Family Businesses (vehicle repair garage and farm)	Vehicle Mechanic
Elizabeth	Family Catering Business and Housewife	Social Worker
Robert	Owned Computer Business	Company Director
Alison	Family farm before migrating to South Africa	Unemployed. Pensioner. Voluntary work
Garth	Policeman in Rhodesia and Swaziland	Unemployed. Pensioner
Kenneth	Family Business	Secondary School Teacher
Terry	Secondary School Student	Artist
Joy	Secondary School Student	Vehicle Mechanic

⁹³ Mars and Ward, 'Ethnic Business Development in Britain', p.12.

White participants in the research were unanimous in acknowledging that the community has failed to replicate those entrepreneurial successes which had sustained Zimbabwe in both the colonial and post-colonial era. This was despite Robert describing significant number of Whites immigrants as harbouring proud memories of their resilience, work ethic and entrepreneurial capabilities that did not only help sustain 'Rhodesia' during UDI despite the economic sanctions and nationalist led armed struggle, but also economically sustained post-colonial Zimbabwe through their viable businesses and farms.⁹⁴ Contrary to this pre-emigration entrepreneurship identity the Table shows formal employment and not self-employment or business ownership as the best single indicator of their position on Britain's labour market.

Robert, who used to own what he described as a 'successful computer business', attributed this lack of entrepreneurialism to homeland political events sanctioned by the government to redress colonial injustices.⁹⁵ He specifically identified the violent circumstances surrounding the emigration of a majority of White Zimbabweans as the main reason why a majority of Whites failed to replicate their entrepreneurial activities in Britain. He narrated how at the height of White farm invasions in 2001 he was forced to sell his computer business to a Black entrepreneur. This was after developing perceptions, like most Whites in a similar position, that life in Zimbabwe was becoming unsafe for Whites who had no connections with the political establishment. By selling his business, his aim was to use the proceeds from the sale to start a new life in Britain. However, as the political climate became increasingly hostile for Whites he was not able (just like the evicted farmers) to

⁹⁴ Robert, Interview. 13 November 2013.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

pursue payment, thus forcing him to leave the country with 'nothing' from the sale of the business.⁹⁶

The farm evictions and threats to their businesses had therefore made a significant number of Whites flee Zimbabwe with little or no financial resources to set up businesses once they settled in Britain. With reference to his own experience, Robert explained how a majority of Zimbabwean Whites had to start life in Britain 'from scratch with no bank account' as they had no utility bills to present as proof of residence; neither did they have UK credit history to enable them to access bank loans to start a business.⁹⁷

The participants singled out ex-Zimbabwean White farmers to illustrate how the violent circumstances surrounding their emigration negatively impacted on their diaspora entrepreneurship. A combination of being forced to migrate without the financial resources to invest in farming following the farm invasions and their inability to provide collateral to be able to borrow money from Britain's financial institutions, made it extremely difficult for the White farmers to either lease or purchase a farm. Without access to financial capital, the farmers failed to resuscitate their careers; a situation which was affirmed by the participants when they expressed ignorance of a British farm owned or leased by a White Zimbabwean farmer.

The diaspora economic fortunes of the White farmers were also inextricably linked with (homeland) migration patterns of those who had been evicted. According to a survey taken in 2009, the destinations of the dispossessed farmers were as follows: 74.2 per-cent remained in Zimbabwe, Australia and New Zealand had 9.3 per-cent, South Africa 6 per-

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

cent, SADC (Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia) 3.3 per-cent, and UK 2.9 per-cent.⁹⁸ With Lloyd Sachikonye alluding to evidence of a notable increase in agricultural production or to the economy in countries they settled in with the exception of the Britain,⁹⁹ one has to conclude that those who migrated to Britain were too old or too demotivated (because of the pre-migration trauma of the farm evictions) to reengage in farming activities. Instead, Alison (whose family used to own a farm in colonial Zimbabwe until the 1980s) explained how a sizeable number of the farmers became content in using their agricultural skills by either working on British farms (some as labourers) or for companies selling farm products.¹⁰⁰

Apart from those working in the agricultural sector, Alison also highlighted how a significant number of White Zimbabweans found employment related to their pre-emigration experiences. She identified the construction, automotive industry and industrial engineering as employment sectors which absorbed a significant number of White Zimbabwean males with relevant skills. According to her, they would have acquired these technical skills working on family owned businesses or during the colonial era when technical apprenticeship courses were dominated by Whites.¹⁰¹

In addition to the nature of jobs identified by Alison,¹⁰² *The Rhodesian Jobs Forum* also indicated a wide range of unskilled or semi-skilled jobs being sought by White Zimbabweans settled in Britain. These included drivers, child-minders, handymen, security personnel and estate managers; with no enquiries on how to start a business. *The Rhodesian Jobs Forum*

⁹⁸ Lloyd Sachikonye, *Zimbabwe's Lost Decade: Politics, Development and Society* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2012), p. 121.

⁹⁹ Ibid p. 123.

¹⁰⁰ Alison, Interview, 15 November 2013.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

is a *Facebook* account created to assist Zimbabweans who were settled or planning to settle in different parts of the world to find employment. As of 21 June 2015, it had 1 171 members.

The nature of jobs on the *Forum* provided clues on the nature of qualifications or skills possessed by White Zimbabweans who settled in Britain. A majority of them were presented as individuals who were not skilled enough to look for highly skilled employment that would facilitate rapid movement up the social ladder. It is not because there were no highly skilled Whites in Zimbabwe. Those with skills related to mining, construction, business or financial management according to the *Forum* postings tended to look for jobs within SADC or in Australia and New Zealand. These were countries which traditionally have been emigration destinations (apart from Britain) for most White Zimbabweans since they believed their skills would be utilised without facing much competition.

However, Robert's experience from the time he settled in Britain showed that it is misleading to conclude there were no White Zimbabwean immigrants who used their pre-emigration entrepreneurial expertise to establish viable businesses. Although Robert admitted that he was initially bitter with the circumstances surrounding his migration, he became part of a White Zimbabwean immigrant community which resolved that they will not allow the bitterness to deter them from identifying ways of integrating into Britain's economic and social structures.¹⁰³ This was after developing an attitude influenced by memories of their historic economic successes that successful economic integration was possible in the unfamiliar diaspora environment. They were convinced that by successfully integrating they would be sending a message to Zimbabwe's political leadership that the

¹⁰³ Robert, Interview. 13 November 2013.

country had lost resilient and entrepreneurial individuals who would not have allowed the Zimbabwean economy to collapse as it did during the first decade of the 2000s.¹⁰⁴

He recalled how the challenges of losing his business instead ‘inspired him to find work opportunities which would allow him to utilise his imported entrepreneurial skills’.¹⁰⁵ It was therefore not surprising that his initial attempt to integrate was to work as a self-employed distributor of “Kleeneze catalogues” in people’s homes. Although he admitted it was ‘hard work’ as he was forced at times to travel long distances, he got satisfaction for being self-employed. This was because he felt he had no restrictions when utilising his entrepreneurial skills in selling the products.¹⁰⁶

After working as a self-employed Kleeneze agent in Milton Keynes for several months he was eventually employed by a telecommunications technology company. Using his experience in Information Technology (after having owned a computer business back in Zimbabwe), he was able rise to the position of company director. This was after forming a business partnership with an indigenous colleague to purchase controlling shares in the company. As a result of his business achievements, he had to admit that his only regret was postponing emigration in the 1990s when he started realising that the gradual deterioration of Zimbabwe’s economy was increasingly being accompanied by political rhetoric against White economic dominance.¹⁰⁷ He was convinced that if he had migrated at that time he would have been well established within the Milton Keynes’ business community.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

The diaspora Coloured community's entrepreneurial engagement also failed to escape pre-emigration experiences. Although sustained marginalisation in both colonial and post-colonial eras had fostered the desire to make choices that promoted self-employment rather than pursuit of educational attainment, the pre-emigration self-employment identity that had characterised the lives of a significant number of Coloureds failed to be replicated in the diaspora. This was affirmed by fifty-eight year old ex-Zimbabwean Coloured businessman Patrick.¹⁰⁹ He highlighted how in cities with a high concentration of Coloureds like Milton Keynes, a majority of the community's members who were known to be self-employed entrepreneurs back in Zimbabwe failed to re-establish their pre-emigration self-employment identity.

As an ex-businessman, Patrick noted why the failure to be self-employed could not be divorced from the homeland influences of the colonial and post-colonial era. Placing educational attainment at the periphery of their lives meant that a significant number of self-employed Coloureds prior to emigration had attained skills through 'on the job training' without enrolling at a higher institute of learning such as university or tertiary college.¹¹⁰ Patrick identified motor mechanic, electrical and plumbing as the most popular skills acquired through 'on the job training' by those who wanted to be self-employed.¹¹¹

Although 'on the job training' facilitated acquisition of technical skills to be self-employed as plumbers, electricians or motor-mechanics, it was always highly likely that individuals with these undocumented skills would always be vulnerable to limited economic success if they were to migrate. According to Hughes, being self-employed in an 'unfamiliar business

¹⁰⁹ Patrick, Interview, 20 January 2015.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

environment' without certified evidence of their skills was always going to be difficult since their clientele was to a large extent restricted to Zimbabwean Coloureds or individuals with close associations with the community.¹¹²

Migrating with no certificates of professional qualifications was therefore the most significant reason why entering into self-employment was not an economic integration indicator for the majority of first generation Zimbabwean Coloureds who would have been self-employed prior to migration. Despite having had the desire to re-establish their self-employment identity, Patrick explained how Britain's 'strict codes and standards' represented an environment in which the former self employed Coloureds found it difficult to operate.¹¹³ Using the example of plumbers, he pointed out how they experienced a reality check as they struggled to find work without a gas safety certificate. With their pre-migration skills having been gained through 'on the job training' there was no motivation to pursue further education so as to attain relevant qualifications. Instead, Patrick acknowledged how a majority of them decided to seek formal employment in the different sectors of Britain's economy where they would be able to utilise their imported skills working as semi-skilled workers.¹¹⁴

As for Coloured women who migrated with a background of doing office work as receptionists, administration assistants or typists, Patrick acknowledged how a sizeable number of them found work in offices as temporary agency staff; whilst those who migrated without professional qualifications would be engaged in any a variety of jobs which were

¹¹² Hughes, Interview, 4 November 2013.

¹¹³ Patrick, Interview, 20 January 2015.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

not physically demanding.¹¹⁵ Examples of such jobs would include shop assistants, working as security personnel or providing childcare mainly for the Coloured community working parents.

Historic relations between Blacks and Coloured can also not be ignored when explaining why entrepreneurial Coloureds became disillusioned in their attempts to establish diaspora businesses. The Black interviewees' comments signalled that in the eyes of most Black Zimbabweans, Coloureds had and will always be seen as 'others'; a 'community without an identity' and therefore they are not compelled to interact with them. Colonial administration policy (discussed in Chapter Two) of placing Coloured children in residential homes after removing them from their African environment was the source of the 'them and us' attitude between Blacks and Coloureds which was to be exhibited in the diaspora. With the wedge between the two communities continuing to exist in independent Zimbabwe following indigenisation policies which had excluded Coloureds, support of each other's entrepreneurial activities in the diaspora could not be guaranteed.

As a minority Zimbabwean diaspora community without a history of close interactions with Blacks, it would have been natural for entrepreneurial Coloureds to accept that support from the diaspora Black Zimbabwean community could not be guaranteed. The impact of not having a large clientele base was illustrated by Hughes when he pointed out that a few Coloureds who attempted to be self employed by starting courier or man and van removal services either struggled or their businesses were short lived.¹¹⁶ Without support from other Zimbabweans he admitted that this outcome was inevitable as they were operating in an

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Hughes, Interview, 4 November 2013.

'unfamiliar business environment' in which business success largely depended on community success.¹¹⁷

It would be misleading to conclude that homeland influences were the only determinants of the multi-racial Zimbabwean immigrant community's economic integration. As already stated in the chapter's introductory section; whilst homeland historical influences played a major role in determining the economic integration of Blacks, Whites and Coloureds, the indicators of economic integration of Asians were more complex as they cannot be entirely understood outside the context of post-war South Asian immigration to Britain. This is because post-millennium immigration of Zimbabwean Asians had been preceded by notable post-war phases of Asians' immigration from the Subcontinent and East Africa. Rashmi Desai identifies the first post-war wave of Asian immigration as taking place immediately after the Second World War when economic expansion in Britain resulted in labour recruitment from the subcontinent.¹¹⁸ Avtar Brah describes the emergence of East African Asians from the mid-1960s into the early 1970s escaping 'Africanisation' policies in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda as another notable phase in Asian immigration.¹¹⁹

Having carved an identity of being entrepreneurial back in Zimbabwe, it would have been an expected outcome for Zimbabwean Asian immigrants to replicate East African Asians who in the 1970s had managed to create a visible business presence in cities like Leicester.¹²⁰ However, since notable immigration of Zimbabwean Asians took place after 2000, Kasim, who owned a marketing company in Zimbabwe, pointed out how the reality of being late

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Rashmi Desai, *Indian Immigrants in Britain* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 1.

¹¹⁹ Avtar Brah, 'The Asian in Britain', in Nasreen Ali, Virinder S Kalra and Salman Sayyid, eds. *A Postcolonial People: South Asians in Britain* (London: C. Hurst & Co, 2006), p. 43.

¹²⁰ Valerie Marett, *Immigrants Settling in the City* (Leicester: Leicester University, 1989), p.4.

arrivals in comparison to other Asians proved to be a hindrance for entrepreneurial Zimbabwean Asians.¹²¹

As a small community of late arrivals spread across Britain, it was perceived as futile to attempt to establish businesses in an environment where non-Zimbabwean Asian support would not be guaranteed; especially if the businesses were seen to be competing with established Asian businesses owned by those from East Africa and the sub-continent.¹²² The reasons for the reluctance to compete with established Asian businesses were linked to historic influences. As already established in Chapter Three, contemporary Zimbabwean Asian immigrants found it easier to interact with South Asians from Southern African countries of Mozambique, Zambia and South Africa because of shared historical experiences and memories. These could be traced back to historic kinship ties established by first generation immigrants in Southern Africa which continued to be reinforced through marriages.¹²³ The reluctance to compete with Asian businesses therefore affirmed Hilary Metcalf, Tariq Modood and Satnam Virdee's argument that Asian businesses tend to develop and succeed where close co-ethnic ties exist.¹²⁴

Without being able to incarnate their Zimbabwean constructed business identity, a significant number of ex-Zimbabwean Asian entrepreneurs found themselves being identified with the working class as they sought employment in warehouses or factories. Kasim recalled how he had to swallow his pride by starting at the 'very bottom' of the social ladder selling international phone cards outside a 'corner shop' of a friend before finding

¹²¹ Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Bhavesh Interview, 1st September 2013.

¹²⁴ Metcalf, Modood and S Virdee *Asian self-employment*, p. 7.

work as a warehouse operative.¹²⁵ These experiences of downward social mobility were described by Kasim as triggering ‘feelings of jealousy’ towards the established entrepreneurial class of non-Zimbabwean Asians, especially those from East Africa.¹²⁶

Without entrepreneurial engagement, it was an expected response for the research’s participants to express ignorance of UK based businesses owned by Zimbabwean Asians. The only exceptions were Black participants living in Leicester who were able to identify a Zimbabwean owned Asian business operating in the city whose entrepreneurial activities are to an extent closely tied with homeland business interests. With Alice Bloch describing the Zimbabwean diaspora community as being active in remitting money to relatives and friends back home,¹²⁷ ‘Royal Comms’ owned by a Zimbabwean Asian entrepreneur with business interests in both the UK and Zimbabwe emerged as one of the most successful money transfer agencies utilised by most Black Zimbabweans across Britain. The money transfer business allowed him to raise invaluable foreign currency to reinvest in his Zimbabwean businesses. Maintaining business interests back home showed the extent to which some within the Asian business community were still determined to keep their business identity by pursuing economic integration processes that would generate enough income to keep the Zimbabwean businesses operational.

Social Integration

The vast and ever emerging academic literature on post-war British migration has been dominated by evolving discourses exploring the relationship between immigrant

¹²⁵ Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Alice Bloch, ‘Zimbabweans in Britain: Transnational Activities and Capabilities’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol.34 (2008), pp.297-305.

communities' case studies and societies hosting them.¹²⁸ Social integration and assimilation has therefore become one of the central research themes related to immigration in Britain.¹²⁹ With a majority of migrants arriving with different cultural or religious backgrounds that may be different to the indigenous population, there is always potential of what Pauline Hope Cheong et al describe as a 'clash between the management of diversity and the context of social integration that is rooted in an archaic sense and mirage of British uniformity.'¹³⁰ To initiate successful integration it becomes imperative for both the indigenous population and immigrants to negotiate ways as to how migrants should be positively engaged with the local community.

While it is undeniable that post-war immigrants have had a profound effect on the British way of life as alluded to by Panikos Panayi,¹³¹ an examination of Zimbabwean immigrants unveiled pre-emigration socialisation as an integral component that determines the nature of interactions with host society's social structures. With immigration naturally transforming British society to make it culturally, socially or religiously diverse, it was therefore necessary to understand the significance of historical influences on trajectories of Zimbabwean immigrants' participation in Britain's social spheres.

By focusing on intermarriage, language, religion and constructions of relations with the indigenous population, this section will allow that salient assessment of historic homeland influences that have been key determinants on Zimbabweans' social integration patterns.

¹²⁸ See for example: Lorna Chessum, *From Immigrants to Ethnic Minority: Making Black Community in Britain* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); Valerie Marett, *Immigrants settling in the city* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1989).

¹²⁹ Kathy Burrell *Moving Lives: Narratives of Nation and Migration among Europeans in Post-War Britain* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p.1.

¹³⁰ Pauline Hope Cheong, et al, 'Immigration, Social Cohesion and Social Capital: A Critical Review', *Critical Social Policy*, Vol. 27 (2007), pp.24-49.

¹³¹ Panikos Panayi, *The Impact of Immigration: A Documentary History of the Effects and Experiences of Immigrants in Britain since 1945* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p.2.

Examination of these social interaction patterns also unravelled ethnicity to be inextricably linked with social integration patterns of Zimbabweans. A comparative study of Blacks, Whites, Coloureds and Asians revealed a diversity of social integration experiences between the ethnic communities.

Although it is undeniable that increased levels of intermarriage as noted by Lucassen can be a litmus test of high levels of social integration,¹³² Zimbabwean Black participants presented clear evidence of a diaspora community that was not keen to embrace inter-racial relations. The reluctance in establishing diaspora intimate relations with the White indigenous population has to be understood as the long term consequence of the colonial racist discourse which was engrained in the hierarchical classification of the population. Racial categorisation of the population complemented by legislation enacted during the early phase of colonial rule successfully created effective imagined racial boundaries that were to be preserved by an absence of inter-racial sexual relations or marriages.

Criminalisation of inter-racial sexualities through the passing of laws such as the 'Immorality and indecency Suppression Ordinance' enacted in 1903 had set the agenda on how interracial relations were to progress in Zimbabwe.¹³³ To ensure effectiveness of the legislation, informal policing was introduced that kept interracial relations to a minimum.¹³⁴ The racist discourse on interracial relations inadvertently facilitated the development of attitudes within Blacks that marrying a White was not a status symbol since it only exposed them to racist stereotypes and prejudices

¹³² Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat*, p.137.

¹³³ See Chapter Two.

¹³⁴ David McDermott Hughes, *Whiteness in Zimbabwe: Race, Landscape, and the Problem of Belonging* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 5.

Although legislation which had criminalised inter-racial relations particularly between Blacks and Whites was repealed in the 1950s, Whites were still not allowed to marry Blacks under the Native Marriages Act of 1950.¹³⁵ The inevitable consequence was that inter-racial relations or marriages remained suppressed throughout the colonial era. Even the post-colonial dismantling of colonial racial barriers especially in education discussed in chapter two failed to trigger a significant shift in the acceptance of mixed marriages. It was this failure to create a post-colonial environment to encourage inter-marriages that made it difficult for Blacks to erase the historically constructed racial discourse that older generation Whites are inherently racist.

Comments by Jessica a 26 year old White Zimbabwean who migrated to Britain in 2002 when she was in her teens justified the perceptions most Blacks had of Whites who had grown up in Rhodesia.¹³⁶ She pointed out that despite having friends across the racial divide at her Zimbabwean school, the older generation in her family were still not comfortable with the idea of her forging intimate friendships with non-White school mates to the extent of visiting each other in their respective homes. Neither were they expected to 'date' non-White boys or girls. In the absence of intimate friendships, Jessica admitted that most Whites of her age had been subtly nurtured to despise interracial relations by older members of the family.¹³⁷ The ultimate result was that very few individuals of her generation crossed the racial boundaries in relations.

¹³⁵ Inter Press Service - *Africa Women in Interracial Marriage Still facing discrimination in Zimbabwe*: document Accessed on

http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/women/ips_racism_gen_0109.pdf (Accessed on 24 April 2015)

¹³⁶ Jessica, Interview, 26 November 2013.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

Black Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain are therefore a community which arrived in the country without having experienced significant inter-racial relations or marriages. With Miri Song pointing out that intermarriage is an emotive issue because of 'historically racialised beliefs and ideologies'¹³⁸, it was an inevitable result that pre-emigration experiences would have made a significant number of Black Zimbabweans reluctant to cross the racial boundaries to be in a relationship with a White British person. The evidence was clear among the participants. Of the seventeen Black Zimbabwean participants who migrated when they were unmarried (statistics include the six individuals who arrived whilst at primary or secondary school and have grown up in Britain), only one acknowledged to have been in a mixed relationship with a White Briton.

Intermarriage like any marriage is regarded by Song as a mechanism that does not only transmit ethnically specific cultural values and practices to the next generation, but also transforms ethnic and cultural distinctiveness through the birth of 'mixed race' children.¹³⁹ With intermarriage requiring such drastic cultural or social identity compromises, imported historical social and cultural practices were also cited by both unmarried and married Black interviewees as significant traditional values that have discouraged intermarriage in Britain. There was universal agreement that the imported historical social and cultural barriers needed to be confronted first for the diaspora interracial marriages or relationships to be tolerated by older members of the community.

However, unmarried 29 year old Nqobile summarised the concerns of the youths in regards to their parents' attitude toward mixed-marriages. He highlighted how Black Zimbabwean

¹³⁸ Miri Song 'Is Intermarriage a Good Indicator of Integration?', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 35 (2009), pp. 331-348.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

young people in the diaspora are still not convinced that their parents are prepared to go the extra mile to overcome cultural barriers especially those to do with: 'bride price' (money paid by the groom to parents of the bride), language and role of extended family in their married life.¹⁴⁰ The young people's concerns were further compounded by the fact that their parents as recent arrivals would not have lived long enough in Britain to let go of these cultural practices related to marriage.

Imported homeland cultural influences also unveiled complex age dynamics in regards to attitudes towards intermarriage. Those of the younger generation who completed their secondary education in Britain and were still in their early twenties did not mind marrying a White British. They viewed cultural values as irrelevant to the younger generation growing up in Britain. Kuda a 22 year old university student in Leicester explained how being socialised by western values outside the home environment had made her generation perceive imported traditions on marriages upheld by their parents to be a hindrance to their social integration.¹⁴¹

Parallel to pre-emigration influences on intermarriage to gauge Black Zimbabweans' social integration was competency in English language. Whilst migrants' proficiency in the host society's language can be perceived as an indicator of successful social integration as pointed out by Katherine Fennelly and Nicole Palasz¹⁴², for Black Zimbabweans it unveiled the extent to which colonial influences impacted on the use of vernacular languages in the diaspora. This was because Black Zimbabweans did not have to go through the phase of learning the English language when they were settling in Britain.

¹⁴⁰ Nqobile, Group Interview, 3 March 2013.

¹⁴¹ Kuda, Group Interview, 3 March 2013.

¹⁴² Katherine Fennelly and Nicole Palasz, 'English Language Proficiency of Immigrants and Refugees in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area', *International Migration*, vol.41 (2003), pp. 93-125.

The colonial era's diffusion of cultures (in which Blacks were indoctrinated to accept a European way of life as being superior) had marked the gradual elevation of English language as a symbol of status among the Black community. The inevitable consequence was the gradual decline of vernacular languages as crucial identity markers within some Black Zimbabweans; a trend which continued in post-colonial Zimbabwe and was then replicated in the diaspora. The impact of historic British socialisation in diluting the traditional identity markers within the Black Zimbabwean immigrant community was well articulated by Terence Ranger whilst describing the culture of Zimbabwean asylum seekers. He pointed out how Zimbabweans on arrival in Britain did not need instruction in British language, belief or culture. Instead, they felt 'at least part of the same universe of thought and culture with the British.'¹⁴³

Rangers' assertion was apparent in most diaspora participants' homes where indigenous languages had been replaced by English, resulting in children not being able to converse in either Shona or Ndebele. The parents seemed comfortable speaking in English with children like Tarisai going to the extent of defending her son's reluctance to speak in Shona by arguing that 'he will never live in Zimbabwe, so why speak it?'¹⁴⁴ The use of English at home affirmed Mary Stopes-Roe and Raymond Cochrane's argument that when two languages are available, the one used in private spaces of home is an important indicator of cultural attachment.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ Terence Ranger, 'The Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Zimbabwean Asylum: Female Voices', *Third World Quarterly*, vol.26 (2005), pp.405-421.

¹⁴⁴ Tarisai, Interview, 2 April 2013.

¹⁴⁵ Mary Stopes-Roe and Raymond Cochrane, *Citizens of the Country: The Asian-British* (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1990), p. 152.

Positive social integration as presented by Guido Bolaffi et al should be a process that should not diminish the identity of the migrants.¹⁴⁶ Instead, there should be equilibrium of tolerance of different cultures so as to allow migrants to maintain their pre-emigration individual identities whilst continuing to interleave with the dominant culture on the basis of implicit egalitarianism.¹⁴⁷ Black Zimbabweans' social integration had to therefore resonate with Ajaya Kumar Sahoo's assertion that imported religious practices of immigrants provide an important identity that helps them 'perpetuate and preserve individual self-awareness.'¹⁴⁸

Pre-emigration denominational affiliations within the diaspora Zimbabwean Christian community provided that framework to gauge Black Zimbabweans' social integration. The Zimbabwean diaspora Christian community had always been split between those who attended home grown churches and those attending the traditional churches. With colonialism having successfully introduced Christianity to Africans, denominational allegiances emerged to be a significant identity among most Black Zimbabwean Christians. As early as the 1920s Black African churches had been established to counter the traditional churches by fusing an African style of worship in the services. Chapter two was able to establish how the continuous establishment of the African churches became an integral component of the Christian landscape throughout Zimbabwe's colonial and post-colonial history.

¹⁴⁶ Guido Bolaffi, et al (Eds), *Dictionary of Race, Ethnicity and Culture* (London: SAGE, 2003), pp.151.

¹⁴⁷ Ameer Ali, 'Assimilation, Integration or Convivencia: The Dilemma of Diaspora Muslims from "Eurabia" to "Londonistan", from "Lakembanon" to Sri Lanka', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol. 30 (2010), p .186.

¹⁴⁸ Ajaya Kumar Sahoo, 'Issues of Identity in the Indian Diaspora: A Transnational Perspective', *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, vol.5 (2006), pp. 81-98.

The successful integration of the predominantly Zimbabwean Christian community was therefore to be measured by how far they would be able to establish home grown Zimbabwean churches without fear of victimisation or prejudices by traditional Churches with western identities. The post-new millennium rapid increase of home grown churches like 'Johane Masowe Chishanu' or 'Johane Marange' in cities like Leicester with distinct African traditional ways of worship emerged to be successful social integration indicators of the Zimbabwean Christian community. Having the freedom to establish home churches without having to compromise pre-emigration styles of worship affirmed Lucassen's assertion that successful integration requires acceptance and tolerance of cultural differences in multi-cultural societies.¹⁴⁹

Whilst pre-emigration influences on intermarriage, language and religion were clear indicators that assessed Black Zimbabweans' social integration, the homeland influences on Whites' diaspora social interactions were more complex. With similar physical features to the indigenous population, it would have been an expected outcome that the shared physical features with the host community would have assisted in disentangling any barriers to successful social interactions of White Zimbabweans.

However, White interviewees' experiences unveiled how migrating with a historically nurtured sense of a collective identity embedded in the belief that they are a nation emerged to be a major hindrance when attempting to establish relations with the indigenous population. The White Zimbabwean immigrants who had decided to stay in Zimbabwe when it became independent were third or fourth generation White

¹⁴⁹ Lucassen, *Immigrant Threat*, p. 18.

Zimbabweans who saw themselves as having little cultural commonality with the indigenous population. They would have severed links with their ancestral European heritage.

The title of Ranka Primorac's discussion 'Rhodesians Never Die? The Zimbabwean Crisis and the Revival of Rhodesian Discourse'¹⁵⁰ in which he explores the narratives of twenty-first century displaced White Zimbabweans living in the diaspora, resonates with White Zimbabweans who would not let go of White Rhodesian identity markers as they attempt to establish social integration patterns in Britain. They instead viewed themselves as 'White Africans'; born in Zimbabwe; growing up there in a sheltered life of socio-economic privileges; and their presence in Britain was not by choice but had been enforced on them by Zimbabwe's political establishment.

The disconnection with Britain was made clear by the older generation White interviewees who were unanimous in acknowledging how they still introduced themselves to new acquaintances as Zimbabweans. Despite the violent circumstances surrounding the migration of the majority of the community members, they still clung on to the hope that they would return back to their 'home' country and reclaim their citizenship. This was testimony of their failure to re-connect with their ancestral links as they settled in what had become their adopted home.

It was this historically nurtured sense of a collective identity embedded in the belief that they are a nation which has been a major hindrance on how the Zimbabwean Whites construct interactions with British society. The exclusive nature of events like 'July Braai' advertised as a Rhodesian event with use of Rhodesian symbols such as the Rhodesian flag

¹⁵⁰ Ranka Primorac 'Rhodesians Never Die?' The Zimbabwean Crisis and the Revival of Rhodesian Discourse' in JoAnn McGregor and Ranka Primorac, *Zimbabwe's New Diaspora: Displacement and the Cultural Politics of Survival* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010) p.202-228.

and Coat of Arms have demonstrated the extent to which the White community imported the Rhodesian national identity.¹⁵¹ However, Elizabeth admitted that failure to let go of that Rhodesian identity has not only been a hindrance to establishment of cordial relations with non-White Zimbabweans, but also in developing strong social interactions with the host society despite the majority of them having British ancestral links.¹⁵²

Elizabeth's experience in Cumbria highlighted the extent of the challenges posed by migrating with this strong Rhodesian or White African identity when attempting to establish social interactions with the host community in areas with a predominantly White British population. When she settled in the county in 2002, 98.4% of the county's population was identified as being White British.¹⁵³ It was this racial demography which Elizabeth identified as the trigger of her apparent isolation from the local society.

In a community dominated by the indigenous population she recalled how she would constantly be asked her country of origin since speaking English with an accent would not hide her Rhodesian identity. She interpreted the inquisitive question about her origins as a deliberate ploy of reminding her that she was a foreigner. Being married to a Briton failed to facilitate acceptance as equals with the indigenous community members. In the eyes of the majority of the local people her family would always be foreigners with restricted rights in accessing social benefits such as allocation of social housing. This became apparent when she was allocated a council house ahead of members of the local community who might have been on a waiting list before her. Although she did not experience violent abuse when

¹⁵¹ See Chapter Four.

¹⁵² Elizabeth, Interview, 6 November 2013.

¹⁵³ Office for National Statistics, *Census 2001 Key Statistics, Local Authorities in England and Wales*: Available at <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/census-2001-key-statistics/local-authorities-in-england-and-wales/index.html> (Accessed on 29 October 2014).

she moved into her council house, she still felt ostracised by her neighbours as there was no initiative to make her family feel welcome: 'not even a greeting on the street' she claimed.¹⁵⁴

She also narrated how both her fifteen year old daughter and twelve year old son felt bullied and ostracised by their schoolmates who would pretend not to understand their English accent. She described how her daughter would often be labelled 'a posh girl with an accent' for not wanting to be part of the teenage clubbing and drinking culture.¹⁵⁵ Without much social interaction, her daughter suffered depression for two years after completion of her GCSE exams in 2003; a situation which she believed was the source of temporarily strained relations between her daughter and the rest of the family. However, her youngest daughter who migrated when she was eight years old did not face similar problems. Elizabeth attributed this to her young age which enabled her to pick up the British accent much faster than her siblings thus enabling her to establish friendship networks. She believed developing friendship networks naturally facilitated her assimilation into the local community faster than her siblings.

Understanding the diaspora Coloured social interactions with the host society is also entrenched in fully grasping the dynamics of homeland racial relations developed in both the colonial and post-colonial eras. The older generation Zimbabwean Coloureds in Britain were second or third generation products of the colonial racial classification of the population who also migrated with a post-colonial history of marginalisation. Chapter two's discussion showed how marginalisation in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe had

¹⁵⁴ Elizabeth, Interview, 6 November 2013.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

created and consolidated the desire in subsequent generations to preserve Coloured consciousness by making choices that trivialised interaction with other communities. A majority of older members of the community had therefore migrated with no historical point of reference to justify the advantages of forging close ties with other races.

With pre-emigration cultural alignment to either Whites or Blacks best described as a metaphoric experience as there were no meaningful interactions to bring closer ties, a majority of the older generation migrated with no motivation of wanting to forge relations with the host society. This is the reason why Pamela described Zimbabwean Coloureds as continuing to create 'enclaves' in Milton Keynes, a town shown by 2001 and 2011 census statistics as becoming more multi-ethnic. In 2001, 13.2% of the town's population was identified as being ethnic minority communities, rising to 26.1% in the 2011 census.¹⁵⁶ Pamela's assertion indicates how memories of past relations with other ethnic groups had superseded the need to establish social interactions.¹⁵⁷

Despite the limited overall interaction with the host society, interracial partnering among the younger Coloured generation has been on the rise in Britain; a development acknowledged by Simon who is in a relationship with a White British and Esther whose son also crossed the racial divide. Pamela who had been married to a White British back in Zimbabwe admitted that Coloureds' alignment to Whites during the colonial era had been instrumental in the acceptance of interracial relations when it involved a White.¹⁵⁸ She singled out the colonial hierarchical classification of the population and placing of Coloured children in exclusive residential homes for facilitating the construction of attitudes of

¹⁵⁶ Milton Keynes Council, Available at <http://www.milton-keynes.gov.uk/your-council-and-elections/statistics/census> (Accessed on 29 October 2014).

¹⁵⁷ Pamela, Interview, 13 October 2013.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

viewing marrying a White person as a status symbol.¹⁵⁹ With interracial relations suppressed in Zimbabwe, the long term consequence of colonial policies was that a majority of older Coloureds would not object when their children crossed the racial boundaries to be in relationships with White British people.¹⁶⁰

Social integration of Asians, co-occupiers with Coloureds in the second category of colonial categorisation of the population, was a process that was also shaped by pre-emigration socialisation. Although the delayed exodus of Zimbabwean Asians could have been a deterrent to their economic integration, Kasim claimed the delayed arrival of Zimbabwean Asians had a positive impact in establishing social interactions with the host society.¹⁶¹ Unlike East African Asians who were forced to migrate during the first decade of their countries' independence, Zimbabwean Asians had the opportunity of living for over thirty years in an independent Zimbabwe before deciding to emigrate. It is this relatively long period of living in independent Zimbabwe which Kasim believed gave them enough time to dismantle remnants of colonial socialisation of seeing themselves as superior to Blacks. The result according to Kasim was the attainment of social skills on how to mix and actively participate with non-Asian individuals including those who do not share their religious beliefs.¹⁶²

Like other Zimbabweans, the most essential skill posed by Zimbabwean Asians to facilitate this positive interaction was their ability to speak English. Long historical associations with British traditions had allowed Zimbabwean Asians to fall into the category of Asian

¹⁵⁹ Simon, Interview. 17 September 2013.

¹⁶⁰ Pamela, Interview, 13 October 2013.

¹⁶¹ Kasim, Interview, 4 November 2013.

¹⁶² Ibid.

communities described by Mohan Luthra as 'secularised and westernised'.¹⁶³ As recipients of British inspired education in which they learned the English language, the Zimbabwean Asians did not have to undergo radical cultural adjustment to be able to interact with Britain's social or economic structures. Their historic association with British traditions was in contrast to those from the sub-continent whose majority was described by Rashmi Desai as having arrived in Britain speaking very little English and therefore needed severe adjustment in their knowledge of English if they were to socially or economically integrate.¹⁶⁴

Song's assertion that intermarriage fundamentally changes ethnic cultural distinctiveness has been a major reason why Zimbabwean Asians have been reluctant to engage or promote intermarriage.¹⁶⁵ Prior to migration, this was a community which had managed to preserve their cultural distinctiveness without practicing intermarriage. It was therefore expected that the need to preserve historical traditional values was cited by Zimbabwean Asian participants as the major reason why intermarriage has been discouraged in the diaspora. Twenty-two year old Kamal who is in a relationship with a British born non-Zimbabwean Asian admitted that the only intermarriage most Zimbabwean Asian parents can accept is within the Asian community; especially from those of the same caste or religion.¹⁶⁶ As a Muslim, his choice of a partner had been influenced by his religion.

Summary and Conclusion

¹⁶³ Mohan Luthra, *Britain's Black Population: Social Change, Public Policies and Agenda* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), pp. 21-22.

¹⁶⁴ Desai, *Indian Immigrants*, p.9.

¹⁶⁵ Miri Song, 'Is Intermarriage a Good Indicator of Integration?', pp. 331-348.

¹⁶⁶ Kamal, Interview, 4 November 2013.

This chapter has developed an argument showing how the dynamics in the construction of social or economic interactions by Zimbabwe's diaspora community failed to conceal community and individual identities which had been constructed in both the colonial and post-colonial eras. By focusing on education and employment, the chapter unravelled diverse economic integration processes between the different ethnic and racial groups. The diversity was a direct consequence of attitudes and prejudices developed during the colonial era which were not desensitised in independent Zimbabwe. Historical socialisation of elevating education attainment as a means of attaining middle class status has been influential in the economic integration of Black Zimbabweans as the majority of them pursued higher professional and educational qualifications more than any other Zimbabwean community.

The chapter unveiled the extent to which having confidence in White owned businesses by the participants were reflective of an African mind-set that had been subtly constructed during the colonial era and failed to be erased in independent Zimbabwe due to perceived economic mismanagement. With the status quo remaining after independence of perceiving Whites as having been better managers of the Zimbabwean economy in both the colonial and post-colonial eras, a majority of Blacks have migrated with a negative attitude towards Black owned business. The inevitable consequence of harbouring such pre-emigration perceptions was justification of why diaspora businesses owned by Black Zimbabweans should not expect support from Blacks. Without guaranteed support from their fellow Black Zimbabweans' entrepreneurial potential was naturally suppressed thus resulting in the failure to establish a vibrant and visible business community.

The chapter also showed how the economic integration of White Zimbabweans had been a complex process determined by variables emanating from colonial privileges engrained in the hierarchical classification of the population and the circumstances that led to their post-colonial emigration. With a history of privileges in both the colonial and post-colonial era a majority of older members of the community had migrated without having gone through experiences of appreciating the need for higher educational qualifications as a means of moving up the social ladder. Education was therefore not embraced by the majority of the older members as an indicator of their economic integration. Their economic integration was to a large extent focused on providing their children with an economically stable future they believed had been violently taken away from them by the Zimbabwean government's authorised farm invasions.

The failure to adopt economic integration processes that would have allowed Zimbabwean Asians to curve a visible presence in Britain was a result of three inter-related historical factors: their late arrival in Britain compared to other Asians; the uneven dispersal of the community across Britain; and professional qualifications attained prior to emigration. As late arrivals, it was inevitable that a majority of Zimbabwean Asians became resigned to the fact that they would find it difficult to resuscitate an affluent life they had been used to in Zimbabwe as business owners. This was because: they were reluctant to compete with the already established entrepreneurial Asians from East Africa and the sub-continent. The only exception of those who successfully integrated into Britain's economic structures were individuals who migrated with transferable skills such as teaching.

Economic and social integration of first generation Zimbabwean Coloured immigrants could not escape the influences of identities constructed during the colonial and post-colonial

phases of Zimbabwe's history. By having a history of placing education at the periphery of their lives, the diaspora community of older generation Coloureds has not been motivated to enrol for further education, a trend which is gradually changing in the younger generation. Older generation Coloureds' participation in Britain's economic structures had therefore been a varied and complex process determined by the level of professional or educational qualifications and the desire to be self-employed and preserve Coloured consciousness.

The ability by Zimbabweans to start their home based churches with a distinct style of worship has been identified by the chapter as an indicator of successful social integration in which British society demonstrated tolerance of immigrants imported cultures. The Zimbabwean home grown churches have firmly established themselves as part of the Christian community especially in cities like Leicester where there is a large concentration of Black Zimbabweans. The result has been the preservation of styles of worship which had become identifiable with Zimbabwean Black African churches since the 1920s.

With intermarriage becoming an accepted cultural phenomenon in Britain, patterns of intimacy between non-White Zimbabwean immigrants and White Britons would have been a 'litmus test' for social integration. However, given the fact that the first generation Black Zimbabwean immigrants who arrived in Britain had grown up in an environment in which imagined racial boundaries created by colonial classification of the population had not been fully dismantled, racial prejudices and social or cultural differences emerged to be significant barriers to intermarriage with natives. A correlation between imported cultural influences on marriages and parents' memories of racial prejudices among the Black and

Asian immigrants has also not instigated a significant rise in marriages between their children and White Britons.

By making a comparative analysis between the different ethnic and racial communities the chapter was able to affirm why Zimbabweans in the diaspora should not be regarded as a monolithic community. The diversity of the integration processes between the different ethnic or racial groups shows how the historical nurtured ideologies unique to each group has necessitated the need to look at multiple paradigms when exploring the integration of Zimbabweans. One important aspect which came out of the chapter was that the influence of historical socialisation on economic or social integration had allowed the Black community to experience more rapid upward and recognisable social mobility than other communities.

Conclusion

The colonial creation of a nation-state was an alien concept to Zimbabwe's pre-colonial African communities described by David Beach as having been divided by language dialects and loosely defined territories.¹ The colonial invention of a state modelled along Western socio-economic and political systems facilitated stimulation of ethnic particularism that would undermine the creation of a cohesive nation in both the colonial and post-colonial phases of Zimbabwe's history. Construction of relations and integration processes of Zimbabwean diaspora communities in Britain can therefore not be fully understood outside the context of the evolution of socio-economic structures developed under colonial rule as discussed by Smart Otu.²

With Graham Day pointing out how belonging to a community is encapsulated in consciousness of social boundaries, it would have been misleading for the thesis to have examined Zimbabwean diaspora communities as uniform, static or rigid.³ In recognition of the ethno-racial diversity of the Zimbabwean immigrants, the research adopted a comparative analysis of Blacks (Ndebele and Shona), Whites, Coloureds and Asians. As the respective diasporic Zimbabwean communities settled in Britain, consciousness of their minority status led to social reconstruction or reinforcement of their historically embedded sense of community identities and prejudices that had engendered a sense of belonging during the course of Zimbabwe's history. Consolidating these historic identities and prejudices affirmed Gerard Delanty's argument that legacies of the past are significant

¹ David Beach, *Zimbabwe Before 1900* (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1984), p. 5.

² Smart Otu, 'Class Struggle, Resistance and the Revolutionary Pressures of Crisis in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe', *Journal of Pan African Studies*, vol. 3 (2010), pp. 189-210.

³ Graham Day, *Community and Everyday Life* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), p.2.

components in producing and shaping collective or individual identities of diaspora communities.⁴

In unravelling the impact of historical influences on the Zimbabwean diaspora community, chapters three and four explored relations between the Zimbabwean communities and their interactions with Britain's socio-economic structures. Education, employment (formal and self-employment), intermarriage, religion and language were used to measure Zimbabweans' socio-economic integration. Focusing on these themes enabled the thesis to demonstrate that Zimbabweans in Britain are still a product of unresolved ethno-racial prejudices and identities that were constructed during the phases of Zimbabwe's history.

Whilst it is undeniable that colonial Zimbabwe was beset with a series of political and economic policies which constructed a racially divided community, the thesis also revealed a Black diaspora community imbued with historic communal tensions and prejudices. Although Zimbabwean scholars like Sabelo Gatsheni-Ndlovu recognised how the 1830s arrival of the Ndebele in Zimbabwe marked the beginning of tensions with the Shona,⁵ it was the arrival of Whites that would consolidate that ethnic particularism. The thesis established three developments linked to the arrival of Whites as being significant contributory factors to the consolidation of ethnic prejudices or particularism within the African community. These were: Christian missionary activities, 1890s colonisation process and creation of ethnic named regions.

Chapter two established how Christian missionary activities led to disparities in establishing mission schools between Mashonaland and Matabeleland thus allowing the Shona to have a

⁴ Gerard Delanty, *Community* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 158.

⁵ Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'Nation-Building in Zimbabwe and the Challenges of Ndebele Particularism,' *African Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol.8 (2008), pp. 27-56.

head-start in acquiring numeracy and literacy skills to integrate into the colonial economic systems. An environment had therefore been created to nurture Shona prejudices and arrogance. The colonial process that saw Mashonaland and not Matabeleland being colonised first was the second development that consolidated Ndebele prejudices of seeing themselves as being superior to the Shona. The colonial administration's creation of ethnic named boundaries was the third significant factor that legitimised ethnic distinctions within the African community. Awareness of ethnic differences would inevitably stifle future nation building initiatives within the Black Nationalist movement fighting the colonial autocratic socio-economic and political systems.

Upon attaining independence on 18 April 1980, the new Zimbabwe had therefore inherited a society not only polarised by racial prejudices, but also ethnic tensions and allegiances within the Black community that needed to be tactfully addressed in building a new nation-state. However, as evidenced in chapter two, the post-colonial government failed to invoke nation building initiatives to conceal the fractures of ethnicity within the Black community that could be traced back to the pre-colonial era. With ethno-nationalism continuing to dominate African politics, any initiatives to deal with historic ethnic tension were severely undermined with the outbreak of Gukurahundi in 1982. The government's response to the insurgence inflamed ethnic tensions as the Ndebele found themselves not only being marginalised, but also going through a period of indiscriminate and disproportionate persecution by the security forces.

Without pre-emigration sensitisation of how to deal with historic ethnic tensions there was no paradigm shift within the Black diaspora community to unite. Memories of atrocities committed by security forces on the Ndebele during the Gukurahundi period (which some

within the Shona community trivialised) became a major deterrence in uniting Black Zimbabwean immigrants. With the atrocities of Gukurahundi becoming an integral component of Ndebele history, ethnic particularism continued to be reinforced in Britain through restricted interaction with the Shona.

Migrating with the historical dominance of the Shona which some Ndebele feel was effectively used against them during Gukurahundi has not only comprised their attachment to Zimbabwe, but it has also made them feel vulnerable in an environment dominated by the Shona. Chapter three provided clear evidence of the reluctance by most Ndebele to participate in diaspora community events or Zimbabwean Associations in which the Shona dominate unless there were guaranteed proportional representation in the leadership. The Ndebele actions served to confirm how some members of the community emigrated with perceptions that they will always be threatened by the majority Shona community. With memories of Gukurahundi still embedded in the lives of the Ndebele, they continued to entertain the belief that a real sense of security or their interests could only be guaranteed when among fellow community members. This has been one of reasons why cities like Leicester experienced an influx of the Ndebele thus creating a community large enough to challenge the Shona dominance.

Apart from ethnicity, relations within the Black Zimbabwean immigrant community have also been immersed in suspicion, augmented by profound distrust and jealousy of each other. With a significant number of middle class Zimbabweans experiencing deskilling, the inherited prestige of social class had been replaced by immigration status in determining an individual's diaspora socio-economic status. Without immigration papers, Zimbabweans would be classified as part of the underclass even if they had attained pre-emigration

professional qualifications. It was therefore expected that Black Zimbabweans (whether deskilled or not) working illegally would not feel comfortable interacting with other Zimbabweans or seeking advice on immigration issues. They would prefer to stay at home whilst their immigration papers were being processed. This was because of the fear of being reported to immigration officials for working illegally. Only after they had regularised their immigration status would they feel comfortable to interact.

The source of the diaspora suspicions and mistrust within the Black community was entrenched in both the colonial and post-colonial phases of Zimbabwe's history. Regrettably, during the armed liberation struggle for independence, there were instances in which personal rivalries or jealousy would result in Blacks falsely labelling each other as collaborators with the colonial state. With death being the ultimate punishment of such accusations, there were a significant number of innocent victims, hence the mistrust. After independence, intolerance to political opposition that triggered an exodus of political asylum seekers at the turn of the new millennium further reinforced mistrust and suspicion. A significant number of first generation Black Zimbabweans had therefore migrated with memories of Black against Black acts of violence.

A holistic understanding of the debates surrounding the Black Zimbabwean diaspora community could not have been fully appreciated without a comparative analysis of the colonial and post-colonial immigrants. Despite emigration taking places in different periods, the construction of relations could not be immune from shared historic commonalities. Chapter three's examination of colonial and post-colonial Black immigrants revealed differences on how they constructed their identities. Whilst a majority of contemporary Black Zimbabwean immigrants arrived with experiences and memories which were devoid

of any nation building initiatives, shared colonial subjugation stimulated a consciousness of sameness that superseded any historic ethnic tensions within the majority of Blacks who arrived in the colonial era.

The determination to return to an independent Zimbabwe had forged a united identity in political activism to remove colonial injustices. This was because the Black students in the 1970s viewed themselves as victims of colonial racial policies and not political refugees or economic immigrants. Their diaspora political activism had emerged to be another front in the liberation struggle for independence. To ensure success their political activities were not characterised by ethnic affiliations. It was this unwavering attachment to Zimbabwe and political activism which did not condone any ethnic differences that distinguished the 1970s Black student community from contemporary Black Zimbabwean immigrants.

The colonial categorisation of the population created racial boundaries which to a large extent were maintained by an absence of intermarriage. The racial prejudices that hindered intermarriage had created a Black community that disregarded intermarriage as a status symbol. The failure at independence to desensitise Zimbabweans from colonial racial prejudices resulted in very little change to colonial attitudes on intermarriage. A majority of individuals from all the racial communities continued to be reluctant to cross the colour bar in marriage. Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain had therefore arrived in the country without having experienced significant inter-racial relations or marriages to motivate them to enter into relations with the indigenous population.

The thesis was also able to develop an argument showing how the dynamics in the economic integration of Zimbabweans had been a complex process determined by variables of historical memories or experiences. The advent of western education to complement the

colonial capitalist system that facilitated the exceptionally intelligent within the Black community to climb the social ladder had started the process of conditioning Black Africans to believe that educational attainment was not only a symbol of status, but also a viable route out of poverty. This inextricable link between education and meritocracy continued to be reinforced in post-colonial Zimbabwe under the principle of 'education for all' that was targeting the Black community. This was when measures were implemented to facilitate universal accessibility to educational opportunities. It was this historically nurtured inclination to pursue education which was to play a pivotal role in the economic integration of the contemporary Zimbabwean Black diaspora community in Britain. The utilisation of education facilitated the rapid movement up the social ladder of Blacks in comparison to other diaspora Zimbabwean communities.

Whilst, it is undeniable that communalism had naturally undermined cohesiveness or unity of Black diaspora Zimbabwean immigrants, the impact of colonial hierarchical categorisation of the population cannot be trivialised when seeking to understand the development of relations between the diaspora Zimbabwean communities. With the establishment of colonial racial boundaries that could not be transgressed, the racial hierarchical classification of the society in which Whites were placed at the pinnacle of the country's socio-economic structures triggered socialisation processes that could not conceal the development of racial prejudices that were to extend in independent Zimbabwe.

As evidenced in chapter two, Zimbabwean scholars Karen Alexander, David Hughes and James Muzondidya point out how a majority of Whites after independence continued to exhibit their racial prejudices in several ways. These included: continuing to segregate themselves from Blacks (especially residential segregation by not wanting to live in suburbs

that had been designated for Blacks during the colonial era); not wanting to economically empower Blacks, especially in farming; not making efforts to learn indigenous languages or live in areas that were once reserved for Blacks during the colonial era; and not attending national events like independence. It was this failure to dismantle racial prejudices by not positively engaging with nation building initiatives in post-colonial Zimbabwe that would emerge to be a hindrance in establishing inter-racial relationships in the diaspora.

After having gone through the trauma of nationalist guerrilla attacks during Zimbabwe's armed struggle from the late 1960s to the late 1970s and the violent eviction from their farms at the turn of the new millennium, a majority of older generation Whites emigrated with perceptions that a majority of Black Zimbabweans especially within the nationalist movement had never accepted White Zimbabweans as citizens of Zimbabwe. It was therefore an accepted outcome for a majority of older generation Whites, especially those with a farming background, not to forge diaspora associations with Blacks. Memories of colonial historical experiences and the violent nature of post-colonial emigration had instead been instrumental in developing a strong support network within the White diaspora community.

Migrating with this shared ethos of wanting to support each other had been an essential catalyst that led to the establishment of support networks with roles of assisting struggling community members in Britain and pensioners in Zimbabwe. The support ethos of the White community was a distinct identity marker that differentiated them from the Black community. Whilst historical experiences had created a mind-set of unity within the White community, in Blacks it had reinforced a mind-set of suspicion and mistrust of each other.

The colonial transformation of the Zimbabwean White community which resulted in the creation of a Rhodesian identity had been instrumental in determining social integration of White Zimbabweans in the diaspora. The establishment of a Rhodesian identity was a natural process for a community in which its pioneers were not a monolithic group made up of individuals with the same ancestry. The construction of a Rhodesian identity to repel any external or internal threats would not have been possible without the development of a sense of nationalism within the White community. Support of Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence which ultimately delayed Zimbabwe's independence showed the extent to which nurturing a sense of nationalism had strengthened the determination to make Zimbabwe a White man's country with a permanent White population.

It was this historically nurtured sense of a collective identity embedded in the belief that they are a nation which established itself as a major hindrance to how the Zimbabwean Whites construct interactions with other communities. The exclusive nature of events like 'July Braai' advertised as a Rhodesian event with use of Rhodesian symbols such as the Rhodesian flag and Coat of Arms have demonstrated how the first generation members of the White community had imported the Rhodesian national identity. The Rhodesian identity had therefore not only been a hindrance to the establishment of cordial relations with non-White Zimbabweans, but also the development of strong social interactions with the host society despite the majority of them having British ancestral links.

Pursuit or upgrading of educational or professional qualifications that had become a necessity for a majority of Blacks was not reciprocated by a majority of older generation Whites. Instead, their integration was driven by the consciousness that the violent circumstances surrounding their emigration had made their children innocent victims. With

a majority of them over forty-five years of age and experiencing financial challenges when they first arrived, they perceived as 'selfish' and 'foolish' the pursuit of personal gains of academic attainment at the expense of providing the best quality of life for their children who had been robbed of a financially stable future.

A majority of older Whites had also migrated without having experienced social or economic marginalisation that would have encouraged them to attain higher educational qualifications as a means of moving up the social hierarchy. By virtue of having occupied the pinnacle of Zimbabwe's socio-economic structures both in the colonial and post-colonial eras, they had been able to move up the economic structures without having to put much emphasis on higher academic or professional qualifications' attainment.

Zimbabwean Coloured's interactions with other Zimbabwean communities in Britain had been a consequence of Coloured consciousness stimulated during the colonial era and reinforced by the Lancaster House Constitution negotiations which facilitated Zimbabwe's independence. Without official representation of either Coloureds or Asians, the Lancaster House negotiations had unwittingly endorsed the bi-polarisation of Zimbabwe's multicultural society. Whilst the colonial era had clearly demarcated population categories in which Coloureds were co-occupants with Asians of the intermediate category, the absence of a conduit to unite all Zimbabweans placed the Coloureds in a vulnerable position. The older generation of Coloureds therefore emigrated with no motivation or reason to interact with other Zimbabweans as they had been made to feel invisible in the realms of Zimbabwe's economic and social structures. Instead, they established exclusive diaspora support networks to assist new Coloured arrivals.

The diaspora Coloured community (just as it was in Zimbabwe) continued to demonstrate their disdain of the Black community (driven by attitudes of superiority) by not encouraging inter-marriage with those from the Black community; and also by resisting being described as 'Blacks'. Although it is undeniable that Coloured consciousness contributed to strong resistance to marry Blacks, chapter two also established how colonial residential foster homes in which Coloureds were being conditioned to align with Whites by adopting English names and being required to speak in English led to an acceptance of relationships between Coloureds and Whites. However, despite the conditioned alignment to Whites, imported memories of historical racial prejudices have stifled intermarriage between Coloureds and White Zimbabweans.

Experiences of sustained marginalisation in both the colonial and post-colonial period created and consolidated the desire in subsequent generations to preserve Coloured consciousness and to have control over their own destiny by making choices which trivialised self-development through education. There was therefore general contentedness within the community to deal with their marginalisation by acquiring technical skills as electricians, motor mechanics or plumbers which would allow them to be self-employed tradesmen. With the advent of independence failing to eradicate attitudes of trivialising education following the government's inability to correct racial inequalities in education by providing more schools and training opportunities to the Coloured community, a significant number of Coloureds migrated with no history of having been motivated to excel academically. As a result, it was an expected outcome that very few older generation Coloured immigrants adopted integration processes which would involve pursuit of better educational or professional qualifications.

Zimbabwean Asians migrated from an environment in which their group cultural mindedness had denied them the opportunity to develop collective will-power necessary to interact with other Zimbabweans. Adhesive identity features in the development of group mindedness were historic cultural commonalities not shared by non-Asian Zimbabweans. These included caste, religion, language and historic family ties which allowed them to carve community enclaves with limited interaction with other communities outside business activities.

By not having shared historical or cultural commonalities with non-Asians, the Zimbabwean Asian immigrants arrived in Britain as a community which had managed to safeguard themselves from cultural contamination. It was therefore a natural response that Zimbabwean Asians' diaspora interactions were determined by shared commonalities with other South Asian communities already settled in Britain. The ultimate consequence has been assimilation into Asian communities with the same cultural, language, caste or religious identity markers; a process which has made the Zimbabwean Asian community virtually invisible. As a small community of late arrivals spread across Britain, Zimbabwean Asians' invisibility was also exacerbated by their failure to resuscitate their business identity.

Whilst historical memories that had been constructed in Zimbabwe were instrumental in the economic integration of Black, Whites and Coloureds, the same could not be said about Asians. Britain's historical post-war migration trends have instead influenced the economic integration patterns of Asians. Contemporary Zimbabwean Asians' migration to Britain had been preceded by post-war Asian immigration from the subcontinent and East Africa from the 1950s. As a result, they could not resuscitate their business identity because they

perceived it a futile attempt to compete with established Asian businesses with no guarantees of support.

In conclusion, whilst it is undeniable that racial and ethnic prejudices developed during Zimbabwe's history led to the construction of separate insular communities which rarely interacted, the contribution of post-colonial events cannot be omitted when examining why Zimbabweans migrated with no unifying national identity. Although a majority of Zimbabwean immigrants in Britain are still comfortable to introduce themselves to new acquaintances as Zimbabweans, their identity with Zimbabwe is mainly based on cherished environmental memories of their homeland. These include physical features (climate and tourist attractions) and social features (food, drinks and family connections).

However, memories of post-colonial political tragedies and the collapse of socio-economic structures (which forced a majority to emigrate) have made a significant number of Zimbabweans in the diaspora become ashamed of association with a contemporary brand of Zimbabwe under Mugabe's leadership. For most Zimbabwean immigrants, the image of Zimbabwe has been tainted and soiled by corruption, farm invasions, undemocratic tendencies manifested in the violent suppression of political opposition, infrastructure collapse and economic disaster. With such an image, Zimbabweans in the diaspora have found no reason to organise or celebrate national events such as Independence or Heroes Day.

The socio-economic identities of the Zimbabwean diaspora community have been a product of multifaceted but inter-connected processes of: ethnic divisions (which can be traced back to pre-colonial); divisive and racist policies of the colonial times; ethnic identities within the nationalist movement; and the post-colonial government's failure in nation building in

which historic racial and ethnic diversity and tensions would be managed. Migrating without experiencing state-building initiatives has naturally created a fragmented Zimbabwean community that is recognisable along ethnic or racial lines.

With historic identities continuing to be an integral part of their lives, the Zimbabwean diaspora community exists as an imagined nation that still needs to conquer the effects of imported ethnic and racial differences and tensions that have characterised Zimbabwe's two historical interludes: colonial and post-colonial. Diasporic national identity as a collective sentiment based upon what Montserrat Guibernau describe as a 'collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation' has failed to resonate with Zimbabweans in Britain.⁶ Migrating with no common history, kinship, language or national has meant that a unified Zimbabwean immigrant community has failed to emerge.

Zimbabwean contemporary immigrants arrived with identities, prejudices and memories which were devoid of any nation building. Migrating without experiencing coherent and inclusive political initiatives allowed the thesis to demonstrate how the construction of Zimbabwean diaspora communities cannot only be understood as contemporary outcomes of colonialism, but also as consequences of tragic failures by post-colonial governments to construct a radical nation building agenda. With Jan Penrose describing a nation as a social construction with common tangible characteristics such as language, cultural practices or religion,⁷ the Zimbabwean diaspora community demarcated by ethnic and racial differences provided an illustration of social dissolution embedded in the post-colonial failure to create a national identity. Instead, historical experiences and memories emerged to be frameworks

⁶ Montserrat Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 11.

⁷ Jan Penrose, 'Reification in the Name of Change: The Impact of Nationalism on Social Constructions of Nation, People and Place in Scotland and the United Kingdom', in Peter Jackson and Jan Penrose (eds), *Constructions of Race, Place and Nation* (London: UCL Press, 1993), pp. 28-30.

undermining the development of feelings of wanting to establish a united diaspora community. As the thesis has shown, the only unifying consciousness of being part of a Zimbabwean diaspora community was encapsulated in the sharing of territorial boundaries of the country of origin.

Migrating without a collective national identity gave respective communities a leeway to use historic memories to interpret what it means to be Zimbabwean. In the absence of shared historic experiences, the Zimbabweans in the diaspora have emerged to be a community which fits well with what Benedict Anderson describes as an 'imagined community.'⁸ It is imagined because in the absence of shared historic cultural, economic or political experiences most members have never made an effort to interact with other Zimbabweans of different race or ethnicity despite knowing of their existence. Awareness of their presence has allowed them to develop an image of communion in their minds which has failed to evolve into practical interactions as a community of Zimbabweans living in Britain.

⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).

Appendices

Appendix 1: Interview Questions

Migration and Settlement

1. When and why did you migrate to Britain?
2. Where did you first settle e.g. city?
3. Why choose the place as your initial settlement/destination?
4. What made you move from your initial place of settlement?
5. Describe your socio-economic experiences when you first settled?
6. Was/Is there a recognisable Zimbabwean community where you first settled? If not did you make any effort of finding other Zimbabweans?
7. Was Britain your first choice migration destination?
8. Did you/Do you have plans of settling in Britain permanently? (Why?)
9. What made you want to settle permanently in Britain?

Historical (Colonial and Post-Colonial Zimbabwe)

10. To what extent did the colonial period undermine African culture as of pagan origins, and somehow deficient and unable to progress? How did this help in constructing a colonial community identity based on racial, tribal or regional prejudices?
11. Did/Is the Zimbabwean Nationalist Movement do/doing enough to restore Zimbabwean traditional pride and dignity which could have been undermined during colonial rule?
12. To what extent did post-colonial Zimbabwean government implement socio-economic and political policies to
 - a. Remove or overcome socio-economic barriers/prejudices placed by the colonial regime
 - b. Reinforce prejudices of the colonial period

- c. Forge a united Zimbabwean nation (not a Zimbabwean community constructed on racial, tribal, class, regionalism basis)
13. How best can you describe the Zimbabwean community in colonial Zimbabwe:
- a. United
 - b. Fragmented
14. How best can you describe the Zimbabwean community in post-colonial Zimbabwe
- a. United
 - b. Fragmented
15. How effective were tribalism, racism, political affiliations and regionalism in creating a Zimbabwean community (you described in questions 13 and 14) during
- a. Colonial period
 - b. Post-colonial period
16. Back home where you a member of a political or social organisation?
17. Describe the ethnic or social class composition of the group members (described in question 16).

Diaspora Interactions

18. Within the Zimbabwean UK community do you have any close associations with those of different racial, tribal, cultural, religious etc. background from you? (Why?)
19. To what extent do the following factors influence the construction of visible and united Zimbabwean community in the Diaspora:
- a. Colonial governance
 - b. Post-colonial governance
 - c. Colonial and post-colonial inherited economic and social status

- d. Political associations
 - e. Religious affiliations
 - f. Immigration status (Asylum seekers V Non-Asylum seekers)
 - g. Transnational associations (Religious and political)
20. Do Zimbabweans' personal/community associations (both in Zimbabwe and in the Diaspora) cut across tribal, regional, racial etc. differences?
21. Have you ever attended or invited to any Zimbabwean community event?
22. Are there any Zimbabwean organised events in your area of residence?
23. What are your views on inter-marriage vis-à-vis community identity?
24. Are you a member of a Zimbabwean political, religious, social club etc. organisation?
(If not, Why?)
25. Are you actively involved in activities which bring you closer to other Zimbabweans in your community?
26. In comparison to multi-ethnic /tribal African communities in the Diaspora (e.g. Zambians) do you think the Zimbabwean community is united?

Transnational Links

27. Do you maintain contact with home country? (How and Why?)
28. In what ways are Zimbabweans continuing to keep contact with home?
29. Do you feel trapped in the UK? (Why)
30. Do you see yourself relocating back to Zimbabwe? (Why)

Diaspora Identity

31. If you were describing yourself to a new acquaintance, would you describe yourself as Zimbabwean/British/Both (e.g. British-Zimbabwean)/ethnicity first and then Zimbabwean?
32. How often do you wear or do something which is meant to show a connection with Zimbabwe?
33. How often and to whom do you speak in your native language?
34. Which socio-economic sector(s) are Zimbabweans in the Diaspora more visible or active in?
35. How do you see the Zimbabwean community 20 years from?
36. Identify cultural norms, racial prejudices or tribal prejudices/conflicts which were imported by Zimbabweans when they migrated (thus hindering the construction of a visible and united Zimbabwean Diaspora community).
37. Describe Zimbabwean immigrants who migrated before Independence and in the early 1980s.
38. Identify differences, if any, between the colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwean immigrants.
39. How do you maintain your ethnicity/cultural norms?
40. Do you see any inter-generational cultural conflict within the Zimbabwean community?

Appendix 2

Youth Questionnaire: What makes you Zimbabwean?

1. Gender
Male ☐ Female ☐
2. Age
_____ years
3. Were you born in the UK?
Yes ☐ No ☐
4. If answer to Q3 is No; when did you migrate to the UK?

5. Where do you live during holiday time?
6. Is there a visible Zimbabwean community where you live during holiday time?
Yes ☐ No ☐ I don't Know ☐
7. When was the last time you visited Zimbabwe?

8. How many times have visited Zimbabwe since you migrated?

9. How do you describe yourself to a new acquaintance?
Zimbabwean ☐ British ☐ Zimbabwean born British ☐
British-Zimbabwean ☐
10. What is the main language of communication at home?
Shona ☐ Ndebele ☐ English ☐
Mixture Ndebele/Shona with English ☐ Other (Specify) _____
11. Describe your fluency in either Ndebele or Shona?
Excellent ☐ Good ☐ Average ☐ Poor ☐
12. Can you speak both Ndebele and Shona?
Yes ☐ No ☐ Slightly ☐
13. Do you see yourself relocating back to Zimbabwe?
Yes ☐ No ☐ Maybe ☐ I Don't Know ☐

14. Can you sing the Zimbabwean national anthem?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Slightly ☐

15. Can you sing the British national anthem?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Slightly ☐

16. Do you know the meaning of the Zimbabwean flag colours?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Slightly ☐

17. Are you aware of pre-colonial and colonial Zimbabwean history?

Yes ☐ No ☐

18. Are you aware of post-colonial Zimbabwean history?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Slightly ☐

19. Do you know major Zimbabwean national dates such as Independence Day, Heroes and Defence Forces day?

Yes ☐ No ☐

20. Are you a member of any Zimbabwean organisation?

Yes ☐ No ☐

21. Do you have any close associations with those of different racial, tribal, cultural or religious or background from you?

Yes ☐ No ☐

Interviews

Blacks (Shona)

- | | | |
|--------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| • David | 13 January 2013 | Stevenage and Leicester |
| • Edison | 17 January 2013 | London |
| • Zivanayi | 17 January 2013 | Essex |
| • Happison | 23 January 2013 | Derby |
| • Jacob | 23 January 2013 | Derby |
| • Mathew | 3 February 2013 | Leicester |
| • Collins | 6 February 2013 | Leicester |
| • Israel | 10 March 2013 | Kent |
| • *Junior | 3 March 2013 | Northampton |
| • *Solomon | 3 March 2013 | Birmingham |
| • *Marvelous | 3 March 2013 | Nottingham |
| • *Kuda | 3 March 2013 | Chesterfield |
| • Sharai | 14 March 2013 | Leicester |
| • Taku | 21 March 2013 | Surrey |
| • Panganayi | 24 March 2013 | Reading |
| • John | 24 March 2013 | Slough |
| • Kudzi | 1 April 2013 | Bradford |
| • Tarisai | 2 April 2013 | Derby |
| • Nyasha | 8 April 2013 | Leicester |

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- Timothy 10 May 2013 Leicester
- Paurosi 2 July 2013 Zimbabwe
- Gutu 24 July 2013 Zimbabwe
- Lenny 28 July 2013 Zimbabwe
- Mary 13 October 2013 Cambridge
- Memory 27 November 2013 Leicester

*Leicester Students Interviewed as a group.

Blacks (Ndebele)

- Jonah 28 February 2013 Leicester
- Jabulani 18 February 2013 Leicester
- Zanele 2 March 2013 Leicester
- *Nqobile 3 March 2013 Leicester
- Ralph 13 May 2013 Leicester
- Mabuza 9 May 2013 Leicester
- Linda 1 September 2013 Leicester
- Daniel 10 November 2013 Leicester
- Themba 17 November 2013 Leicester
- Sibo 19 April 2015 Liverpool and Leicester
- Irene 28 April 2015 Leicester
- *Leicester based Ndebele student who participated in a group interview.

Mixed (Shona-Ndebele)

- | | | |
|-----------|-----------------|--------------|
| • Natalie | 18 October 2014 | High Wycombe |
| • Brenda | 23 October 2014 | Luton |

Whites

- | | | |
|-------------|------------------|---------------|
| • Ray | 17 January 2013 | London |
| • Elizabeth | 6 November 2013 | Cumbria |
| • Robert | 13 November 2013 | Milton Keynes |
| • Terry | 14 November 2013 | Cumbria |
| • Alison | 15 November 2013 | London |
| • Jessica | 26 November 2013 | Lincoln |
| • Gareth | 28 November 2013 | Surrey |
| • Kenneth | 9 January 2014 | London |

Coloureds

- | | | |
|-----------|-------------------|-------------|
| • Ellen | 7 March 2013 | Cardiff |
| • Esther | 10 June 2013 | Leicester |
| • Anita | 26 July 2013 | Zimbabwe |
| • Simon | 17 September 2013 | London |
| • Pamela | 13 October 2013 | Cambridge |
| • Hughes | 4 November 2013 | Essex |
| • Patrick | 20 January 2015 | Northampton |

Asians

- Abdi 17 June 2013 Leicester
- Bella 1 August 2013 Zimbabwe
- Bhavesh 1 September 2013 Leicester
- Kasim 4 November 2013 Leicester
- Kamal 4 November 2013 Leicester

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The Telegraph

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